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INTRODUCTION 
The 1968 science fiction novel, Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep?, chronicles the actions of bounty hunter Rick Deckard as he 
tracks down six escaped androids who are visually and physically 
indistinguishable from normal humans but lack empathy.1 To determine 
if a suspect is an android, Deckard needs to use a device called a 
Voight-Kampff testing apparatus to gauge a test subject’s emotions by 
analyzing eye-muscle and capillary reactions to statements designed to 
trigger emotional responses.2 An issue in the novel is whether the 
Voight-Kampff testing apparatus can distinguish representatives of the 
newest and most advanced (i.e., most human-like) model of android3 
from humans, or whether Deckard (and other bounty hunters) will have 
to develop a new and improved tool to do so.4 
Today, federal regulators are faced with a very different and yet in 
some ways similar task: monitoring the actions of artificially-intelligent 
algorithmic trading robots—frequently referred to as “algo bots”—in a 
continuous effort to combat price manipulation and disruptive trading 
practices in the markets for futures contracts,5 commodity options,6 and 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See generally PHILIP K. DICK, DO ANDROIDS DREAM OF ELECTRIC SHEEP? (First 
Ballantine Books Trade Paperback ed. 1996) (1968). The 1982 film, Blade Runner, was loosely 
based on this novel. See Blade Runner: Full Cast & Crew, IMDB, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083658/fullcredits (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (listing writing 
credits).  
 2. See DICK, supra note 1, at 48. For example, drawing from the novel, a statement might 
be: “You have a little boy and he shows you his butterfly collection, including his killing jar,” 
and an answer might consist of, “I’d take him to the doctor.” Id. at 49. 
 3. See id. at 30 (describing the “Nexus-6”—the newest and most advanced model of 
android). 
 4. See id. at 38–39, 56–57 (referring to, inter alia, advances in android technology that 
previously had made three earlier android testing methods obsolete, though new, effective 
methods were quickly developed each time).  
 5. A futures contract is  
[a]n agreement to purchase or sell a commodity for delivery in the future: (1) at 
a price that is determined at initiation of the contract; (2) that obligates each 
party to the contract to fulfill the contract at the specified price; (3) that is used 
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other derivatives.7 Both Deckard the bounty hunter and the financial 
regulator for the futures and derivatives markets—the U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)8—must face off against the most 
technologically advanced thinking machines of their day. As with 
Deckard’s analysis of the suspected androids, determining the mental 
state of suspects is critical to the CFTC’s success because many civil 
enforcement causes of action require proof of a culpable mental state, 
such as scienter9 or specific intent.10  
For the CFTC, the existence of computer software programs that 
independently (i.e., on their own without specific human direction) 
place trades in futures contracts is not science fiction.11 Electronic 
computer systems have largely replaced the human floor brokers and 
traders who once shouted out bids and offers in the physical trading pits 
of futures exchanges.12 Now, almost all parts of the financial markets, 
                                                                                                                     
to assume or shift price risk; and (4) that may be satisfied by delivery or offset. 
CFTC Glossary, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/
ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/index.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) 
(defining “futures contract”). 
 6. An option is “[a] contract that gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy 
or sell a specified quantity of a commodity or other instrument at a specific price within a 
specified period of time, regardless of the market price of that instrument.” Id. (defining 
“option”). A commodity option is “an option on a commodity or futures contract.” Id. (defining 
“commodity option”).  
 7. “Derivatives are broadly defined as financial instruments whose value is derived from 
other variables (referred to as ‘reference assets’ or ‘underliers’).” Kelly S. Kibbie, Dancing with 
the Derivatives Devil: Mutual Funds’ Dangerous Liaison with Complex Investment Contracts 
and the Forgotten Lessons of 1940, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 195, 196 n.1 (2013). 
 8. The CFTC is the equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), but 
regulates the markets for futures, options on futures, commodity options, swaps, and certain 
other derivatives. See 2 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES 
REGULATION § 4.03, at 959 (2004). 
 9. See infra Section II.A. 
 10. See infra Subsection II.B.5. Deckard, on the other hand, had to determine if a suspect 
lacked proper emotional responses, a fact that marked one as an android. See, e.g., DICK, supra 
note 1, at 49 (“The gauges remained inert, and he said to himself, An android response.”). 
 11. See Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,573 app. 2 (Sept. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
ch. 1) (providing the statement of then CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler in support of new CFTC 
regulations regarding various forms of electronic and high frequency trading). 
 12. See Hearing on High Frequency and Automated Trading in Futures Markets Before 
the S. Comm. of Agric., Nutrition & Forestry, 113th Cong. (2014), available at http://www.ag. 
senate.gov/hearings/high-frequency-and-automated-trading-in-futures-markets (providing the 
written testimony of Andrei Kirilenko, professor of the practice of finance at the Sloan School 
of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and former chief economist for the 
CFTC); id. (“Today, trading floors have been replaced by server farms, prescribed gestures have 
been replaced by message protocols, and automated trading is not visible to the human eye. The 
traders themselves have been replaced by anonymous algorithms that often operate with little or 
no oversight.”); SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: HIGH-SPEED TRADERS, AI BANDITS, AND THE 
3
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including the markets for futures and other derivatives, are 
computerized and automated to some extent, from the exchanges to the 
traders.13 
Consider, for example, Dagger. Dagger is not a villain in a science 
fiction novel or film; it is Citigroup’s automated trading system 
(ATS)14:  
Bred and trained in secret by Citi’s financial engineers, 
Dagger can stalk through more than 20 markets, public and 
otherwise—hunting anomalies, buying and selling, 
prowling through mountains of historical data—all at the 
behest of Citi’s clients. . . . Dagger fulfills its duties in 
flickering silence, with a speed and acuity no human can 
match.  
 
“It’s self-learning,” [Citi’s global head of algorithmic 
products] says. “The numbers keep updating, the strategy 
keeps adjusting itself. It gets smarter.”15 
And Dagger is not alone; there are many more of its kind at banks, 
hedge funds, and independent proprietary-trading16 firms.17 More 
                                                                                                                     
THREAT TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 273 (2012) (quoting U.S. Senator Ted Kaufman, 
who said, “We basically went from a market that was a floor-based market to a market that was 
digitalized and decimalized. . . . People came into the market and began to develop these high-
speed computers. Human beings were no longer doing the trading, computers were. They 
developed these algorithms. It ran automatically.”). See generally Jerry W. Markham & Daniel 
J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of 
ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865 (2008) (concluding that technological advances are making trading 
floors obsolete). 
 13. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,542 (“U.S. derivatives markets have experienced a 
fundamental transition from human-centered trading venues to highly automated and 
interconnected trading environments. The operational centers of modern markets now reside in a 
combination of automated trading systems (‘ATSs’) and electronic trading platforms that can 
execute repetitive tasks at speed orders of magnitude greater than any human equivalent.”).  
 14. See Timothy Lavin, Monsters in the Market, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2010, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/monsters-in-the-market/308122/ (calling 
Dagger “a canny and powerful beast”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Propriety trading occurs “[w]hen a firm trades for direct gain instead of commission 
dollars. Essentially, the firm has decided to profit from the market rather than from commissions 
from processing trades.” Proprietary Trading, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ter 
ms/p/proprietarytrading.asp (last visited Dec. 14, 2014); see also Lynne Marek, Quick-Buck 
Traders Get a Spokesman: Meet Keith Ross, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (May 5, 2014), 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140503/ISSUE01/305039968/quick-buck-traders-
get-a-spokesman-meet-keith-ross (“Trading only for their owners’ benefit and not outside 
customers, many of the Chicago proprietary trading firms, known as prop shops, started as small 
partnerships, but a handful, including Getco, grew into major firms with hundreds of people on 
4
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importantly, ATSs are not restricted to securities markets; they also 
operate in the futures and derivatives markets.18  
ATSs generally trade based on instructions from computer 
algorithms,19 often referred to as “algos.”20 An algorithm is “a step-by-
step procedure for solving a problem or accomplishing some end 
especially by a computer.”21 But “[t]his rudimentary definition of 
                                                                                                                     
their payrolls. They all use automated algorithms to trade stocks, options, futures and bonds in 
split seconds, but some also place and cancel gobs of orders in high-frequency strategies.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Katherine Heires, Algo Arms Race Has a Leader—For Now, SEC. INDUS. 
NEWS, Dec. 18, 2006, at 1 (“[Financial] firms are constantly on the hunt for the next big 
algorithmic innovation, paying top dollar for relevant quantitative and programming skills and 
brandishing offerings with appropriately combative labels such as Guerrilla and Sniper (Credit 
Suisse), Ambush and Razor (Banc of America Securities), Cobra and Nighthawk (Instinet) and 
Dagger (Citigroup).”); Pierre Paulden, Daggers, Dark Pools and Disintermediation, 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/132506 
0/Search/TRADING-Daggers-Dark-Pools-and-Disintermediation.html (“Big brokerage houses 
like Citigroup and Merrill Lynch & Co.—some of which were openly hostile to electronic 
trading just a few years ago—are now fighting an all-out arms race to offer the most 
sophisticated algorithms, often giving them militaristic names like Credit Suisse’s Sniper and 
Citi’s Dagger.”). 
 18. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,545 (“An established body of data indicates the importance of 
electronic and algorithmic trading in U.S. futures markets.”). For example, “[b]y the end of the 
first quarter of 2010, ATSs accounted for over 50% of trading volume in a number of significant 
product categories at CME Group, Inc.’s [designated contract markets].” Id.; see RISHI K. 
NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT QUANTITATIVE TRADING 5 (2009) 
(“The large presence of quants is not limited to equities. In futures and foreign exchange 
markets, the domain of commodity trading advisors (CTAs), there is a significant presence of 
quants. . . . [One estimate is that] 85 percent of assets under management among all CTAs are 
managed by quantitative trading firms.”); see also MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS 268–69 (2014) 
(describing individuals’ efforts to construct extremely fast connections between the futures 
markets in Chicago and the stock market facilities in New Jersey for HFT firms seeking to take 
advantage of arbitrage opportunities from temporary price discrepancies). Indeed, some of the 
founders of well-known HFT firms started out trading on the floor of commodity futures 
exchanges. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 188–91. 
 19. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,542 (“[A]utomated trading environments are characterized 
precisely by their high degree of automation, and by the wide array of algorithmic and 
information technology systems that generate, risk manage, transmit, and match orders and 
trades, as well as systems used to confirm transactions, communicate market data and link 
related systems through high-speed communications networks.”). 
 20. Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds, N.Y. TIMES (July 
23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/business/24trading.html. 
 21. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 28 (10th ed. 1993); see also 
CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: HOW ALGORITHMS CAME TO RULE OUR WORLD 5 
(2012) (“The classical definition of an algorithm says the device is a list of instructions that 
leads its user to a particular answer or output based on the information at hand. One could, for 
instance, write an algorithm for determining what jacket to wear to work in the morning. Inputs: 
temperature, presence of rain, presence of snow, wind speed, distance and pace you plan to 
walk, sun or cloud cover.”); id. at 25 (“[A]lgorithms can be looked at as giant decision trees 
5
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algorithms . . . gives little justice to the colossal webs they have become 
thanks to computers.”22 Nowadays, ATSs are effectively robots: they 
use “multiple linked algorithms” that have “thousands of inputs, factors, 
and functions” and are “dynamic” and “capable of self-improvement.”23  
One form of automated trading is high-frequency trading (HFT),24 
which, generally speaking, involves using computers and computer 
programs to automatically send and cancel orders for trades at speeds 
faster than humans can think or react.25 High-speed ATSs can “read” 
                                                                                                                     
composed of one binary decision after another.”); id. at 54 (“At its core, an algorithm is a set of 
instructions to be carried out perfunctorily to achieve an ideal result. Information goes into a 
given algorithm, answers come out.”). 
 22. STEINER, supra note 21, at 6. 
 23. Id.; see also Heires, supra note 17 (discussing “‘adaptive algorithms’ with built-in 
intelligence that emulate human reactions to market changes”). “As Ian Bogost wrote in his 
book Alien Phenomenology, we don’t have to go to other planets to find aliens. They live among 
us as algorithms.” Dan Saffer, Why We Need to Tame Our Algorithms Like Dogs, WIRED (June 
20, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/06/algorithms-humans-bffs (comparing the 
evolution of some wild wolves into human companions—that is, dogs—with the possible future 
evolution of algorithms and of the relationship between humans and algorithms). 
 24. Philip Stafford, Computer Errors: Mishaps Prompt Greater Scrutiny of High Speed 
Traders, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012, 7:53 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f8c3eb58-0e21-
11e2-8b92-00144feabdc0.html (registration required for access) (“Typically conducted by 
investors trading their own capital, [HFT] transactions rely on superfast computers, and 
algorithms and automation to hold positions in assets for fractions of seconds.”). The CFTC’s 
Technology Advisory Committee (TAC) “received a definition of HFT from its working group 
panel of experts” that listed “[t]he attributes of HFT” as including: 
(a) Algorithms for decision making, order initiation, generation, routing, or 
execution, for each individual transaction without human direction;  
(b) low-latency technology that is designed to minimize response times, 
including proximity and co-location services; 
(c) high speed connections to markets for order entry; and  
(d) recurring high message rates (orders, quotes or cancellations) determined 
using one or more objective forms of measurement, including (i) cancel-to-fill 
ratios; (ii) participant-to-market message ratios; or (iii) participant-to-market 
trade volume ratios. 
Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,545. 
 25. “According to one study, it takes a human being between 400 and 500 milliseconds to 
recognize and respond to a visual stimulus—let alone make a complicated financial investment 
decision.” Eamon Javers, How High-Speed Trading Is About to Get Speedier, CNBC (Apr. 10, 
2013, 1:08 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100631346. “The fastest firms can now execute a 
trade in under 10 microseconds. It takes 350,000 microseconds just to blink your eye.” Matthew 
Philips, How High-Speed Traders Outraced the Profits, BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 16, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-10-16/how-high-speed-traders-outraced-the-profits. 
“Definitions differ, but at its most basic, high-frequency trading implies speed: Using 
supercomputers, firms make trades in a matter of microseconds, or one-millionth of a second.” 
6
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news reports and information on the Internet in fractions of a second 
and then use that information for trading purposes.26 The move to 
computerized, automated trading environments went hand-in-hand with 
the arrival of computer and math whizzes27—commonly called “quants” 
or “quant traders,” short for quantitative analysts or traders28—to the 
world of finance.29 With the influx of quants, some of whom had 
experience working on software programs grounded in artificial 
                                                                                                                     
Scott Patterson & Geoffrey Rogow, What’s Behind High-Frequency Trading, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
1, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124908601669298293.html (subscription 
required); see also PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 206 (“In the early 2000s, it was a matter of 
milliseconds, or thousandths of a second—two hundred times the average speed of human 
thought. By the end of the decade, high-speed firms would be measuring executions in 
microseconds, or one-millionth of a second. There was talk of trading in nanoseconds, one-
billionth of a second.”); Floyd Norris, Time for Regulators to Impose Order in the Markets, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/business/14norris.html (“The 
computers that now dominate trading are amazing. Their speed is measured in milliseconds. 
They can post and withdraw an order faster than you can read this word. If a fast computer is on 
the other side, then a trade can be made before any person could even notice a trade was 
possible.”). 
 26. See Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,560 (“[T]he data analyzed by trading algorithms can include 
government economic reports (e.g., GDP, unemployment, and inflation data), as well as 
economic reports from non-governmental organizations such as universities, trade groups, and 
other sources.”); PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 196 (“[An HFT firm] started recruiting AI 
programmers skilled in machine-learning techniques [so that] [h]ighly sensitive programs would 
monitor reams of data coming from all corners of the market, learning dynamically on the fly 
which strategies worked best under a variety of circumstances.”); Duhigg, supra note 20 
(“Powerful algorithms—‘algos,’ in industry parlance—execute millions of orders a second and 
scan dozens of public and private marketplaces simultaneously. They can spot trends before 
other investors can blink, changing orders and strategies within milliseconds.”); Vanessa 
Kortekaas & Philip Stafford, Regulators Eye New Way to Spot Market Fraud, FIN. TIMES (May 
12, 2013, 2:23 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8b823360-b407-11e2-ace9-
00144feabdc0.html (registration required for access) (“This ‘sentiment analysis’ software 
monitors everything from macroeconomic news reports to rumours on merger and acquisition 
deals . . . . Software, such as Thomson Reuters’ NewsScope and Deutsche Borse’s Alphaflash, 
is already used in the investment industry—especially by hedge fund managers—to feed data 
into their automated trading tools.”). 
 27. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 196 (“[One firm] started poaching math and 
computer wonks from the Illinois Institute of Technology, a breeding ground for techheads.”); 
id. at 206 (mentioning a quantitative trading firm that was “founded by a trio of math and 
computer experts from MIT and Harvard”); id. at 299 (referring to David Shaw, who had 
“taught computer science at Columbia University before jumping into finance,” as “the 
legendary founder of D.E. Shaw, a giant New York hedge fund that used math and computers to 
mine hundreds of millions of dollars from the market year after year”). 
 28. See, e.g., NARANG, supra note 18, at xi; Chris Gay, Does High-Speed Trading Hurt 
Investors?, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012, 9:25 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-
finance/mutual-funds/articles/2012/12/03/does-high-speed-trading-hurt-investors.  
 29. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 45. 
7
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intelligence30 and “machine learning,”31 ATSs referred to as “black 
boxes”32 and “algo bots”33 began to dominate the trading on some 
exchanges.34  
The increased presence of high-speed ATSs in the futures markets 
brought complaints of the “algo bots” engaging in abusive trading 
practices and price manipulation in violation of federal law and 
financial regulations. For example, then CFTC Commissioner Bart 
Chilton, who has referred to HFT firms as “cheetahs,” stated in 2013 
that the CFTC was investigating signs that HFT firms were engaging in 
                                                                                                                     
 30. See, e.g., id. at 277 (“Artificial intelligence programs, the cutting edge of computer 
science, became the new key to riches. The programs were so sophisticated that they could read 
breaking news, just like a human reader scanning the pages of The Wall Street Journal. Only the 
computers could do so in milliseconds.”); id. at 283 (“Computers were conducting more and 
more trades through complex AI-armed algorithms.”). 
 31. See, e.g., id. at 334 (“Machine learning . . . is everywhere around us—it’s used by 
Netflix to predict what kinds of movies we like based on past choices, by Apple’s photography 
software to zero in on human faces, by e-mail firewalls to block spam. And it is also a powerful 
method for investing, because a computer armed with a robust machine-learning algorithm can 
detect relationships in the stock market that people could never find.”).  
 32. See NARANG, supra note 18, at xi (noting that quantitative trading strategies are also 
known as “black boxes”); Gay, supra note 28 (same); see also Alyse L. Gould, Regulating 
High-Frequency Trading: Man v. Machine, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 273, 285 & n.67 (2011) (noting 
that “[t]he secrecy is often referred to as trading in the ‘black box,’” and that the term 
“originated out of the obscurity of the investment strategy”); Carol Clark & Rajeev Ranjan, How 
Do Broker-Dealers/Futures Commission Merchants Control the Risks of High Speed Trading? 
FED. RES. BANK CHI. 19 n.2 (June 2012), http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications
/policy_discussion_papers/2012/pdp_3.cfm (“Black box trading strategies are 100 percent 
automated, pre-programmed, and traders cannot interact or modify the algorithms.”). 
 33. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 2–3 (discussing “Guerilla, the first mass-
marketed robot-trading algorithm that could deftly buy and sell stocks in ways that evaded the 
detection of other algos, a lethal weapon in the outbreak of what became known as the Algo 
Wars”); see also Rivlin Says U.S. Needs Bipartisan Budget Compromise, BLOOMBERG TV (Aug. 
28, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/video/rivlin-says-u-s-needs-bipartisan-budget-comprom 
ise-hRaoe9i9SSi4hP8ZyaLX_Q.html (asking Dr. Alice Rivlin, former director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, the following question: “[D]o you think the SEC should intervene and 
do something to basically take all these high-frequency traders, guys with co-located servers and 
algo bots that are front-running pension funds and mutual funds and sort of bring them to 
heel?”). 
 34. See, e.g. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 205 (“By the mid-2000s, just four firms—
Automated Trading Desk, Renaissance, Tradebot, and Getco—accounted for roughly 25 to 30 
percent of all stock trading in the United States.”); id. at 196–97 (describing the high-speed 
automated trading firm, Getco, as “a dominant player in Treasuries, currencies, futures, and 
ETFs”); David L. Kornblau et al., Market Manipulation & Algorithmic Trading: The Next Wave 
of Regulatory Enforcement?, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), at 1 (Feb. 20, 2012) (stating that 
“[c]omputerized trading,” which is “[a]lso known as algorithmic trading, . . . now accounts for 
more than half of the trading volume in U.S. equities markets, and 60 percent of futures contract 
trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange”).  
8
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a “shocking” amount of wash trading35—the name given for illegally 
taking both sides of prearranged, noncompetitive trades—in the futures 
markets.36 Another common illegal practice of HFT firms is 
“spoofing,”37 also called “quote stuffing” or “order stuffing.”38 
                                                                                                                     
 35. The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) prohibits wash trades, also called wash sales. 
Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4c(a)(1)–(2), 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(1)–(2) (2012)); see also Scott Patterson et al., ‘Wash Trades’ 
Scrutinized, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2013, 9:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887323639604578366491497070204 (subscription required).  
U.S. regulators are investigating whether high-frequency traders are routinely 
distorting stock and futures markets by illegally acting as buyer and seller in 
the same transactions . . . . 
Such transactions, known as wash trades, are banned by U.S. law because they 
can feed false information into the market and be used to manipulate prices. 
Intentionally taking both sides of a trade can minimize financial risk for the 
trading firm while potentially creating a false impression of higher volume in 
the market.  
The [CFTC] is focused on suspected wash trades by high-speed firms in futures 
contracts tied to the value of crude oil, precious metals, agricultural 
commodities and the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index, among other 
underlying instruments . . . . 
Id. 
 36. Ann Saphir, UPDATE 1-US Regulators Examining ‘Wash Trades,’ CFTC’s Chilton 
Says, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2013, 6:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/cftc-
washtrades-chilton-idUSL1N0CADUD20130318 (“The practice is barred under CFTC and 
exchange rules because it can create the appearance of an active market where there is 
none. . . . But the CFTC’s surveillance data shows the practice is ‘voluminous’ and widespread 
among high-frequency trading firms, said Chilton . . . .”); see also Silla Brush, High-Frequency 
Firms’ Wash Trades Need U.S. Review, Chilton Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2013, 11:22 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-18/high-frequency-firms-wash-trades-need-u-s-rev 
iew-chilton-says.html (“High-frequency trading firms conduct transactions with themselves in 
ways that distort liquidity in derivatives markets and warrant regulatory review, according to 
[then CFTC Commission member] Bart Chilton.”); Sakthi Prasad & Mridhula Raghavan, U.S. 
Regulators Probing High-Speed Traders for “Wash Trades,” REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2013, 11:16 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-cftc-washtrades-idUSBRE92H02A2013031 
8 (“The [CFTC] is investigating suspected wash trades by high-speed firms in futures contracts 
tied to crude oil, precious metals, agricultural commodities and the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock 
index, among other underlying instruments . . . .”).  
 37. In addition to violating CEA § 4c(a)(5)(C), the CFTC also has combatted spoofing 
with CEA § 4c(a)(2)(B)’s prohibition against causing non-bona fide prices to be reported and 
CEA § 9(a)(2)’s prohibition on causing false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports to be 
delivered that affect the price of a commodity. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4c(a)(5)(C) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C)); In re Gelber Group, LLC, No. 13-15, Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,534, 2013 WL 525839, at *3–4 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 8, 2013); In re Bunge 
Global Mkts., Inc., No. 11-10, 2011 WL 1099346, at *3–4 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 22, 2011); cf. In re 
Lorenzen, No. 13-16, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,535, 2013 WL 525841, at *1, *3–4 
(C.F.T.C. Feb. 8, 2013) (noting respondent’s violation of the prohibition against wash sales); 
9
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Spoofing is defined as “bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the 
bid or offer before execution.”39 By engaging in spoofing, HFT firms 
can flood markets with orders and then cancel them almost immediately 
after they are placed, thereby disrupting markets.40 
                                                                                                                     
Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Sanctions Gelber Group, LLC $750,000 for Trading Abuses on 
Two Exchanges (Feb. 8, 2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr65 
12-13 (same). The CFTC has argued that spoofing gives other market participants a “misleading 
impression of increasing liquidity” and thereby constitutes attempted manipulation in violation 
of CEA §§ 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2). Complaint at 2, CFTC v. Moncada, No. 12-CV-8791 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Files Complaint in Federal Court 
Against Eric Moncada, BES Capital LLC, and Serdika LLC Alleging Attempted Manipulation 
of Wheat Futures Contract Prices, Fictitious Sales, and Non-Competitive Transactions (Dec. 4, 
2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6441-12. 
 38. See Reuters, S.E.C. to Study Rapid-Fire Stock Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/business/08sec.html (“Federal regulators are examining 
certain practices involving ‘quote stuffing,’ where large numbers of rapid-fire stock orders are 
placed and canceled almost immediately, the chairwoman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Mary L. Schapiro, said on Tuesday.”); see also Peter J. Henning, Markets Evolve, 
as Does Financial Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2013, 7:01 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/11/11/markets-evolve-as-does-financial-fraud/ (“When orders are entered and canceled in 
the blink of an eye, is that ‘order stuffing’ intended to affect prices or just a common—if quite 
rapid—way of doing business?”). Some sources appear to differentiate spoofing from 
quote/order stuffing, although both strategies involve placing orders for trades and then 
canceling them before execution. See, e.g., Eliot Lauer et al., Stay Afloat in the New Wave of 
High-Frequency Trading Actions, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.co 
m/id=1202589088509 (subscription required) (“The CFTC’s interpretation seems to also 
prohibit layering[, another disruptive HFT tactic,] and quote stuffing . . . .”). Additionally, it 
appears that “[s]poofing in the securities industry is a bit different than in the commodities 
industry in that it is considered a form of market manipulation and requires that certain orders be 
executed.” Matthew F. Kluchenek & Jacob L. Kahn, Deterring Disruptions in the Derivatives 
Markets: A Review of the CFTC’s New Authority over Disruptive Trading Practices, 3 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 120, 131 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/2013/03/deterring-disruption-in-the-
derivatives-markets-a-review-of-the-cftcs-new-authority-over-disruptive-trading-practices/. 
 39. Commodity Exchange Act § 4c(a)(5)(C) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C)).  
 40. See Sen. Jack Reed Holds a Hearing on Computerized Trading, POL. TRANSCRIPT 
WIRE (Sept. 24, 2012), available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1069271973?accountid 
=10920 (subscription required) (providing the testimony of David Lauer, a market structure and 
high-frequency trading consultant to Better Markets, a nonprofit, non-partisan organization that 
advocates for strong financial regulation); id. (“Absolute[ly], there is a way to manipulate prices 
in markets, especially with the current speed of systems right now . . . . There’s well-
documented evidence of practices such as ‘stuffing’ which is to slow down the channel of a 
direct proprietary feed in order to pick off participants that are slower or unable to keep up with 
a high volume of data.”); Marty Steinberg, CFTC Charges Trading Firm Under New 
‘Antispoofing’ Authority, CNBC (July 22, 2013, 10:49 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/10090278 
2 (“Spoofing, a form of disruptive trading practice that is becoming more common with the 
entrance of high speed trading, is a scheme in which false price bids are entered and then pulled 
back before anyone can execute them. It’s done to create ‘liquidity’ at certain prices for big 
offers, and then make money from smaller offers . . . .”); see also, e.g., Silla Brush & Lindsay 
Fortado, Panther, Coscia Fined over High-Frequency Trading Algorithms, BLOOMBERG (July 
22, 2013, 11:28 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-22/panther-coscia-fined-over-
10
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Additionally, “banging the close”—the practice of “buying or selling 
large volumes of commodity contracts in the closing moments of a 
trading day” with the intent to move the price of the contract (or 
contracts)—is another illegal41 disruptive trading tactic that HFT firms 
reportedly employ in derivatives markets.42 
                                                                                                                     
high-frequency-trading-algorithms-1-.html (“Panther, based in Red Bank, New Jersey, and 
Coscia used a computer algorithm that placed and quickly canceled bids and offers in futures 
contracts for commodities including oil, metals, interest rates and foreign currencies, the 
[CFTC] said in a statement today. The enforcement action was the CFTC’s first under Dodd–
Frank Act authority to target disruptive trading practices.”); Dina ElBoghdady, High-Frequency 
Trading Firm Panther Energy Fined in ‘Spoofing’ Case, WASH. POST (July 22, 2013), http://ww 
w.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/high-frequency-trading-firm-fined-in-spoofing-case/ 
2013/07/22/361e26bc-f2d8-11e2-ae43-b31dc363c3bf_story.html (“A high-speed trading firm in 
New Jersey and its owner agreed on Monday to pay $2.8 million to settle federal charges that 
they used a disruptive market trading practice that was banned by Congress three years ago. The 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission accused Panther Energy Trading and its owner, 
Michael J. Coscia, of using sophisticated computer algorithms to illegally place and quickly 
cancel bids on commodity contracts, a practice known as ‘spoofing.’”); Steve Stroth, Oil-Trade 
‘Spoofing’ Allegations Reviewed by CFTC, Chilton Says, BLOOMBERG (June 24, 2013, 11:50 
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-24/oil-trade-spoofing-allegations-reviewed-by-
cftc-chilton-says.html. 
 41. David Cho, CFTC Charges Firm with Manipulating Oil Prices, WASH. POST (July 25, 
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/24/AR200807240383 
1.html. “Banging the close” violates the Commodity Exchange Act § 4c(a)(5)(B) (codified at 7 
U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(B)), although the CFTC has civilly prosecuted such activity with the statutory 
provisions prohibiting price manipulation in CEA §§ 6(c) and 9(a)(2). Commodity Exchange 
Act § 6c (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 9(1)); id. § 9(a)(2) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2)); see CFTC 
v. Wilson, No. 13 Civ. 7884(AT), 2014 WL 2884680, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2014) (denying 
a motion to dismiss where a high-speed trading firm was accused of banging the close in 
violation of CEA §§ 6(c) and 9(a)(2)); Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Charges Donald R. Wilson 
and His Company, DRW Investments, LLC, with Price Manipulation (Nov. 6. 2013) 
[hereinafter Press Release: CFTC Charges Wilson and His Company], available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6766-13; see also Casey Sullivan, NY Judge 
Rules Regulator’s Case Against Speed-Trading Firm DRW to Proceed, REUTERS (June 26, 
2014, 8:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/27/pricerigging-donwilson-
idUSL2N0P72AH20140627 (stating that Wilson and his firm, DRW, were accused “of 
manipulating the price of an interest rate swap futures contract in 2011” by engaging in “a 
practice known as ‘banging the close’”).  
 42. David Sheppard & Jonathan Stempel, High-Frequency Trader Optiver Pays $14 
Million in Oil Manipulation Case, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2012, 12:54 AM), http://www.reuters.com 
/article/2012/04/20/us-optiver-settlement-idUSBRE83J01220120420 (noting a “case [where the 
CFTC] alleged that traders in Optiver’s Chicago office reaped a $1 million profit by engaging in 
a practice called ‘banging the close,’ in which the firm attempted to move U.S. oil prices by 
executing a large volume of deals during the final moments of trading”); Landon Thomas Jr., 
Inquiry Stokes Unease over Trading Firms That Shape Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/business/global/04optiver.html; David Sheppard, ‘Milestone’ 
U.S. Oil Manipulation Case Unsettles Traders, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2012, 10:14 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/20/cftc-manipulation-idUSL2E8FK2K020120420 (“In 
its first major case against an algorithmic trader and the biggest financial penalty involving 
manipulation in the oil futures market, the [CFTC] said late Thursday that a court settlement 
11
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The CFTC’s mission is to protect market participants from fraud, 
manipulation, and abusive practices.43 To that end, the CFTC brings 
civil enforcement actions against persons who are violating (or have 
violated) the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)44 and the CFTC 
regulations45 promulgated thereunder.46 Indeed, the CFTC has initiated 
investigations and actions against HFT firms for spoofing,47 banging the 
close,48 and manipulating the price of futures contracts,49 but in those 
cases, evidence apparently showed that humans had directed the 
improper trading practices (or the defendants had admitted as much in 
settling).50 
                                                                                                                     
required the Amsterdam-based company to disgorge $1 million in profits and pay $13 million 
over allegations it used a rapid-fire tool nicknamed ‘The Hammer’ to influence U.S. oil prices in 
2007.”). 
 43. See About the CFTC: Mission & Responsibilities, CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/About/
MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 44. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27f.  
 45. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–1.75 (2014).  
 46.  Law & Regulation: Enforcement, CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/lawregulation/enforcem 
ent/index.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 47. E.g., Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders Panther Energy Trading LLC and Its 
Principal Michael J. Coscia to Pay $2.8 Million and Bans Them from Trading for One Year, for 
Spoofing in Numerous Commodity Futures Contracts (June 22, 2013) [hereinafter Press Release: 
CFTC Orders Panther Energy to Pay $2.8 Million], available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/ 
PressReleases/pr6649-13; see also Nathaniel Popper, New Powers Invoked to Curb a High-Speed 
Trading Feint, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2013, 12:19 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/high-
speed-trading-firm-is-fined-and-barred/ (“Regulators are using new powers to crack down on a high-
speed trading firm that they contend was trying to manipulate the prices of futures contracts.”). 
 48. E.g., Press Release, CFTC, Federal Court Orders $14 Million in Fines and 
Disgorgement Stemming from CFTC Charges Against Optiver and Others for Manipulation of 
NYMEX Crude Oil, Heating Oil, and Gasoline Futures Contracts and Making False Statements 
(Apr. 19, 2012) (quoting Enforcement Director David Meister’s statement that “[m]anipulative 
schemes like ‘banging the close’ harm market integrity”), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6239-12.  
 49. E.g., Press Release: CFTC Charges Wilson and His Company, supra note 41. 
 50. For example, in the Optiver case, the CFTC had evidence of traders openly discussing 
“hammering” and “bully[ing]” the price of oil. Press Release, CFTC, Case Background 
Information: CFTC v. Optiver US, LLC, et al. (July 24, 2008), available at http://www.cftc.gov/
ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/enfoptiverbackground.pdf (quoting Optiver 
employees and traders discussing their scheme to manipulate the price of oil); see also Thomas 
Jr., supra note 42 (discussing the transcripts and taped conversations about HFT under scrutiny 
by the CFTC). Similarly, the CFTC’s Complaint against Donald R. Wilson and his HFT firm, 
DRW Investments LLC., references statements made, inter alia, by Wilson and his employees. 
See, e.g., Complaint at 16–17, 19, 21, CFTC v. Wilson, No. 13 CV 7884 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 
2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/ 
legalpleading/enfdrwcomplaint110613.pdf; see also Wilson, No. 13 Civ. 7884(AT), 2014 WL 
2884680, at *4–5 (quoting statements made by traders and one of the defendants). Additionally, 
on July 22, 2013, the CFTC issued an Order simultaneously filing and settling the first case 
involving its new Dodd–Frank Act anti-spoofing authority. See Press Release: CFTC Orders 
Panther Energy to Pay $2.8 Million, supra note 47. The behavior at issue appears to have been 
12
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The question then arises as to whether the CFTC’s existing arsenal 
of CEA and CFTC regulatory provisions is sufficient to combat ATS 
misconduct that humans did not initiate or direct. What if, based on the 
facts of a case, an ATS engaged in improper trading practices—wash 
trades, spoofing, or manipulating derivatives prices for example—
without any human wanting the ATS to do so? What if no human 
programmed, oversaw, or operated an ATS with scienter or with any 
culpable mental state beyond, say, negligence? If a business entity that 
was using a self-learning ATS engaged in wash trading or banging the 
close (without a human intentionally programming or directing the ATS 
to do so), would that business entity face the same legal consequences 
as a business entity employing human traders that had engaged in 
exactly the same conduct?51  
Many causes of action under the CEA require proof that a human 
involved with the improper activity acted with a culpable mental state. 
Accordingly, those causes of action would be ineffective in 
circumstances where computerized trading bots, without specific human 
direction, engaged in disruptive trading conduct while continuously 
modifying their own algorithms and independently altering their trading 
practices in response to the tactics of other ATSs in the markets. 
Others have discussed the difficulty of proving scienter in 
circumstances involving ATSs.52 But what if it is not just difficult but 
                                                                                                                     
so egregious that it came to the attention of, and was ultimately punished by, the CFTC, the 
United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority, and disciplinary officials with the exchanges 
where the trades took place. Id.  
 51. Specifically, this Article seeks to analyze circumstances in which an ATS engages in 
manipulative or disruptive trading practices that are identical to trading practices that have 
warranted CFTC prosecution when directed by humans, i.e., conduct mirroring that of 
defendants in prior CFTC enforcement cases. See, e.g., CFTC v. Parnon Energy, Inc., 875 F. 
Supp. 2d 233, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Consent Order, CFTC v. Optiver US, LLC, No. 08 Civ. 
6560 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforce 
mentactions/documents/legalpleading/enfoptiverorder041912.pdf; Order, In re Gelber Group, 
No. 13-15, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,534, 2013 WL 525839 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 8, 2013). 
 52. See, for example, Kara Scannell & Arash Massoudi, Battle to Keep HFT Probe on 
Right Lines, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2013, 6:53 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b8a5b6e4-8849-
11e2-b011-00144feabdc0.html. The article provides the following quotes:  
“Unless there is evidence of intent to manipulate, it’s hard to derive intent from 
raw trading data,” said one government official. 
To bring a manipulation case, the government would have to find a way to 
show a person programmed the code to manipulate trades. 
“How people will pull those signals apart will be complex,” said Tyler Moeller, 
chief executive of Broadway Technology, which builds electronic trading 
platforms.  
“Determining if the trades were related and were actually manipulative and that 
13
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impossible to prove scienter or any other culpable mental state—e.g., 
specific intent—in a particular case because, in fact, no human actually 
had intended the ATS in question to do anything improper or even 
recklessly disregarded the risk that such conduct would occur? Under 
these circumstances, causes of action that have a scienter or culpable 
mental state requirement—statutory or regulatory provisions used to 
target wash trades,53 price manipulation,54 fraud-based manipulation,55 
and spoofing56—most likely would be ineffective. That would seem to 
mean, for example, that (in the futures and derivative markets) banging 
the close is lawful if an ATS—such as Citigroup’s Dagger—bangs the 
close without a human intending for the ATS to do so, unless of course 
there is another regulatory mechanism for prohibiting such conduct. 
While regulators could ultimately decide that there are legitimate 
reasons to prohibit only reckless or intentionally manipulative and 
disruptive trading practices, treating identical conduct differently based 
on a person’s mental state could create a loophole through which ATS-
initiated manipulative and disruptive trading practices could escape 
sanction.57  
This Article seeks to determine if the CFTC needs new tools to 
combat disruptive, manipulative, or otherwise harmful trading practices 
that originate solely from the “minds” of ATSs.58 Part I of this Article 
                                                                                                                     
there was malicious human intent behind them can be extremely difficult,” he 
said.  
Id. 
 53. A wash trade violation requires at least proof of intentional conduct. See In re Morgan 
Stanley & Co., No. 12-22, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,218, 2012 WL 3262462, at *4 n.4 
(C.F.T.C. June 5, 2012); see also supra note 35 (discussing the prohibition against wash trades 
under the CEA). 
 54. A price manipulation claim requires proof that the defendant specifically intended to 
cause a derivative to have an artificial price. Parnon Energy, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 244. 
 55. A fraud-based manipulation cause of action requires proof of scienter, which is 
satisfied by proof of reckless or intentional conduct. See Prohibition on the Employment, or 
Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price 
Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,404 (July 14, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180 
(2014)). 
 56. Spoofing requires proof of scienter beyond recklessness, meaning at least intentional 
conduct. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890, 31,896 (May 28, 2013). 
 57. Cf. Caitlin Kline, Derivatives Specialist for Better Markets, Transcript of Technology 
Advisory Committee Meeting of the U.S. CFTC 158–59 (Feb. 10, 2014), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/tac_021014_transcript.pdf 
(“[P]ractices that are illegal when performed by humans, should be equally illegal when done by 
computers” and if that is not the case, “then there is an urgent need to adapt the rulebook to 
match the playing field”). 
 58. Some industry leaders, and even regulators themselves, have said that financial 
regulatory agencies have not kept up with the technological changes in the financial markets. 
See Silla Brush, High-Speed Traders Outpace CFTC’s Oversight, O’Malia Says, BLOOMBERG 
(May 7, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-06/high-speed-trades-
14
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provides a brief regulatory background of the derivatives markets, then 
examines the increased automation in those markets today, and 
concludes by looking at the CFTC’s initial responses to the issues raised 
by automation. Part II briefly looks at the law concerning different 
mental states for causes of action. Part III examines the CFTC’s pre- 
and post-Dodd–Frank Act tools to police disruptive and manipulative 
trading practices, which are causes of action that, generally speaking, 
have scienter or culpable mental state requirements. This makes these 
tools ineffective in situations where none of the prospective defendants 
acted with the requisite mental state. 
Part IV analyzes the failure-to-supervise cause of action under CFTC 
Regulation 166.3.59 It determines that this regulation potentially could 
be an effective weapon against ATS-initiated behavior that disrupts or 
manipulates derivative markets because: (1) a Regulation 166.3 claim 
does not require proof of an underlying violation of the CEA or CFTC 
Regulations, and (2) decisions analyzing Regulation 166.3 appear to 
apply a reasonableness standard (as opposed to a scienter requirement) 
in scrutinizing whether a firm diligently supervised its employees and 
agents in connection with its business as a CFTC registrant.60 More 
specifically, although never explicitly stated, Regulation 166.3 violation 
decisions appear to apply a reasonableness standard that analyzes 
whether a reasonably prudent registrant—as opposed to a reasonably 
prudent person—would have acted the same in similar circumstances. 
Part IV also suggests that, to ensure that Regulation 166.3 will 
effectively deter disruptive and manipulative trading practices by 
                                                                                                                     
outpace-cftc-s-oversight-o-malia-says.html (quoting former CFTC Commissioner Scott 
O’Malia, who stated that “[t]he CFTC lacks the technology necessary to routinely oversee the 
millions of messages traders send every day to futures exchanges”); Ari Burstein, Senior 
Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst. & ICI Global, Speech at the TradeTech Asia Conference: Assessing the 
Impact of Global Regulatory Reform—Are We Best Serving the Markets and Investors? (Nov. 
8, 2012), available at http://www.ici.org/iciglobal/news/speeches/12_burstein_singapore (“One 
thing is clear: regulations governing the financial markets have not kept pace with the 
significant changes in trading practices. We are therefore pleased that regulators have started to 
focus on some of the critical issues surrounding technology, automated trading, and the 
challenges posed for effectively overseeing the markets.”); Dan Waters, Managing Dir., ICI 
Global, Speech at the ICI Global Trading and Market Structure Conference: Amid Global 
Market Complexity, a Simple Focus on Investors (Dec. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.ici.org/iciglobal/news/speeches/12_dw_trading (“Technological advances in trading 
may also enable those who would manipulate markets to do so more easily and cheaply. 
Another challenge is regulatory: Simply put, changes in trading practices have outpaced 
regulations governing the financial markets. The potential for market abuse and disorderly 
trading related to computer generated orders remains troubling.”).  
 59. 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (2013). 
 60. The term “registrant” includes “any person who is registered or required to be 
registered with the [CFTC] pursuant to the [CEA] or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder.” 
17 C.F.R. § 166.1(a). For a discussion of decisions analyzing Regulation 166.3, see Part IV.  
15
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registrants’ ATSs, the CFTC could promulgate a rule making clear that 
a registrant’s duty to diligently supervise its employees in connection 
with its business as a registrant includes making sure that employees 
monitor ATSs for improper trading practices.  
This Article is the first to: (1) suggest that Regulation 166.3 is most 
likely the best tool for combatting improper trading practices by ATSs 
where no human connected to the activities had the requisite scienter; 
(2) contend that Regulation 166.3 uses a reasonableness standard that is 
best viewed as a reasonably prudent registrant (as opposed to a 
reasonably prudent person) standard for diligence in connection with 
supervisory duties; and (3) point out that this standard establishes, as a 
baseline, mandatory awareness of requirements in the CEA and 
applicable CFTC and self-regulatory organization (SRO) rules and 
guidelines.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
This Part first provides the regulatory background of the derivatives 
market. Next, it examines the increased automation of trading in those 
markets today. Finally, it concludes with a review of the CFTC’s initial 
responses to the issues raised by automation. 
A.  Regulatory Framework for Futures and Other Derivatives  
The CEA is the federal statute governing the financial markets for 
futures contracts, commodity options, swaps, and other derivatives.61 In 
2010, Congress enacted the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act).62 Title VII of the Dodd–
Frank Act63 amended the CEA, inter alia, to establish a comprehensive 
new regulatory framework, largely overseen by the CFTC, for swaps.64 
The Dodd–Frank Act also gave the CFTC additional authority to 
combat fraud-based manipulation and disruptive trading practices.65 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 1.14[1], at 284. 
 62. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf.  
 63. Title VII of the Dodd–Frank Act is named the Wall Street Transparency and 
Accountability Act of 2010. Id. § 701, 124 Stat. at 1641. 
 64. See Seema G. Sharma, Over-the-Counter Derivatives: A New Era of Financial 
Regulation, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AMS. 279, 281–82 (2011); see also Timothy E. Lynch, 
Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 13 n.48 (2011). 
Generally speaking, “[a] swap contract is an agreement to exchange future cash flows.” 
MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES 29 (2d ed. 2011).  
 65. See, e.g., Lauer et al., supra note 38 (stating that “Dodd-Frank provides the CFTC 
with ‘new ammo in [its] enforcement arsenal’ through broader anti-manipulation authority and 
new ‘disruptive practices’ authority, likely to trigger enforcement activity in the futures and 
commodities markets for high-frequency traders,” and predicting that “[t]he recent surge of 
16
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Although not specifically defined in the CEA or CFTC Regulations 
promulgated thereunder,66 the CEA refers to a futures contract as a 
“contract[] of sale of a commodity for future delivery.”67 The CEA 
defines the term, “commodity,” with remarkable breadth to include, 
among other things, “all . . . goods and articles, except onions . . . and 
motion picture box office receipts . . . , and all services, rights and 
interests . . . in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the 
future dealt in.”68 The CEA requires intermediaries in the derivatives 
markets—futures commission merchants (FCMs),69 introducing brokers 
(IBs),70 commodity trading advisors (CTAs),71 commodity pool 
operators (CPOs),72 and their associated persons (APs)73—to register 
with the CFTC.74 The CFTC delegated administration of its registration 
function to the National Futures Association (NFA). The NFA is a 
registered futures association and the SRO for the futures, swaps, and 
derivatives industry. In its capacity as SRO, the NFA promulgates and 
enforces rules prohibiting its members from engaging in improper 
conduct.75  
                                                                                                                     
interest in high-frequency trading, and the CFTC’s expanded authority under Dodd-Frank, 
signal a substantial future increase in enforcement and litigation activity in this area”).  
 66. Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, The Private Digital Currency, and the 
Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 147 (2012). 
 67. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2012). 
 68. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 1a(9), 42 Stat. 998 (1922) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9)). For additional insight and analysis concerning the CEA’s broad 
definition of the term “commodity,” see Paul M. Architzel & John P. Connelly, Delivery on 
Futures Contracts as a Legal Requirement, 36 BUS. LAW. 935, 936–39 (1981). 
 69. Commodity Exchange Act § 1a(28) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(28)) (defining FCM). 
“The [FCM], if in the securities business, would probably be called a brokerage house. . . . A 
person wishing to trade on the CFTC-regulated markets may open an account at a 
[FCM] . . . . Trading orders are given by the customer, directly or indirectly, to the FCM.” 1 
JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 1.06[1], at 195–96.  
 70. Commodity Exchange Act § 1a(31) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(31)) (defining an IB as 
any person (except anyone registered as an associated person (AP) of an FCM) who solicits or 
accepts orders for, inter alia, the purchase or sale of any futures contract, swap or commodity 
option; and who does not accept any money to secure any trades that may result from those 
orders).  
 71. Id. § 1a(12) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12)) (defining CTA as, inter alia, any person 
who, for compensation or profit, engages in the business of advising others as to the value or 
advisability of trading in any futures contract, commodity option, swap, or other derivative).  
 72. Id. § 1a(11) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(11)) (defining CPO as “any person engaged in a 
business that is of the nature of a commodity pool, investment trust, syndicate, or similar form 
of enterprise, and who, in connection [to that business], solicits, accepts, or receives [funds from 
others] . . . for the purpose of trading in commodity interests”). 
 73. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(aa) (2013) (defining AP as, generally speaking, a human—called 
“natural person” in the CFTC Regulations—who is the agent of another registrant and who 
either solicits funds or trading orders or who supervises those who do so). 
 74. See, e.g., Commodity Exchange Act § 4d(a)(1) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1)); id. 
§ 4d(g) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6d(g)).  
 75. See, e.g., Performance of Registration Functions by National Futures Association with 
Respect to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. 2708, 2709 (Jan. 19, 2012) 
17
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Under the CEA, most trading in futures contracts must take place on 
CFTC-regulated exchanges, which are called designated contract 
markets (DCMs).76 CME Group is a Chicago-based corporation that 
owns several major DCMs, including the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME), New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), and Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT).77 CME Group’s electronic trading system for 
its DCMs is CME Globex.78  
DCMs also are SROs and, accordingly, must police their markets for 
disruptive and improper trading practices by their members.79 Section 5 
of the CEA describes the regulatory obligations—in the form of twenty-
three “Core Principles”—that exchanges must comply with, both 
initially upon receiving a designation as a contract market and on an 
ongoing basis thereafter.80 For example, Core Principle 4 for DCMs 
                                                                                                                     
(providing a CFTC order “authorizing NFA . . . to perform the full range of registration 
functions under the CEA and the [CFTC’s] regulations with regard to [swap dealers and major 
swap participants]” and listing all previous such grants of authority to NFA concerning other 
intermediaries); Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. 2613, 
2619 (Jan. 19, 2012) (“[T]he [CFTC] intends to delegate its full registration authority under the 
CEA and its regulations to NFA with respect to applicants for registration, and registrants, as [a 
swap dealer or major swap participant].”); Gary Rubin, CFTC Regulation 1.59 Fails to 
Adequately Regulate Insider Trading, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 599, 606 (2008) (“The 1974 
[Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act] also authorized the creation of ‘registered 
futures associations.’ This legislation led to the establishment of the [NFA], a nationwide 
[SRO], for the futures industry, in 1982.”). Among other things, NFA prohibits its members 
from “[e]ngag[ing] in manipulative acts or practices regarding the price of a commodity futures 
contract.” See NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, NFA MANUAL, COMPLIANCE RULES R. 2-2, available at 
http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=RULE%202-2&Section=4 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2014). NFA also requires members to “observe high standards of 
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade in the conduct of their commodity 
futures business.” Id. R. 2-4.  
 76. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 1.04[1], at 150–51. 
 77. See CME Group Overview, CME GROUP (2013), http://www.cmegroup.com/company 
/files/cme-group-overview.pdf. CME is a “for-profit company [that] operates the world’s largest 
futures exchange.” Lynne Marek, Futures Regulators Challenged by Changing Industry, 
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20130420/ISSUE0 
1/304209982/futures-regulators-challenged-by-changing-industry; see also Andrew Harris & 
Matthew Leising, CME Sued on Claims High-Frequency Traders Bought Access, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-04-13/cme-gave-high-frequency-
traders-peek-at-market-lawsuit-claims.html (describing CME Group as the “owner of the 
world’s largest futures market”). 
 78. CME Group Overview, supra note 77 (“Today, more than 80 percent of the trades at 
CME Group are electronic.”).  
 79. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 1.04[3], at 167 (stating that, to receive 
CFTC approval to be a DCM, “[t]he most important focus . . . is on the ability of the applicant 
for contract market designation to show that it has adequately provided for the prevention of 
conduct that would interfere with the ability of the market to reflect true economic conditions”). 
Generally, a DCM’s members are FCMs. See id. § 1.06, at 196–97.  
 80.  Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 5(d)(1)(A)(i), 42 Stat. 998 (1922) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012)). 
18
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states that exchanges must “have the capacity and responsibility to 
prevent manipulation [and] price distortion . . . through market 
surveillance, compliance, and enforcement practices and procedures.”81 
Likewise, Core Principle 12 (“Protection of markets and market 
participants”) requires exchanges to “establish and enforce rules (A) to 
protect markets and market participants from abusive practices 
committed by any party, including abusive practices committed by a 
party acting as an agent for a participant; and (B) to promote fair and 
equitable trading on the contract market.”82 To that end, CFTC 
Regulation 38.152 requires DCMs to prohibit abusive trading practices, 
including front running and wash trading.83 Similarly, CFTC Regulation 
38.156 states that each DCM “must maintain an automated trade 
surveillance system capable of detecting and investigating potential 
trade practice violations.”84 
In turn, to comply with the Core Principles and CFTC Regulations, 
DCMs adopt rules to govern the behavior of their members. For 
example, CBOT has a rule prohibiting wash trades and another rule 
prohibiting prearranged, prenegotiated, and noncompetitive trades.85 
The CFTC, in fulfilling its supervisory role over DCMs, conducts rule 
enforcement reviews to ensure that DCMs are complying with the Core 
Principles and CFTC Regulations.86 In this capacity, the CFTC has 
stated that a DCM “should require market participants whose automated 
trading systems or algorithms result in trading patterns that are 
indicative of apparent violations of [DCM] rules to discontinue the use 
of such systems or algorithms until the cause of the apparent violations 
is identified and remedied.”87 One of the primary objectives of the Core 
                                                                                                                     
 81. Id. § 5(d)(4) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(4)). 
 82. Id. § 5(d)(12) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(12)). 
 83. 17 C.F.R. § 38.152 (2013); see also id. § 38.651 (stating, inter alia, that a DCM “must 
have and enforce rules that are designed to promote fair and equitable trading and to protect the 
market and market participants from abusive practices”).  
 84. Id. § 38.156 (stating that “the automated trade surveillance system must have the 
capability to detect and flag specific trade execution patterns and trade anomalies”); see also id. 
§ 38.153 (providing the requirement that a DCM must have the “[c]apacity to detect and 
investigate rule violations”); id. § 38.157 (providing the requirement that a DCM must conduct 
“[r]eal-time market monitoring”). 
 85. See CME GROUP, CBOT RULEBOOK R.R. 534, 539A, available at 
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CBOT/I/5/5.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).  
 86. See Rule Enforcement Reviews of Designated Contract Markets, CFTC, 
http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/dcmruleenf (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2014).  
 87. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Releases Rule Enforcement Review of NYSE Liffe U.S. 
(Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6241-12; Rule 
Enforcement Review of NYSE Liffe U.S., CFTC 36 (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@iodcms/documents/file/rernyseliffe042012.pdf (referencing the CFTC’s 
findings and its statement that the DCM needed to take measures to ensure that market 
19
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Principles and CFTC Regulations is to ensure that the markets, through 
trading on DCMs, can serve their essential price discovery function for 
derivative contracts,88 “whereby all market information known to both 
hedgers and speculators is reflected by the market price of any given 
contract.”89 Manipulative and disruptive trading practices harm the 
ability of a market to fulfill its price discovery function.90  
“Self-regulation is the hallmark of the U.S. futures industry.”91 
Indeed, the SROs—both NFA and the DCMs92—require members to 
diligently supervise their employees and agents in the conduct of their 
futures and derivatives business.93 This includes supervision of 
                                                                                                                     
participants who use ATSs do not engage in wash trading in contracts that are traded on the 
DCM). 
 88. Core Principle 9 states that an exchange “shall provide a competitive, open, and 
efficient market and mechanism for executing transactions that protects the price discovery 
process of trading in the centralized market of the board of trade.” Commodity Exchange Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 5(d)(9), 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(9) (2012)); see 
also Scott D. O’Malia, Comm’r, CFTC, Keynote Address at the State of the Industry 2014 
Conference, Commodity Markets Council: We Can Do Better—It’s Time to Review Our Rules 
and Make Necessary Changes (Jan. 27, 2014), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/opaomalia-32 (stating that “the Commission must protect the essential price 
discovery and hedging function of the futures and swaps markets”). Indeed, the idea that 
businesses, consumers, and even other futures markets participants can rely on the price 
discovery function of futures exchanges has long been touted as one of the benefits of futures 
markets. See William L. Stein, The Exchange-Trading Requirement of the Commodity Exchange 
Act, 41 VAND. L. REV. 473, 484 (1988) (“National and international businesses rely on prices 
discovered on exchanges to reflect an equilibrium between supply and demand, not other 
artificial factors. . . . Moreover, businesses rely on the prices discovered on the exchanges as 
being a reflection of the opinions and expectations of a broad base of knowledgeable market 
participants.”). 
 89. Richard Carlucci, Note, Harmonizing U.S. Securities and Futures Regulations, 2 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 461, 476 (2008). 
 90. See Charles R.P. Pouncy, The Scienter Requirement and Wash Trading in Commodity 
Futures: The Knowledge Lost in Knowing, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1625, 1635–36 (1995). 
 91. Philip Shishkin, Insight: MF Global Puts Harsh Light on Self-Regulation, REUTERS 
(Dec. 14, 2011, 2:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/14/us-mfglobal-regulation-
idUSTRE7BD1WE20111214. See generally Jake Keaveny, Note, In Defense of Market Self-
Regulation: An Analysis of the History of Futures Regulation and the Trend Toward 
Demutualization, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1419 (2005) (detailing the history of self-regulation in the 
futures industry and arguing that self-regulation is the most practical and efficient approach to 
regulating financial markets).  
 92. Swap execution facilities also are SROs, see 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ee) (2013), but this 
Article primarily focuses on NFA and DCMs—the futures exchanges—as SROs.  
 93. See, e.g., CME GROUP, CBOT RULEBOOK R. 432, available at http://www.cmegroup. 
com/rulebook/CBOT/I/4/4.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (listing the “[g]eneral offenses,” 
which include the failure to diligently supervise employees and agents in connection with 
business related to the exchange); CME GROUP, NYMEX RULEBOOK R. 501, available at 
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/NYMEX/1/5.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (“Members 
shall be responsible for ensuring that their employees comply with all Exchange rules . . . .”). 
20
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employees who are responsible for computerized and automated 
systems.94 DCMs also generally require every order entered for a trade 
to identify whether the order was entered by automated or manual 
means.95  DCMs often enforce their regulations through the use of fines. 
For example, on November 25, 2011, both CME and NYMEX fined 
Infinium Capital Management (Infinium) for failing to diligently 
supervise its ATS.96 NYMEX fined Infinium $350,000 for failing to 
sufficiently test, control, and supervise its ATS in a 2010 incident 
involving crude oil futures, whereas CME fined Infinium $500,000 for 
failure to diligently supervise its ATS in connection with trading 
malfunctions in E-mini Nasdaq 100 Index futures in 2009.97 While 
                                                                                                                     
NFA Compliance Rule 2-9 is the general supervisory rule for intermediaries in the non-forex 
markets, i.e., involving futures, options and swaps. See NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, NFA MANUAL,  
COMPLIANCE RULES R. 2-9, available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/NFAManual.asp 
x?RuleID=RULE%202-9&Section=4 (last visited Dec. 14, 2014); see also 17 C.F.R. § 1.73 
(a)(2)(i) (2013). 
 94. See, e.g., Notice of Disciplinary Action, In re Kohl Trading, LLC, No. 12-8783-BC 
(CME Group Nov. 27, 2013), available at http://www.cmegroup.com/tools-information/
lookups/advisories/disciplinary/CME-12-8783-BC-KOHL-TRADING-LLC.html (citing and 
fining a member $25,000, pursuant to a settlement, for failure to diligently supervise its 
employees because the member did not use an alert system to notify the exchange that its pre-
trade controls were inadvertently disabled); Notice of Disciplinary Action, In re Chopper 
Trading, LLC, No. 12-8969-BC (CME Group Nov. 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.cmegroup.com/tools-information/lookups/advisories/disciplinary/CBOT-12-8969-B 
C-CHOPPER-TRADING-LLC.html (citing and fining a member $20,000, pursuant to a 
settlement, for, among other things, failure to diligently supervise its employees because 
although the member had tested its ATS in liquid derivative products on the exchange it had 
failed to perform specific testing in the back months— less liquid time periods—of derivatives). 
 95. See, e.g., Market Regulation Advisory Notice, CME Group, Advisory Number 
RA1210-5: Manual/Automated Trading Indicator (Fix Tag 1028) (Oct. 8, 2012), available at 
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/files/cme-group-ra1210-5.pdf. 
 96. Case Summary: Infinium Capital Management, CME 09-06562-BC, NAT’L FUTURES 
ASS’N [hereinafter Case Summary: Infinium Capital Management, CME 09-06562-BC], 
http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Case.aspx?entityid=0338588&case=09-06562-BC&contrib 
=CME (last visited Dec. 14, 2014); Case Summary: Infinium Capital Management, NYME 10-
7565-BC, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N [hereinafter Case Summary: Infinium Capital Management, 
NYME 10-7565-BC], http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Case.aspx?entityid=0338588&case= 
10-7565-C+INFINIUM+CAPITAL+MGMT&contrib=NYME (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 97.  Case Summary: Infinium Capital Management, CME 09-06562-BC, supra note 96; 
Case Summary: Infinium Capital Management, NYME 10-7565-BC, supra note 96; see also 
High-Frequency Oil Trader Fined for Runaway Trades, REUTERS (Dec. 23, 2011, 1:35 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/23/us-cme-infinium-trader-idUSTRE7BM1BF2011122 
3 (referring to a 2010 “error in [a] computer file [that] caused [Infinium] to enter 6,767 one-lot 
orders for crude [oil] futures contracts in just three seconds” that “generated a million-dollar loss 
for Infinium, which earlier this year was fined a total of $850,000 for the 2010 error as well as 
two other computer-trading malfunctions in 2009”). On a side note, thirty-one former employees 
of Infinium have accused six of the HFT firm’s executives “of tricking them into sinking their 
personal money into the Chicago automated trading company while hiding its struggles to say 
afloat.” Arash Massoudi & Gregory Meyer, Infinium Ex-Employees Sue over $4.1m Loss, FIN. 
21
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CME Group’s executive chairman and president has stated that its 
market surveillance capabilities are sufficient,98 “others question 
whether CME and other regulators have tools sophisticated enough to 
police the high-speed electronic traders.”99 Indeed, “a former head of 
market regulation at CME” has stated: “I suspect that there are forms of 
violations—although clearly less frequent—that are occurring that are 
more difficult to detect because of the relative anonymity of electronic 
trading, that only really powerful analytic software is ever going to 
find.”100 
B.  Derivatives Markets Today: Algo Bots, Black Boxes, and HFT  
Comedian Stephen Colbert was (probably) joking when he said, 
“[o]ur financial system is much safer now because Wall Street has 
                                                                                                                     
TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014, 4:47 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a6f086da-7912-11e3-91ac-
00144feabdc0.html (subscription required) (“31 employees said they collectively lost $4.1m—
including the life savings of some—after being persuaded to convert loans they had made to 
Infinium into equity later rendered worthless.”). In March of 2014, Infinium’s president said that 
the HFT firm had ceased operating and that currency trading firm Forex Capital Markets 
(FXCM) “and a subsidiary [had] acquired five trading desks, physical assets, and 48 employees” 
from the HFT firm. Tom Polansek, Exclusive: High-Speed Trader Infinium Capital Winds 
Down—President, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/ 
06/us-speed-trader-infinium-idUSBREA251Y520140306.  
 98. High Frequency and Automated Trading in Futures Markets: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry, 113th Cong. *2–3 (May 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.ag.senate.gov/hearings/high-frequency-and-automated-trading-in-futures-markets 
(providing the written testimony of Terrence A. Duffy, Executive Chairman and President of CME 
Group Inc.); id. (“CME promotes market stability through industry leading risk controls. . . . These 
include: . . . [p]re-execution risk controls[,] . . . price banding[,] . . . messaging controls[,] . . . stop-
logic functionality[,] . . . [and] velocity-logic functionality. . . . This balance of regulation and 
market surveillance–—along with deep pools of liquidity—gives market participants the 
confidence they have come to expect as they rely on [the] markets to effectively manage their 
risk.”). 
 99. See Marek, supra note 77 (quoting the former head of market regulation at CME as 
stating that, inter alia, because the financial industry has greater resources than regulators, “[t]he 
rocket scientists are developing trading algorithms” and “not developing surveillance software 
for regulators”). “But CME did not always spot the snafus itself. Rather, like Infinium, the firms 
reported the problems, sometimes in hopes of revising bad trades.” Id. Then CFTC 
Commissioner Bart Chilton also stated: “I think we all are behind the curve in doing the types of 
surveillance, monitoring and enforcement that we need to do in the fast-paced ‘cheetah’ trading 
world.” Id. “A look at the recent history of self-regulation shows the government repeatedly 
raised concerns about the resources the major exchanges dedicate to market oversight, while the 
federal agency also experienced staff cutbacks and retreated from hands-on policing.” Shishkin, 
supra note 91 (noting that CME previously had opposed the concept of registration 
requirements for HFT firms and stating that “[i]n a common refrain, many market participants 
have accused CME Group of not doing enough to supervise large brokerages whose business 
and trading volume are key to the company’s bottom line”).  
 100. Marek, supra note 77. 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/5
2015] IMPROPER TRADING PRACTICES BY ALGORITHMIC ROBOTS 243 
 
removed the weakest link—man.”101 Colbert’s comment highlights one 
of the distinguishing characteristics of quant trading strategies, which is 
the automation of trading and, consequently, the removal of human 
biases and emotions from the actual process of deciding when and how 
to place trades.102 
The key determination that puts quants on one side of [the] 
spectrum and everyone else on the other is whether daily 
decisions about the selection and sizing of portfolio 
positions are made systematically (allowing for exceptions 
of “emergency” overrides . . . ) or by discretion. If both the 
question of what positions to own and how much of each to 
own are usually answered systematically, that’s a quant. If 
either one is answered by a human as standard operating 
procedure, that’s not a quant.103 
That is not to say that quant trading strategies do not involve 
humans, because humans are the ones who create, program, and oversee 
the ATSs.104 As mentioned above, today ATSs direct a great deal of 
trading in many financial markets.105 For purposes of this Article, an 
ATS is a computer or computer software program that automatically106 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Gay, supra note 28 (quoting Stephen Colbert). 
 102. “Besides conceiving and researching the core investment strategy, humans also design 
and build the software and systems used to automate the implementation of their ideas. But once 
the system ‘goes live,’ human judgment is generally limited in the day-to-day management of a 
portfolio.” NARANG, supra note 18, at xii.  
[B]y utilizing a computerized, systematic implementation, quants eliminate the 
arbitrariness that pervades so many discretionary trading strategies. In essence, 
decisions driven by emotion, indiscipline, passion, greed, and fear—what many 
consider the key pratfalls of “playing the market”—are eliminated from the 
quant’s investment process. They are replaced by an analytical and systematic 
approach that borrows from the lessons learned in so many other fields: If 
something needs to be done repeatedly and with a great deal of discipline, 
computers will virtually always outshine humans. 
Id. at xv.  
 103. Id. at 14. “In this context, systematic is defined as a disciplined, methodological, and 
automated approach.” Id. at xi. 
 104. Id. at xi (“These people, the ones behind quant trading strategies, are commonly 
referred to as quants or quant traders.”).  
 105. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,542 (Sept. 12, 2013).  
 106. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 78 (defining 
“automatic” as “a machine or apparatus that operates automatically,” with a “self-acting or self-
regulating mechanism”); see also id. (defining “automate” as “to operate by automation” and “to 
convert to largely automatic operation”); id. (defining “automation” as “automatically controlled 
operation of an apparatus, process, or system by mechanical or electronic devices”).  
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submits trades to an exchange or trading platform.107 While there can be 
varying degrees of automation,108 this Article focuses on ATSs that, 
although created, programmed, and supervised by humans,109 operate 
independently in deciding when and how to place (or cancel) orders for 
trades.110  
“Algorithmic trading uses computer [algorithms] to enter trading 
orders with the computer algorithm deciding aspects of the order, such 
as the timing, price, and quantity of the order, or in many cases, 
initiating the order without human intervention.”111 Nowadays, the most 
sophisticated ATSs are “digital robots with programs that evolve[] 
through time.”112 As mentioned, such ATSs, including those using HFT 
strategies, continuously analyze, evaluate, and adapt their trading 
algorithms, which means, as a practical matter, that “an HFT 
algorithm’s half-life can often be measured in weeks.”113  
Some algorithms’ roots trace to the field of artificial 
intelligence. They may not be intelligent and self-
aware . . . , but algorithms can evolve. They observe, 
experiment, and learn—all independently of their human 
creators. Using advanced computer science techniques such 
as machine learning and neural networking, algorithms can 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,544 n.7 (“[T]he term is generally understood to mean a 
computer-driven system that automates the generation and routing of orders to one or more 
markets. Other elements of an ATS may also include systems for analyzing market data as a 
precursor to order generation, managing orders for conformance with establish[ed] risk 
tolerances, receiving confirmations of orders placed and trades executed, etc.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Neil Rosenthal, Guide to Trading System Development, FUTURES MAG. 
(Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.futuresmag.com/2012/09/01/guide-to-trading-system-development 
(“Some systems just generate the signals for the trader to follow, while others place the trades 
into the market on behalf of the trader.”). 
 109. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,547 (“In automated trading, humans design and test ATSs, 
establish decision criteria, manage implementation, and intervene when technology systems fail. 
ATS designers must identify the range of market conditions that an ATS could reasonably face, 
and determine the range of permissible responses by the ATS to each condition.”). 
 110. A working group of a CFTC committee has “described automated trading as 
cover[ing] systems employed in the decision-making, routing and/or execution of an investment 
or trading decision, which utilizes a range of technologies including software, hardware, and 
network components to facilitate efficient access to the financial markets via electronic trading 
platforms.” Id. at 56,545 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 111. Nathan D. Brown, The Rise of High Frequency Trading: The Role Algorithms, and the 
Lack of Regulations, Play in Today’s Stock Market, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L. 209, 209 (2012).  
 112. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 309. 
 113. Andrew J. Keller, Robocops: Regulating High Frequency Trading After the Flash 
Crash of 2010, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1464 (2012); see also, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 
306 (discussing that ATSs generally run several algorithms simultaneously, identify the 
algorithms that make the most money, and discard the “algos” that are less successful). 
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even create new and improved algorithms based on 
observed results.114  
“[T]he data analyzed by trading algorithms can include government 
economic reports, (GDP, unemployment, and inflation data for 
example) as well as economic reports from non-governmental 
organizations such as universities, trade groups, and other sources.”115 
Thus far, much of the commentary and focus has been about ATSs and 
HFT firms operating in the securities markets,116 but (as mentioned) 
ATSs and HFT firms also trade in the commodities and futures 
markets.117  
Not all ATSs use HFT118 strategies.119 For example, since 2007, 
                                                                                                                     
 114. STEINER, supra note 21, at 7; see also High-Frequency Trading: The Fast and the 
Furious, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21547988/ (“The next 
stage . . . will be self-learning systems, in which sentient algorithms mine the capital markets, 
spotting correlations that are too complex for humans to see and suggesting trading ideas as a 
result.”).  
 115. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,560. 
 116. See, e.g., Michael J. McGowan, iBrief, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency 
Trading: Use and Controversy, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 16, at *1–2 (“Today, many 
trades on the stock markets are carried out via complex automated computer programs. These 
programs are constantly evolving, with faster computers and programs being developed every 
few weeks. . . . [T]he majority of trades are now dominated by traders utilizing powerful 
computer algorithms in a practice known as high frequency trading (HFT).” (footnotes 
omitted)).  
 117. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,545 (“An established body of data indicates the importance of 
electronic and algorithmic trading in U.S. futures markets.”). For example, “[b]y the end of the 
first quarter of 2010, ATSs accounted for over 50% of trading volume in a number of significant 
product categories at CME Group, Inc.’s . . . DCMs.” Id.; see also NARANG, supra note 18, at 5 
(“The large presence of quants is not limited to equities. In futures and foreign exchange 
markets, the domain of commodity trading advisors (CTAs), there is a significant presence of 
quants. . . . [One estimate is that] 85 percent of the assets under management among all CTAs 
are managed by quantitative trading firms.”).  
 118. There are many definitions of HFT. See, e.g., Tara Bhupathi, Note, Technology’s 
Latest Market Manipulator? High Frequency Trading: The Strategies, Tools, Risks, and 
Responses, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 377, 386 (2010) (“High-frequency trading refers to 
‘professional traders acting in a proprietary capacity’ to use ‘low-latency system[s]’ in running 
large numbers of liquidity providing non-marketable orders electronically, most of which are 
subsequently cancelled.”); McGowan, supra note 116, at *2 (“At its essence, high frequency 
(HF), or algorithmic trading, is computer determined trading; the algorithm makes important 
decisions such as timing, price, or in many cases, executing the entire order without human 
interaction.”); Gay, supra note 28 (“HFT—actually a generic term for a range of high-speed 
trading tactics—is the fine art of using powerful computers programmed with complex 
instructions to trade stocks at lightning speed, seeking profits in tiny price discrepancies that 
might exist for a fraction of a second.”).  
 119. See Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,545 (“[HFT] strategies have also become an increasingly 
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New York City hedge fund Rebellion Research has left the job of 
picking stocks to “Star,” “an artificial intelligence program.”120  
Star picked stocks by scanning a dizzying array of 
statistics, from the price of commodities such as oil and 
corn to the performance of international currencies to the 
latest ticks of thousands of stocks around the world. More 
important, Star had learned its stock-picking strategies on 
its own. And as time went on, Start kept learning.121  
“Rebellion beat the market by a wide margin in 2007 and 2008”122 and, 
“[w]ell into 2011, Star had never once, in more than four years, fallen 
behind the S&P 500 in any rolling 365-day period.”123 
C.  The CFTC’s Concept Release  
On September 9, 2013, the CFTC issued a Concept Release on Risk 
Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments, 
which solicited comments in response to 124 questions in the 
document.124 The Concept Release noted that, “[i]n [CFTC]-regulated 
markets, orders generated by ATSs are ultimately transmitted to DCMs 
that have themselves become automated systems for the matching and 
execution of orders.”125 The “Concept Release reflects fundamental 
statutory objectives under the CEA . . . includ[ing] fostering a system of 
effective self-regulation, deterring and preventing disruptions to market 
integrity, protecting market participants and ‘promot[ing] responsible 
innovation and fair competition among boards of trade, other markets 
and market participants.’”126 In particular, the Concept Release stated 
                                                                                                                     
important component of automated trading environments. . . . Effectively, HFT is a form of 
automated trading, but not all automated trading is HFT.”).  
 120. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 322–29. “Star was akin to a digital Warren Buffett, 
a buy-and-hold computer program able to comb through nearly all tradable stocks in the world 
and determine which were the best and which the worst.” Id. at 323.  
 121. Id. at 322–23. 
 122. Id. at 323.  
 123. Id. at 332.  
 124. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,542. Then CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler stated that:  
“[t]his Concept Release [was] intended to stir public discussion and debate on 
how best to protect the functioning of markets for the benefit of farmers, 
ranchers, merchants and other end users who rely on markets to hedge risk—
particularly in light of the reality that the majority of the market is using 
automated trading systems.”  
Id. at 56,573 app. 2 (providing Statement of Support of Chairman Gary Gensler).  
 125. Id. at 56,544. 
 126. Id. (citing Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 3(b), 42 Stat. 998 (1922) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 5(b) (2012)). 
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that the CFTC desired to ascertain the risk controls and safeguards that 
would best help prevent market disruptions like the May 6, 2010 “Flash 
Crash.”127 The CFTC described the Concept Release as “a high-level 
enunciation of potential measures intended to reduce the likelihood of 
market disrupting events and mitigate their impact when they occur.”128 
Then CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler stated:  
We have witnessed a fundamental shift in markets from 
human-based trading to highly automated electronic 
trading. Automated trading systems, including high 
frequency traders, enter the market and execute trades in a 
matter of milliseconds without human involvement. 
Electronic trading makes up over 91 percent of the futures 
market. The swaps market also is moving toward electronic 
trading.129  
Through the Concept Release, the CFTC sought comments 
concerning four general topics: (1) pre-trade controls;130 (2) post-trade 
reports and other post-trade measures;131 (3) system safeguards;132 and 
(4) additional protections.133 The Concept Release also solicited 
comments concerning the stage at which risk controls would be most 
useful for firms, intermediaries,134 or exchanges135 (or all three).136 
                                                                                                                     
 127. See id. at 56,547. The Concept Release explained the events that precipitated the 
“Flash Crash” as follows:  
On that day, major equity indices in both the futures and securities markets fell 
over 5% in minutes before recovering almost as quickly. After investigation by 
both the [CFTC] and the SEC, it was found that a fundamental seller utilized an 
automated execution algorithm to sell 75,000 E-mini contracts (valued at 
approximately $4.1 billion) over an abbreviated time interval. The algorithm 
placed orders based on recent trading volume but was not programmed to take 
price or time into account; because of this lapse, a feedback loop triggered 
continued orders from the algorithm even as prices moved far beyond 
traditional daily ranges. Like the hypothetical example provided above, these 
declines in the derivatives market quickly filtered over to different, but closely 
related, products on many other exchanges.  
Id. 
 128. Id. at 56,551. 
 129. Id. at 56,573 app. 2. 
 130. Id. at 56,551–55. For example, “[s]ome regulated exchanges have tools specifically 
designed to . . . limit self-trading,” i.e., wash sales. Id. at 56,553.  
 131. Id. at 56,555–56.  
 132. Id. at 56,556–60. 
 133. Id. at 56,560–63. 
 134. Intermediaries include FCMs, CPOs and CTAs. Each of these intermediaries was 
defined in Section I.A. of this Article. Supra notes 69, 71–72 and accompanying text.  
 135. Examples of exchanges include DCMs and swap execution facilities (SEFs). Concept 
Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments, 78 Fed. 
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Potential pretrade controls include, inter alia, volatility awareness 
alerts, price collars, maximum order sizes, trading pauses, and credit 
risk limits.137 Possible post-trade controls include, inter alia, order 
reports, position reports, and standardized reporting windows for error 
trades.138 System safeguards referenced in the Concept Release include 
kill switches;139 policies and procedures concerning the design, testing, 
and supervision of ATSs; and ATS or algorithm identification.140 Other 
protections include possibly requiring the registration of persons who 
use ATSs as floor traders if they are not otherwise registered with the 
CFTC.141 Section 1a(23)(A) of the CEA defines the term, “floor trader,” 
as, inter alia, “any person . . . who, in or surrounding any pit, ring, post, 
or other place provided by a contract market for the meeting of persons 
similarly engaged, purchases, or sells solely for such person’s own 
account . . . any [futures contract, security futures product, swap or 
commodity option] or . . . who is registered with the [CFTC] as a floor 
trader.”142 The Concept Release’s comment period ended on December 
                                                                                                                     
Reg. at 56,552. For a definition of DCM, see supra note 76 and accompanying text. Generally, 
“[t]he term ‘swap execution facility’ means a trading system or platform in which multiple 
participants have the ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by 
multiple participants in the facility or system.” Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 
§ 1 a(50), 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(50) (2012)). 
 136. See Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,552. 
 137. Id. at 56,552–55. 
 138. See id. at 56,555–56.  
 139.  
For example, an order “kill switch” enables a market participant to immediately 
cancel all working orders generated by one or more of its ATSs, and prevents 
the submission of additional orders until the appropriate natural persons allow 
order placement to resume. Such a kill switch could be operated by the market 
participant generating orders, the clearing firm guaranteeing its trades, or the 
trading platform on which its orders would be executed. As another example, 
ATS monitoring and supervision standards, as well as pre-established crisis 
management protocols, could help ensure that human supervisors intervene 
quickly when ATSs experience degraded performance, and that supervision 
staff have . . . both the authority and knowledge to intervene as required.  
Id. at 56,549.  
 140. Id. at 56,556–63. 
 141. Id. at 56,560. The Concept Release also asked, “Should software firms providing 
algorithms be required to register . . . ?” Id. at 56,567.  
 142. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 1a(23)(A), 42 Stat. 998 (1922) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(23)(A) (2012)). Section 1a(23)(B) further states that the CFTC 
by rule or regulation, may include within, or exclude from, the term “floor 
trader” any person in or surrounding any pit, ring, post, or other place provided 
by a contract market for the meeting of persons similarly engaged who trades 
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11, 2013, but the CFTC re-opened the comment period for additional 
comments from January 21, 2014 until February 14, 2014.143 The CFTC 
is reportedly working on a notice of proposed rulemaking concerning 
ATSs, and the proposal might include a registration requirement for 
ATSs or HFT firms.144  
                                                                                                                     
solely for such person’s own account if the [CFTC] determines that the rule or 
regulation will effectuate the purposes of this chapter. 
Id. § 1a(23)(B) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(23)(B)). A floor broker, by comparison, is  
any person . . . who, in or surrounding any pit, ring, post, or other place 
provided by a contract market for the meeting of persons similarly engaged, 
shall purchase or sell for any other person [any futures contract, security futures 
product, swap, or commodity option] or . . . who is registered with the [CFTC] 
as a floor broker.  
Id. § 1a(22)(A) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(22)(A)). CEA § 1a(22)(B) contains language similar 
to CEA § 1a(23)(B), allowing the CFTC by rule or regulation to similarly expand or restrict the 
categories of persons who fall within the ambit of the term, “floor broker.” Compare id. 
§ 1a(22)(B) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(22)(B)), with id. § 1a(23)(B).  
 143. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Reopens Comment Period for Concept Release on Risk 
Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments (Jan. 17, 2014), 
available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6835-14.  
 144. Silla Brush, CFTC Weighs High-Speed Trader Registration for Oversight, 
BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2014, 2:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-13/cftc-
weighs-high-speed-trader-registration-for-oversight.html; Robert Schroeder, ‘Financial Markets 
Are Not Rigged’: CME Group President, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2014, 11:42 AM), http://blogs. 
marketwatch.com/capitolreport/2014/05/13/financial-markets-are-not-rigged-cme-group-presid 
ent/ (“The [CFTC’s] former chief economist told senators that high-speed traders should register 
with regulators. Andrei Kirilenko, now a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
said there should be a registration category for automated brokers and traders. The definition 
would be similar to what used to be called ‘floor brokers and traders,’ Kirilenko said.”). SEC 
Chair Mary Jo White stated that her agency also is considering, among other things, requiring 
“[p]roprietary traders who use automated strategies . . . to register with the SEC.” Silla Brush & 
Cheyenne Hopkins, High-Speed Traders Face Scrutiny by Levin’s Senate Investigators, 
BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-06-05/high-speed-
traders-face-scrutiny-by-levin-s-senate-investigators.html; see Douwe Miedema, U.S. CFTC 
Preparing Rule for High-Frequency Traders-Regulator, REUTERS (May 6, 2014, 12:49 AM), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/05/06/cftc-trading-idINL2N0NS1LA20140506 (noting the 
CFTC’s preparation of a proposed rule for automated trading); High Frequency and Automated 
Trading in Futures Markets: Hearing of the S. Comm. of Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry, 113th 
Cong. (2014), available at http://www.ag.senate.gov/hearings/high-frequency-and-automated-
trading-in-futures-markets (providing testimony of Vince McGonagle, director of the CFTC’s 
Division of Market Oversight); Hearing of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry 
Committee Subject: "High Frequency and Automated Trading in Futures Markets,” FED. NEWS 
SERV. (May 13, 2014),  available at advance.lexis.com (paid subscription required) (“One 
proposal or suggestion that we have in the concept release is whether we should . . . use the floor 
trader definition for high-frequency traders. And that’s something that we’re considering at the 
staff level with respect to recommendation . . . back to the [CFTC].”). White stated that the 
proposals would “includ[e] an ‘anti-disruptive trading’ rule to rein in aggressive short-term 
trading by high-frequency traders during vulnerable market conditions, and a plan to force more 
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II.  THE LAW OF MENTAL STATES 
 This Part examines the CFTC’s difficulty in proving the scienter 
requirement in a cause of action under the CEA. To better understand 
the different causes of action under the CEA, this Part explains the 
varying mental states the CFTC must prove for each cause of action. 
A.  Scienter for Business Entities  
Under the CEA, scienter—or a culpable mental state—is a required 
element of the majority of civil claims involving manipulation, abusive 
market practices, or financial fraud.145 Only humans and business 
entities are considered “persons” for purposes of the law.146 Noticeably, 
that leaves out computers and software programs, including ATSs.147 
                                                                                                                     
proprietary trading shops to register with regulators and open their books for inspection.” Sarah 
N. Lynch et al., U.S. SEC Chair Plots Major Rules for High-Speed Traders, Dark Pools, 
REUTERS (June 5, 2014, 5:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/05/sec-markets-
idUSL1N0OM1OB20140605. “The proposals will be developed by the SEC’s staff in the 
coming months and will require a vote by the full commission, meaning it could be months—if 
not years—before they’re fully implemented.” Scott Patterson, SEC’s White Unveils Sweeping 
Market Proposals, MARKETWATCH (June 5, 2014, 1:04 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/sto 
ry/secs-white-unveils-sweeping-markets-proposals-2014-06-05. 
 145. For example, one of the primary antifraud provisions in CEA § 4b, requires proof of 
scienter. Commodity Exchange Act § 4b (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6b); CFTC v. R.J. Fitzgerald & 
Co., 310 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2002). An exception is CEA § 4o(1)(B), which prohibits 
fraud by CTAs and CPOs (and their APs) and has been interpreted as not requiring proof of 
scienter. Commodity Exchange Act § 4o(1)(B) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B)); e.g., CFTC v. 
Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 233 F.3d 981, 993 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the 
language of 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) “focuses upon the effect a [commodity trading advisor’s 
(CTA’s)] conduct has on its investing customers rather than the CTA’s culpability, and so does 
not require a showing of scienter”); Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 677, 679 (11th 
Cir.1988) (stating that CEA § 4o(1)(B) “does not require proof of scienter” (emphasis omitted). 
Scienter also is an essential element of a securities fraud claim under SEC Rule 10b-5, which is 
the primary antifraud provision of the securities laws. See Randall W. Bodner et al., Corporate 
Scienter After Janus, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1639, at 1639 (Sept. 3, 2013) (“Scienter—
or a culpable mental state—is an essential element of any Rule 10b-5 securities fraud claim, 
including when the claim is against a corporation.”).  
 146. Business entities are “persons” for purposes of the law. See 21st Century Language 
Act of 2012, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the 
context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals . . . .”);  7 U.S.C. § 1a(38) (“The term ‘person’ imports the plural or singular, and 
includes individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts.”). 
 147. While some scholars have analyzed the issue of whether computerized or robotic 
artificial intelligences should be accorded personhood and legal rights, the issue of whether 
automated trading systems should be granted such treatment is beyond the scope of this Article. 
See generally F. Patrick Hubbard, “Do Androids Dream?”: Personhood and Intelligent 
Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 405 (2011) (arguing that human artifacts should be afforded legal 
rights if the artifacts meet certain criteria); F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: 
Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803 (2014) (concluding that 
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But because corporations and other business entities act through their 
employees and agents,148 lawsuits against business entities must prove 
scienter in the employee or employees involved in the culpable act 
or acts.149 That is, to determine corporate scienter, a court will look to 
the mental state of the corporate official or officials who made 
the allegedly improper actions—uttering false statements or making 
misrepresentations for instance—with the idea that a corporation can 
only know what is known by the persons acting on its behalf.150 
Therefore, the mental state requirement of any given cause of action 
ultimately must either be met—or not—in the mind of some specific 
human or humans.  
Most causes of action used to police improper trading practices in 
CFTC-regulated markets require at least proof of recklessness.151 
Lawmakers have described recklessness as highly unreasonable conduct 
                                                                                                                     
the current legal system’s method of addressing human injury from robotic machines provides 
an appropriate balance of innovation and liability); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for 
Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231 (1992) (exploring the legal and cognitive science 
landscape surrounding the question of whether artificial intelligence objects should be granted 
legal rights). The difficulty of establishing scienter to address harmful behavior that would 
otherwise, with sufficient proof of scienter, be illegal can arise in other contexts as well, such as 
in connection with self-driving robot cars. See Claire Cain Miller, When Driverless Cars Break 
the Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/upshot/when-
driverless-cars-break-the-law.html (stating that “[c]riminal penalties are a different story, for the 
simple reason that robots cannot be charged with a crime” and quoting Ryan Calo, a student 
studying robotics law at the University of Washington School of Law, as saying: “‘Criminal law 
is going to be looking for a guilty mind, a particular mental state—should this person have 
known better?’”). 
 148. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) (providing that “[t]he act, omission, or failure of 
any . . . agent, or other person acting for any . . . corporation, or trust within the scope of his 
employment or office shall be deemed the act, omission, or failure of 
such . . . corporation, . . . as well as of such official, agent, or other person”). Accordingly, a 
corporation or other business entity is liable for the acts, omissions, and failures of its officers, 
employees, and agents. See also Bodner, supra note 145, at 1639. 
 149. See Bodner, supra note 145, at 1639. Some federal circuit courts hold that the required 
culpable state of mind must be found in the specific natural person engaging in the improper 
activity, whereas other circuit courts have held that the mental state of a business entity—
referred to as “collective scienter” or “corporate scienter”—can be aggregated across multiple 
employees or agents. See id. For the purpose of this Article, the applicable scienter legal theory 
is not important, as both require a natural person or natural persons to have the required mental 
state.  
 150. See Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 
190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 708 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (citing Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th 
Cir. 2004)). 
 151. For example, as mentioned, fraud-based manipulation claims require proof of 
recklessness at a minimum, and price manipulation claims require proof of specific intent to 
cause an artificial price, and spoofing requires proof of scienter greater than recklessness. Supra 
notes 53–55.  
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that departs so greatly from the standard of care that it is “very difficult 
to believe the actor was not aware of what he or she was doing.”152 As a 
result, in circumstances where an ATS—without the direction of any 
human—made all of the specific actions that are alleged to have 
manipulated the price of a derivative or disrupted a market, the mental 
state requirements of many causes of actions could pose an 
insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs in private lawsuits and the CFTC 
in civil enforcement actions.153 Causes of action that require scienter—
reckless or intentional conduct—will not apply to circumstances where 
an ATS engaged in improper trading practices despite the fact that the 
human ATS programmers and operators did not intend for the ATS to 
do so and did not recklessly disregard the risk that the ATS would do 
so. 
B.  Mental States and Conduct: From Accidental to Intentional 
“The existence of criminal, quasi-criminal, or tortious conduct 
requires the convergence of a number of factors, generally characterized 
as the elements of the offense, violation, or cause of action. Included 
among such elements is the actor’s state of mind.”154 Different causes of 
action require different mental states, which can be placed on an 
imaginary continuum based on their difficulty to prove, ranging from 
strict liability claims that do not require proof of any mental state to 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,404 (July 
14, 2011) (citing Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).  
 153. See, for example, Lauer et al., supra note 38 stating: 
Algorithms make pleading and proving scienter far more difficult, magnifying 
its importance in high-frequency trading cases. . . . An algorithm may not 
obviously be designed to execute a manipulative trading practice, and the layers 
of complexity and quasi-randomness that can be introduced when an algorithm 
reacts to market stimuli will make pleading and proving scienter in the high-
frequency trading context far more difficult. 
On any judicial test to assess scienter, a high-frequency trading firm might 
easily defend itself by saying that the result of its algorithm was a truly 
unanticipated consequence of the algorithm’s response to market stimuli—
including other algorithms whose behavior could not possibly be predicted—
thus countering any intent to manipulate or inject inaccurate information into 
the market. 
See also Scott Patterson & Michael Rothfeld, FBI Investigates High-Speed Trading, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 31, 2014, 9:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023048869045 
79473874181722310 (subscription required) (“Because high-speed trades are executed by 
computer programs, it is often more difficult to detect nefarious activity and to prove that it was 
executed intentionally.”). 
 154. Pouncy, supra note 90, at 1685. 
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specific intent claims that require proof that the defendant intended to 
achieve a specific result by a particular act.155 An understanding of 
these different mental states is essential to understanding the causes of 
action discussed in this Article, which generally require proof of a 
particular mental state.  
1.  Strict Liability 
The lowest mental state standard for a claim is, not surprisingly, to 
have no mental state requirement at all. Strict liability causes of action 
impose liability without requiring any proof as to the mental state of the 
actor, a circumstance that makes one liable even for accidental or 
inadvertent violations of the law.156 Many “technical” violations of 
CFTC regulations are strict liability offenses. For example, persons who 
are required to register with the CFTC but fail to do so are liable 
regardless of intent—the CFTC does not have to prove that a person 
intentionally or recklessly failed to register as a commodity trading 
advisor or other intermediary.157  
2.  Reasonableness (Negligence) 
Negligence is the “failure to exercise the care that a [reasonably] 
prudent person usu[ally] exercises” in like circumstances.158 “Under a 
negligence standard, a defendant is liable for failure to act as a 
reasonable person would have under the circumstances, even if [the 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Id. at 1644 n.100 (1995) (“Violations of criminal or civil provisions can be predicated 
on showings of scienter ranging from the highest level of knowledge or intent, i.e., specific 
intent, to no knowledge or intent, i.e., strict liability.”).  
 156. State v. Clay, 900 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ohio 2008) (stating that, with strict liability 
criminal statutes, the accused’s mental state is irrelevant); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 39 (2006) 
(“If a statute expressly dispenses with a culpable mental state, the offense, generally classified 
as ‘malum prohibitum’ rather than ‘malum in se,’ is a strict liability offense.” (footnotes 
omitted)). Black’s Law Dictionary defines strict liability, which has been called “liability 
without fault,” as “[l]iability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but 
that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999). 
 157. See CFTC v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp., 560 F.2d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 
1977). Strict liability offenses arise in various areas of the law. For example, patent 
infringement is a strict liability tort. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (citing Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997)).  
 158. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 777; accord 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (5th ed. 1979) (“Negligence is the failure to use such care as a 
reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances . . . .”); W. 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 175 (5th ed. 1984) 
(concluding that “negligence is a failure to do what the reasonable person would do” under like 
circumstances); see also 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 133 (2004) (“[T]he objective test for 
negligence is normally stated simply in terms of the reasonably prudent person.”).  
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defendant] did not intend or appreciate the risks of [the] activities.”159 
Although negligence frequently is “discussed as a level of mens 
rea, . . . [it] is actually not a state of mind. Rather, it is a standard of 
conduct the defendant is expected to maintain regardless of his state of 
mind.”160 Further, “[t]he essence of negligence is unreasonableness; due 
care is simply reasonable conduct.”161 Therefore, a negligence standard 
involves determining, based on the given facts, whether the individual 
in question acted reasonably under the circumstances.  
Federal courts have interpreted § 4o(1)(B) of the CEA, which 
prohibits fraud by commodity trading advisors and commodity pool 
operators (and their associated persons),162 as not requiring scienter,163 
but only proof of negligence.164 A claim under § 4o(1)(B) “requires 
only that the violator have acted intentionally,” in that “he must have 
intended to employ the ‘device, scheme, or artifice’ but it is not 
necessary that he know that its result will be to defraud the client or 
prospective client.”165 Put another way, “[i]f the trading advisor or 
commodity pool operator intended to do what was done and its 
consequence is to defraud the client or prospective client that is enough 
to constitute a violation of § 4o(1)[(B)].”166 
3.  Recklessness 
The CFTC has stated that “recklessness [is] an act or omission that 
‘departs so far from the standards of ordinary care that it is very difficult 
                                                                                                                     
 159. Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 420 (1993). 
 160. Id. at 402 n.98.  
 161. Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1915); see also BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 156, at 1056 (defining negligence as “[t]he failure to exercise the 
standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation” 
and stating that “[t]he term denotes culpable carelessness”).  
 162. Commodity Exchange Act § 4o(1)(B), Pub. L. No. 112-105, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) (2012)) (“It shall be unlawful for a commodity trading advisor, 
associated person of a commodity trading advisor, commodity pool operator, or associated 
person of a commodity pool operator, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, directly or indirectly . . . to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of 
business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or participant or prospective client 
or participant.”). 
 163. See Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 233 F.3d 981, 993 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating 
that 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) “does not require a showing of scienter”); Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 
847 F.2d 673, 677 (11th Cir.1988) (stating that CEA § 4o(1)(B) “does not require proof of 
scienter” (emphasis omitted)); Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 936 F. Supp. 2d 357, 364 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, No. 13-1624, 2014 WL 4358439 (2d. Cir. 2014) (noting that the CFTC 
“has interpreted § 4o(1)(B) so as not to require scienter”). 
 164. Commodity Trend Serv., 233 F.3d at 994. 
 165. CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 285 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 166. Id. at 285.  
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to believe the actor was not aware of what he or she was doing.’”167 The 
Eleventh Circuit has described reckless conduct as ‘“highly 
unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that involve not merely 
simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from 
the standards of ordinary care, and that present a danger of misleading 
[customers] which is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that 
defendant must have been aware of it.’”168 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit 
has stated that “[r]ecklessness is defined as highly unreasonable conduct 
which is an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care. 
While the danger need not be known, it must at least be so obvious that 
any reasonable [person] would have known of it.”169 
Because “[p]roof of knowledge . . . is not required,”170 one law 
review article has stated that “recklessness is fundamentally a standard 
of conduct that requires judgments about what information an actor 
should have had and what results she should have anticipated, 
regardless of whether she in fact acquired that information or intended 
any particular result.”171 Parties can prove recklessness, as with other 
mental states, with circumstantial evidence.172  
4.  Intent 
“Intent” as a mental state does not appear to receive much in-depth 
analysis in CEA decisional law, as most decisions refer to “scienter,” 
which is “usually defined as an intent to defraud, deceive, or 
                                                                                                                     
 167. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,404 (July 
14, 2011) (quoting Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 
1988)); see also Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(discussing that recklessness under SEC Rule 10b-5 means “an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is 
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1093 
(9th Cir. 2010) (“[S]cienter [under SEC Rule 10b-5] requires either ‘deliberate recklessness’ or 
‘conscious recklessness,’ and . . . includes ‘a subjective inquiry’ turning on ‘the defendant’s 
actual state of mind.’”). 
 168. McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting 
Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961–62 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 169. Ashland, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 648 F.3d 461, 469 n.3 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation 
omitted). The Second Circuit has described recklessness as “[a]n egregious refusal to see the 
obvious, or to investigate the doubtful.” Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 
1996).  
 170. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,404 (citing 
Hollinger, v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568–96 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc)).  
 171. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Revolution in Manipulation Law: The New CFTC Rules 
and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 357, 395 
(2013). 
 172. See Sundstrand Corp., 533 F.2d at 1045. 
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manipulate,”173 although courts have held that recklessness also is 
sufficient.174 Judicial decisions concerning claims under the CEA often 
speak broadly in terms of “scienter” and then refer, without analysis, to 
brief definitions of intentional conduct and recklessness, without 
separately analyzing or explaining the two mental states in detail.175 As 
a result, discerning the exact definition that courts are using for 
“intentional” conduct in claims pursuant to the CEA or CFTC Rules can 
be challenging.176  
Generally speaking, however, to do something intentionally is to do 
the act in question on purpose, i.e., deliberately.177 For example, to 
intentionally defraud a customer, a person accused of fraud “must have 
known that he was cheating,”178 which means that the person must have 
                                                                                                                     
 173. See Dennis P. Orr, Note, New Light on an Old Debate: Negligence v. Scienter in an 
SEC Fraud Injunctive Suit, 51 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 759, 760 (1977).  
According to Prosser, the intent required for a common law action of deceit 
may be established by demonstrating the existence of any one of three states of 
mind. The first and most familiar is where “the speaker believes his statement 
to be false.” The second exists when the statement “is made without any belief 
as to its truth, or with reckless disregard whether it be true or false.” The third 
is where the individual does not know if the fact asserted is true, but his 
representation dictates that he possesses such knowledge. In the third situation, 
Prosser argued, the defendant has the necessary intent to deceive because he 
has misrepresented the actual extent of his knowledge. 
Id. at n.5 (citations omitted). 
 174. See Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
 (“[R]ecklessness is sufficient to satisfy [the CEA’s] scienter requirement.”). 
 175. See, e.g., CFTC v. Cloud, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,922 (S.D. Tex. 2011) 
(stating that “[s]cienter requires proof that a defendant committed the alleged wrongful acts 
‘intentionally or with reckless disregard for his duties under the [CEA]’” (quoting Drexel 
Burnham Lambert Inc., 850 F.2d at 748)); In re Forex Global Solutions Inc., No. 13-20, Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,593, 2013 WL 1496931, at *4 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 9, 2013) (“[S]cienter 
exists where a person knew his representations were false or made them with a reckless 
disregard for their truth or falsity.”). 
 176. In many CFTC enforcement cases involving fraud, the fraudulent conduct in question 
was obviously intentional, so courts frequently do not need to engage in extended analysis over 
whether the misconduct was done “with intent.” See, e.g., CFTC v. Wright, No. 5:13–cv–00092, 
2013 WL 6576882, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 28, 2013) (involving a defendant who misappropriated 
customer funds and told customers that their funds would be used for futures trading); CFTC v. 
Parrilla, No. 11–10621, 2013 WL 6979587 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2013) (“Defendant has 
misrepresented that [his company] would invest customer funds in forex, had high investment 
returns, had substantial trading experience, managed many millions of dollars, and so forth.”). 
 177. Arguably, the meaning of “intent,” as it has been used in the law, is contradictory and 
problematic. See generally David Crump, What Does Intent Mean?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1059 
(2010) (discussing the multiple ways courts have interpreted the word intent). However, an in-
depth examination of what is meant by “intent” is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 178. CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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known that the communications in question were false.179 Likewise, 
scienter generally exists when an individual’s acts are performed “with 
knowledge of their nature and character,”180 although “[p]roof of an evil 
motive is unnecessary.”181 Put another way, people may be presumed to 
intend the natural or probable consequences of their actions.182 Further, 
some courts have determined that “[t]he [CFTC] must demonstrate only 
that a defendant’s actions were ‘intentional as opposed to 
accidental,’”183 which would seem to set a relatively low bar for intent. 
Taken together, it appears that defendants act “intentionally” under the 
CEA if the evidence demonstrates they are consciously aware of what 
they are doing and of the nature of their actions.  
5.  Specific Intent  
Specific intent is a mental state that exists when people desire to 
accomplish a specific result with their actions, as opposed to simply 
intending to do the underlying actions.184 For example, under the CEA, 
price manipulation claims185 require proof of specific intent. This means 
that, in an enforcement action, the CFTC must show that the persons 
accused of manipulation engaged in acts “with the purpose or conscious 
object of causing or effecting a price or price trend in the market that 
did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and demand.”186 Specific 
intent is generally considered a difficult mental state to prove,187 as it 
involves ratcheting up the degree of specificity required in connection 
                                                                                                                     
 179. Id.  
 180. See Wasnick v. Refco, Inc., 911 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 181. Lawrence v. CFTC, 759 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 182. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 385–86 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing, inter 
alia, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977)). 
 183. CFTC v. Cloud, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,922 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2011) 
(quoting Lawrence, 759 F.2d at 773). 
 184. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (9th ed. 2009) (“The intent to accomplish the precise 
criminal act that one is later charged with.”); Specific Intent, NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW 
DICTIONARY, http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/specific-intent-term.html (last visited Dec. 14, 
2014) (defining specific intent as “[a] person’s intent to produce the precise consequences of 
that person’s act, including the intent to do the physical act itself. For example, larceny is taking 
the personal property of another with the intent to permanently deprive the other person of it. A 
person is not guilty of larceny just because he took someone else’s property; the prosecutor must 
prove that the defendant intended to take the property, and that he took it in order to keep it 
permanently”).  
 185. Price manipulation, also referred to as “market-power manipulation,” is discussed in 
more detail in Section III.A. of this Article.  
 186. CFTC v. Parnon Energy, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 187. Indeed, some commentators have referred to price manipulation as “an unprosecutable 
crime,” in part because of the specific intent requirement. See Jerry W. Markham, The 
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 356 (1991).  
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with proving what the defendant allegedly intended to do. As discussed 
in greater detail below, the CFTC has had difficulty in prosecuting price 
manipulation claims, and CFTC officials and members of Congress 
have stated that they believe the specific intent requirement for such 
claims is one of the reasons for that fact.188  
III.  CAUSES OF ACTION THAT PROHIBIT IMPROPER TRADING 
PRACTICES 
Understandably, the CFTC traditionally has policed manipulative 
and disruptive trading practices by filing lawsuits grounded in causes of 
action that explicitly prohibit those activities, as opposed to using 
failure-to-supervise claims. For example, the CFTC has used 
prohibitions from § 9(a)(2) of the CEA against price manipulation and 
false reports189 to combat a variety of improper schemes, from the more 
typical “corners”190 to instances of spoofing191 and banging the close.192 
Likewise, the Dodd–Frank Act amended the CEA to allow for new 
causes of action against fraud-based manipulative and deceptive 
devices193 and three enumerated disruptive trading practices—spoofing, 
banging the close, and violating bids and offers.194 
With one exception, the pre- and post-Dodd–Frank Act causes of 
action require proof of a mental state characterized by recklessness or 
some level of intentional conduct.195 The one exception—violating bids 
and offers—applies to the limited kind of conduct in which a party buys 
a contract at a price higher than the lowest available price offered or 
sells a contract at a price lower than the highest available price bid.196 
This one exception is further restricted by its inapplicability to trading 
                                                                                                                     
 188. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S3348 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (statement of Sen. Cantwell) 
(stating that “[c]urrent law makes it very difficult for the [CFTC] to prove market manipulation” 
because “[t]he CFTC has to prove that someone had specific intent to manipulate, and that is a 
very difficult standard to prove”); see also CFTC, Transcript of Open Meeting on Five Final 
Rule Proposals Under the Dodd–Frank Act 40–41 (July 7, 2011) (comments of then CFTC 
Chairman Gensler), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/d 
fsubmission/dfsubmissionmult_070711-trans.pdf. 
 189. Infra note 212. 
 190. JERRY W. MARKHAM, 13 COMMODITIES REG. § 15:8 (“The more classic market 
manipulation cases involve the use of market power to achieve the manipulation, e.g., a corner 
or squeeze.”). 
 191. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.  
 192. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.  
 193. For a discussion on the CFTC’s new authority to combat fraud-based manipulation, 
see infra Section III.D.  
 194. For a discussion of the CFTC’s new authority regarding disruptive trading practices, 
see infra Section III.C.  
 195. For a discussion of the mental state requirements of each cause of action, see supra 
Part II.  
 196. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890, 31,893–94 (May 29, 2013). 
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on exchanges or platforms that automatically match bids and offers,197 
as is now generally the norm.198 As a result, these more typical means of 
combatting manipulative and disruptive trading practices are useless in 
circumstances where none of the persons accused of wrongdoing have 
the requisite scienter, such as when an ATS independently engages in 
manipulative and disruptive conduct.199 It is still important, however, to 
understand the primary civil enforcement causes of action that the 
CFTC has used to prosecute these kinds of trading abuses, if only to 
provide background for how the CFTC generally combats human-
directed disruptive trading activities. 
A.  Market-Power Manipulation—Attack of the 800-Pound 
Gorilla  
From the beginning of futures trading in the United States in 
Chicago shortly before the Civil War, rampant market manipulation and 
other abusive trading practices have threatened commodity futures 
trading.200 Accordingly, since the passage of the Grain Futures Act of 
1922 (GFA), the precursor to the CEA of 1936 and the first federal 
effort to oversee U.S. derivative markets, the “central focus” and 
“essential goal” of the federal regulation of futures and derivatives has 
been “the punishment and prevention of . . . manipulation,”201 which is 
more specifically referred to as “price manipulation”202 or “market-
                                                                                                                     
 197. Id. at 31,893. 
 198. See Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,544 (Sept. 12, 2013) (“In Commission-regulated 
markets, orders generated by ATSs are ultimately transmitted to DCMs that have themselves 
become automated systems for the matching and execution of orders.”). 
 199. It is possible that a human ATS operator could engage in reckless conduct in the 
course of controlling and supervising an ATS, in which case some of these causes of action 
would be viable. As mentioned above, however, this Article primarily addresses circumstances 
in which a human ATS operator would not have a culpable mental state beyond negligence, 
which would make many of the causes of action discussed below inapplicable.  
 200. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 187, at 288–92; Comment, The Delivery Requirement: 
An Illusory Bar to Regulation of Manipulation in Commodity Exchanges, 73 YALE L.J. 171, 171 
n.2 (1963). 
 201. Thomas A. Hieronymus, Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: Toward a 
Definition, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 41, 41 (1977); see also Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. 112-
105, § 3(b), 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 5(b) (2012)) (stating that the purpose of 
the CEA is, inter alia, “to deter and prevent price manipulation or any other disruptions to 
market integrity”); George A. Davidson, Squeezes and Corners: A Structural Approach, 40 BUS. 
LAW. 1283, 1283 (1985) (citing, inter alia, legislative history from the 1920s and stating that 
“[f]rom the outset of federal regulation of commodities trading, Congress . . . believed that one 
of the principal problems requiring regulation is traders seeking to corner the market or squeeze 
other market participants”). 
 202. See United States v. Radley, 632 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2011) (using the phrase 
“price manipulation”); Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of 
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power manipulation.”203 For the purposes of this Article, the two terms 
will be used interchangeably. Perhaps more colorfully, a former CFTC 
chairman has compared market-power manipulation to situations 
“where the 800-pound gorilla simply invades the chicken coop.”204 
From the beginning, federal law and regulators largely have been 
viewed as ineffective at preventing and punishing manipulation.205 
Starting with the GFA and continuing to this day, federal law has 
outlawed manipulation without defining it.206 Indeed, Congress has 
periodically updated and modified the CEA, frequently with the 
objective of better preventing manipulation,207 most recently with the 
Dodd–Frank Act,208 but without ever adding a definition of the term.209 
Commentators have described market-power manipulation of futures210 
                                                                                                                     
Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 
41,398, 41,407 (July 14, 2011) (same). 
 203. See generally Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis, and 
Deterrence, 31 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing types of “market power manipulations” and 
distinguishing them from “fraud-based manipulations”). 
 204. Philip McBride Johnson, CFTC’s New Manipulation Rules, FUTURES MAG. (July 25, 
2011), http://www.futuresmag.com/2011/07/25/cftcs-new-manipulation-rules. 
 205. See generally Markham, supra note 187, at 288–358 (tracing the history of changes to 
federal law in an attempt to combat manipulation and explaining how those attempts failed). For 
example, Congress created the CFTC in 1974 in the hopes that the new agency would better 
address manipulations and market disruptions than its predecessor, the CEA. Id. at 331–34.  
 206. JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 23A BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS SEC. 
& COMM. LAW § 9:17:50. The lack of a definition for the term, “manipulation,” is somewhat 
less surprising when viewed in connection with other omissions and ambiguities in the federal 
statutory framework governing derivatives. For example, neither the GFA nor the CEA (which 
was largely based on the GFA and superseded it) defined the term, “futures contract,” despite 
the fact that the regulation of futures trading was then—and is now—the overarching purpose of 
those respective statutes. See Glenn Willett Clark, Genealogy and Genetics of “Contract of Sale 
of a Commodity for Future Delivery” in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1175, 
1175 & n.1 (1978). 
 207. See Markham, supra note 187, at 288–358 (detailing the repeated, unsuccessful 
congressional attempts, throughout history, to improve federal law so that authorities could 
better prevent and punish manipulation).  
 208. As will be discussed in greater detail below, Congress added § 753 of the Dodd–Frank 
Act to provide the CFTC with additional means to fight manipulative devices and contrivances. 
See infra notes 274–84.  
 209. See supra note 206; see also Abelardo Lopez Valdez, Modernizing the Regulation of 
the Commodity Futures Markets, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 47 n.69 (1975) (noting the lack of a 
definition of manipulation in the GFA and the CEA). Notwithstanding the lack of a formal 
definition, the CEA’s anti-manipulation prohibitions are not unconstitutionally vague and do not 
violate the fair notice doctrine. See Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350, 351, 354 (7th Cir. 
1933); United States v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1055–61 (N.D. Cal. 
2006), aff’d in part, 188 F. App’x 629 (9th Cir. 2006); CFTC v. Atha, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 
1382–83 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Markham, supra note 187, at 302. 
 210. Market-power manipulation causes of action are similar to antitrust causes of action. 
See Benjamin E. Kozinn, Note, The Great Copper Caper: Is Market Manipulation Really a 
Problem in the Wake of Sumitomo Debacle?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 243, 256 (2000) (“Generally, 
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as follows:  
In the realm of commodities trading, market power 
manipulation arises when a long controls enough of a 
particular futures contract, a substantial portion of the 
underlying cash commodity, or both, during or near the end 
of the delivery month. Because the long controls a 
significant portion of the underlying commodity, she leaves 
no avenue for the shorts to either offset their position or 
make delivery. Inevitably, the shorts are forced to deal 
solely with the long manipulator and must pay an 
“artificial” price to fulfill their obligation, in order to avoid 
defaulting on their contract and having to pay draconian 
sanctions.211  
Under current law, § 9(a)(2) of the CEA prohibits any person from 
manipulating the price of a commodity in interstate commerce, a futures 
contract, or a swap.212 Sections 6(c) and 6(d) authorize the CFTC to file 
a complaint and impose, inter alia, civil monetary penalties and cease 
and desist orders if the CFTC believes that a person has manipulated or 
attempted to manipulate the market price of any commodity, futures 
contract, or swap (or has violated any of the provisions of the CEA).213 
To state a claim for price manipulation, the CFTC must allege that: 
(1) the defendant had the ability to influence market prices; (2) an 
artificial price existed; (3) the defendant caused the artificial price; and 
(4) the defendant specifically intended to cause the artificial price.214 
“An artificial price is a price that does not reflect basic forces of supply 
and demand.”215 To satisfy the specific intent element, the CFTC must 
                                                                                                                     
‘market power’ is the exercise of ‘monopoly power,’ a concept derived from antitrust laws.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
 211. Id. at 256. See generally Davidson, supra note 201 (describing the mechanics of 
“squeezes”). For a definition of “price manipulation,” see 3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, 
§ 5.02[3], at 1240. 
 212. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No 112-105, § 9(a)(2), 42 Stat. 998 (1922) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2012)). Section 9(a)(2) of the CEA also states that it is illegal to 
cause false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate reports to be delivered that affect or tend to 
affect the price of a commodity. Id.; accord In re Bunge Global Markets, Inc., No. 11-10, 2011 
WL 1099346, at *4 (C.F.T.C. 2011). 
 213. Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c)(4)(A) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 9(4)(A)); id. 
§ 9(10)(C) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 9(10)(C)); id. § 6(d) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 13b).  
 214. CFTC v. Parnon Energy, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). To prove 
attempted manipulation under CEA § 9(a)(2), the CFTC must prove: (1) a specific intent to 
affect the market price, and (2) overt acts in furtherance of that specific intent. Intent may be 
inferred from the totality of circumstances. In re Hohenberg Bros. Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 20,271, 1977 WL 383513 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 18, 1997).  
 215. Parnon, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 246 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 2011, the CFTC 
promulgated 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2011), which mirrors traditional price manipulation and 
attempted price manipulation claims. See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted 
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prove that the defendant “acted (or failed to act) with the purpose or 
conscious object of causing or effecting a price or price trend in the 
market that did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and 
demand.”216 To be clear, “the necessary intent must attach to the 
creation of artificial prices, rather than simply to intentional trading that 
thereafter brought about unintended artificial prices,” i.e., “the 
manipulator must have a specific intent to create artificial prices.”217 
Some authors have called intent the “essence”218 and “determinative 
element”219 of a price manipulation claim. Indeed, the CFTC has stated 
that “[i]t is the intent of the parties which separates otherwise lawful 
business conduct from unlawful manipulative activity.”220 “Thus, a 
legitimate transaction combined with an improper motive is 
commodities manipulation.”221 While the CFTC can base proof of intent 
on circumstantial (as opposed to direct) evidence,222 the commission has 
traditionally had great difficulty proving the specific intent requirement 
of a price manipulation claim.223 This is the case because few would-be 
manipulators openly provide evidence of their improper motives.224 As 
                                                                                                                     
Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 
Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,407 (July 14, 2011) (“[I]n applying final Rule 180.2, [the CFTC] will be 
guided by the traditional four-part test for manipulation that has developed in case law arising 
under [CEA §§] 6(c) and 9(a)(2) . . . .”). 
 216. Parnon, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 217. 3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 5.05[3], at 1269; see, e.g., Hershey v. Energy 
Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 249 (5th Cir. 2010).  
 218. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 206 (stating that the element of intent is “the essence 
of a manipulation claim”). 
 219. 3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 5.05[1], at 1266 (quoting and citing Great W. 
Food Distribs. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 1953)); see Davidson, supra note 201, at 
1289 (“In practice, the only important issue is intent.”). 
 220. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., No. 75-14, 1982 WL 30249, at *6 
(C.F.T.C. Dec. 17, 1982); see also Davidson, supra note 201, at 1289 (“[A] squeezer cannot be 
held liable without proof of intent, and evidence of intent will exist only in cases in which the 
respondents have acted in a clumsy and obvious manner.”). 
 221. In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 513, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008), aff’d, 730 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 222. E.g., G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 286, 290 (7th Cir. 1958); accord 3 
JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 5.05[2], at 1267.  
 223. Establishing the existence of an artificial price also is complicated and difficult. 
Davidson, supra note 201, at 1288 (“Defining when a price is ‘artificial’ is more difficult yet.”); 
Markham, supra note 187, at 284 (“But here lies the rub: it is virtually impossible to determine 
what constitutes an artificial price.”). 
 224. See Geoffrey F. Aronow, What Constitutes “Manipulation” or “Disruptive 
Practices” After Dodd-Frank? A Difficult Set of Standards for Traders to Live by Gets More 
Difficult, 30 FUTURE & DERIVATIVES L. REP. (West) No. 8, at 1, *4 (Sept. 2010) (stating that 
proving a person entered trades specifically to create artificial prices—as opposed to doing so 
out of “legitimate commercial needs,” is “the rock on which most CFTC prosecutions have 
floundered” because “in almost every trading situation, in examining conduct after the fact, 
there is a reasonable commercial explanation for the trading”); Davidson, supra note 201, at 
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mentioned above, because of the inherent difficulties associated with 
proving the specific intent element required of price manipulation 
claims, “in recent years the CFTC has brought cases, with few 
exceptions, only when it felt it has a ‘smoking gun’ that demonstrates 
intent to manipulate,” such as “faxes, telephone recordings, memos, 
emails, and instant messages.”225 “But absent such evidence of intent, 
the CFTC has been extremely reluctant to pull the trigger on 
prosecutions.”226 
B.  Noncompetitive, Prearranged Trading  
Section 4c(a) of the CEA and CFTC Rule 1.38 provide that it is 
unlawful for anyone to enter into certain kinds of transactions that are 
considered noncompetitive or believed to facilitate noncompetitive 
                                                                                                                     
1287 (“The problem is that it is very hard to distinguish the unlawful conduct of the squeezer 
from conduct undertaken for the entirely lawful purpose for which traders enter the futures 
market: to make money.”); Markham, supra note 187, at 356–57 (“Even where a gross 
manipulation occurs, the government is still faced with the imposing burden of proving that the 
price was artificial and that the trader was attempting to create an artificial price rather than 
exploiting a market situation based upon natural forces.”); Pirrong, supra note 203, at 10 (“The 
[CFTC] has similarly muddled the intent standard so as to provide a manipulator with 
considerable leeway.”); see also Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A 
Comment on Dealing with Market Manipulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 391, 391 (1991) (“[T]he 
seventy-year effort by the federal government to eliminate . . . market manipulations has been 
more or less unsuccessful.”); see also, e.g., CFTC v. Delay, No. 7:05CV5026, 2006 WL 
3359076, at *1 (D. Neb. Nov. 17, 2006) (stating that “[f]iguring out whether another person 
harbored a wrongful intent is a very hard thing to do” and finding, after a non-jury trial, that the 
CFTC had failed to prove that defendant manipulated or attempted to manipulate the feeder 
cattle futures market).  
 225. Aronow, supra note 224, at *4; see also Davidson, supra note 201, at 1288 (“Since 
unlawful motives are seldom admitted, proof of motive is ordinarily an arduous undertaking that 
involves considerable use of circumstantial evidence. In the squeeze context, the task is 
especially difficult.”). Compare Hearing on High Frequency and Automated Trading in Futures 
Markets Before the S. Comm. of Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry, 113th Cong. *7 (2014), available 
at http://www.ag.senate.gov/hearings/high-frequency-and-automated-trading-in-futures-markets 
(providing the written testimony of Andrei Kirilenko, professor of the practice of finance, Sloan 
School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and former chief economist for 
the CFTC), and id. (“The age when a regulator could rely on an overheard conversation to begin 
an investigation is over. Algorithms don’t brag on the phone that they just ‘hammered the 
market’ or send text messages to their girlfriends about how ‘fabulous’ they are. To catch the 
manipulative or disruptive behavior of an algorithm, regulators need to have the technological 
tools to sift through communication and trading patterns among the new inhabitants of the 
market place—the machines.”), with Pirrong, supra note 203, at 17 (arguing that “[l]awyers, in 
my experience, tend to believe that intent can only be proven through statements made in 
emails, correspondence, documents, or recorded conversations,” whereas economists believe 
that one can “make highly accurate evaluations of intent by comparing the conduct of an alleged 
manipulator” with the conduct of “a profit-maximizing, commercially rational, but 
competitive . . . trader”). 
 226. Aronow, supra note 224, at *4. 
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trading.227 “A noncompetitive trade is generally transacted in 
accordance with an express or implied agreement between the 
participants.”228 That is, in passing § 4c(a) of the CEA, Congress 
wanted “to outlaw insofar as possible all schemes of trading that are 
artificial and are not the result of arms-length trading on the basis of 
supply and demand factors.”229 Specifically, §§ 4c(a)(1) and (2) of the 
CEA, taken together, provide that it is  
unlawful for any person to offer to enter into, enter into, or 
confirm the execution of a transaction . . . involving the 
purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery (or 
any option on such a transaction or option on a commodity) 
or swap . . . that (A)(i) is, of the character of, or is 
commonly known to the trade as, a “wash sale” or 
“accommodation trade”; or (ii) is a fictitious sale; or (B) is 
used to cause any price to be reported, registered, or 
recorded that is not a true and bona fide price.230  
The CFTC has stated that “the common denominator of the specific 
abuses prohibited in § 4c(a) . . . is the use of trading techniques that give 
the appearance of submitting trades to the open market while negating 
the risk or price competition incident to such a market.”231 Similarly, 
Rule 1.38(a)232 also prohibits prearranged trading that is not in 
accordance with the normal, competitive process of exchange trading.233 
                                                                                                                     
 227. Pouncy, supra note 90, at 1635; see also 17 C.F.R. § 1.38(a) (2013). 
 228. In re Blackrock Inst. Trust Co., No. 12-13, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,143, 2012 
WL 1377970, at *3 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 8, 2012) (citing In re Gilchrist, [1990–1992 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,993, ¶ 37,652 (Jan. 25, 1991)). 
 229. In re Goldwurm, 7 Agric. Dec. 265, 276 (1948).  
 230. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (codifying Commodity Exchange Act § 4c(a)(1)–(2)). 
As a general matter, commentators consider wash sales and other such trading practices to be 
illegal forms of market manipulation under the securities laws. See 3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra 
note 8, § 5.08[1], at 1311. Indeed, even under the anti-manipulation provisions of the CEA, 
courts view wash sales as part of a price manipulation scheme. See, e.g., In re Nat. Gas 
Commodity Litig., 337 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing plaintiffs’ 
presentation of evidence that wash trades in the spot market affected the futures and thereby 
caused price manipulation (in addition to violations of the prohibition on wash trading)).  
 231. In re Collins, No. 77-15, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22,982, 1986 WL 1194295, at 
*7 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 4, 1986), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262 (2d. 
Cir. 1987).  
 232. 17 C.F.R. 1.38(a) (2013) (codifying CFTC Rule 1.38(a) and stating that “[a]ll 
purchases and sales of [futures contracts and commodity options] . . . shall be executed openly 
and competitively by open outcry or posting of bids and offers or by other equally open and 
competitive methods, in the trading pit or ring or similar place provided by the contract 
market”). 
 233. In re Blackrock, 2012 WL 1377970, at *3 (citing In re Gimbel, [1987–1990 Transfer 
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,213, ¶ 35,003 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 14, 1988)); In re J.P. 
Morgan Sec. LLC, No 12-14, 2012 WL 1377972, at *3 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 8, 2012). 
44
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/5
2015] IMPROPER TRADING PRACTICES BY ALGORITHMIC ROBOTS 265 
 
Accordingly, the law and regulations provide for separate civil 
enforcement causes of action for: (1) wash sales;234 (2) accommodation 
sales;235 (3) fictitious sales;236 (4) causing a non-bona fide price 
to be reported,237 and (5) violations of Rule 1.38(a).238 Because the 
elements—and mental state requirements—appear to be more or less the 
same for those causes of actions, this Article will analyze one cause of 
action—wash sales—as illustrative of all five of these kinds of 
violations.  
Wash sales in futures contracts involve the following two-step 
scheme: 
Wash trading . . . consists of the simultaneous purchase and 
sale of the same number of futures contracts at the same or 
very similar price. Ordinarily, the purchase of a futures 
contract obligates the buyer to take delivery of the 
commodity represented by the contract on a date certain. 
Conversely, the sale of a commodity futures contract 
obligates the seller to deliver the commodity represented by 
the contract on a date certain. The simultaneous purchase 
and sale of the same commodity futures contract at the 
same price results in a nullity, as the two sets of contractual 
obligations offset each other.239  
                                                                                                                     
 234. “Wash trading . . . is the archetypical form of fictious trading.” See Pouncy, supra 
note 90, at 1637. 
 235.  See id. at 1636 n.54 (defining accommodation sale); Sundheimer v. CFTC, 688 F.2d 
150, 152 (2d Cir. 1982) (“It is this intent, the absence of good-faith, arms-length trading, and the 
undisclosed prearrangement for losses and gains, that demonstrates the ‘accommodation’ nature 
of the transactions in the instant case.”); see also 80 CONG. REC. 6162 (Apr. 27, 1936) 
(statement of Senator Pope) (“An accommodation trade is a transaction between two 
commission houses whereby, one being long with the clearing house and the other being short, 
the one that is long sells to the one that is short enough of a given future to give each house an 
even or nearly even position, thus reducing the amount of the margin to be put up with the 
clearing house. At some later date another transaction is made, unwinding and undoing the first 
transaction.”). 
 236. In re Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 12-22, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,218, 2012 
WL 3262462, at *4 (C.F.T.C. June 5, 2012) (citing In re Collins, [1996–1998 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,194, ¶ 45,742 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 10, 1997)). 
 237. See In re Casas Sendas Comercio E Industria S.A., No. 03-23, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 29,566, 2003 WL 22006283, at *2 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 18, 2003).  
 238. In re Blackrock, 2012 WL 1377970, at *3; In re J.P. Morgan, 2012 WL 1377972, at 
*3 .  
 239. Pouncy, supra note 90, at 1625–26 (footnotes omitted). “Wash sales are fictitious 
transaction[s] usually made so it will appear that there are or have been trades, but without 
actually taking a position in the market.” Id. at 1635 n.52 (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
In a wash sale, for example, a trader gives the appearance of making 
independent decisions to buy and then sell (or sell and then buy) one or more 
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Congress made wash sales illegal in 1936 with the passage of the 
CEA,240 viewing such trading activity as “pure, unadulterated fraud.”241 
One scholar has called wash sales “a powerful multipurpose tool that 
can be used . . . for significant frauds and market manipulations.”242 
Wash sales “are considered harmful because they create illusory price 
movements in the markets.”243 In particular, “[o]ne way wash trades can 
affect other market players is that a burst in volume can lure more 
traders, creating the impression of more action than is actually taking 
place. That can distort prices in ways that benefit some market 
participants.”244 “[M]any prosecutions for wash trading involve the 
trading of nominally different accounts controlled by a single 
individual.”245 Persons engage in wash sales “for a number of reasons” 
including “to increase trading volume in a particular contract, . . . to 
defer trading losses or gains for tax purposes, to transfer funds between 
accounts, to defraud customers, and to manipulate prices of futures 
contracts.”246 While wash sales previously occurred on the floor of 
                                                                                                                     
futures contracts. His actual intention at the time he initiates the transaction, 
however, is to both buy and sell the contract at the same or a similar price—in 
other words, to create a financial and position nullity extraneous to the price 
discovery and risk-shifting functions of the futures markets. 
In re Bear Stearns & Co., No. 80-31, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,994, 1991 WL 11711622, 
at *11 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 25, 1991). “Section 4c of the CEA prohibits wash trades, which are 
fictitious, prearranged sales in which the same parties agree to a pair of offsetting trades for the 
same commodity, at no economic risk or net change in beneficial ownership.” STEVEN 
WOLOWITZ, 6 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 71:13 (3d ed. 2013). 
 240. Pouncy, supra note 90, at 1644–45; see also 78 CONG. REC. 10,449 (1934) (statement 
of Representative Pierce) (“Wash sales and fictitious transactions are prohibited, as they should 
be, and severest penalties are provided for such practices.”). 
 241. 80 CONG. REC. 7905 (1936) (remarks of Senator Smith); see also 80 CONG. REC. 7858 
(1936) (remarks of Senator Murray) (“The bill seeks to minimize cheating or fraudulent 
practices by outlawing . . . wash sales, cross trades, accommodation trades, and other fictitious 
transactions. There hardly is need for any comments on these provisions.”); 80 CONG. REC. 6162 
(1936) (statement of Senator Pope) (“Wash sales are pretended sales made openly in the pit or 
trading place for the purpose of deceiving other traders. They are employed to give a false 
appearance of trading and to cause prices to be registered which are not true prices. They may 
be entered and recorded as real trades, but by agreement between the parties privately are either 
canceled or washed out by other trades.”); 78 CONG. REC. 10,449 (1934) (remarks of 
Representative Gilchrist) (stating that the CEA was “directed . . . against all of those dishonest 
schemes to which dishonest traders sometimes resort in order to trick a gullible public and 
prevent the producer from getting an honest price,” such as wash sales). 
 242. Pouncy, supra note 90, at 1626. 
 243. Wilson v. CFTC, 322 F.3d 555, 559 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 244. Scott Patterson et al., Futures Trades Scrutinized, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2013, 12:01 
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424127887323639604578366491497070204 
(subscription required). 
 245. Pouncy, supra note 90, at 1638. 
 246. Id. 
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trading pits, today traders can use computer programs to facilitate wash 
sales electronically.247 
To establish a violation of the CEA’s prohibition against wash sales 
(or accommodation sales), the CFTC must show (1) the simultaneous 
purchase and sale, (2) of the same delivery month of the same futures 
contract (or option or swap), (3) at the same or similar price,248 plus (4) 
the requisite mental state (intent).249 To prove the required mental state 
for a violation of § 4c(a) of the CEA, one must show that the individuals 
traded with the intent to negate risk or price competition at the time the 
transaction was initiated, and knew at the time that the transaction was 
designed to achieve a wash result that negated risk.250 Indeed, “[t]he 
central characteristic of a wash sale is the intent not to make a genuine 
bona fide transaction.”251 The CFTC can prove intent, however, from 
circumstantial evidence, such as unusual trading activity and motives 
for trading unrelated to the economics of the specific futures 
transactions in question.252  
The exact mental state required for a wash sales claim is unclear,253 
but, based on the language above, it appears that the CFTC must, at a 
minimum, prove that a defendant acted knowingly and with some 
intent.254 The intent required under § 4c(a) is the intent to negate risk at 
                                                                                                                     
 247. E.g., Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Sanctions Gelber Group, LLC $750,000 for Trading 
Abuses on Two Exchanges (Feb. 8, 2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Press
Releases/pr6512-13 (“Moreover, rather than rely solely on manual wash sales . . . [the 
defendant] directed a . . . programmer to create a computer program that would automatically 
enter matching orders from each trader’s computer. The two traders used the computer program 
each month during the relevant period and executed wash sales repeatedly in the Russell 1000 
[index futures] contracts . . . .”). 
 248. In re Piasio, [1998–1999 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 28,276, 2000 
WL 36107969, at *7 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 29, 2000) (citing In re Gilchrist, [1990–1992 Transfer 
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,993, ¶ 37,653 (1991)). 
 249. See Reddy v. CFTC, 191 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 1999); see also In re Citadel Trading 
Co. of Chi., Ltd., Nos. 77-8, 80-11, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,082,1986 WL 1194393, at 
*9 (C.F.T.C. May 12, 1986) (“The central characteristic of a wash sale is the intent not to make 
a genuine bona fide trading transaction.”).  
 250. See Wilson v. CFTC, 322 F.3d 555, 560 (8th Cir. 2003); Reddy, 191 F.3d at 118–19.  
 251. In re Citadel Trading Co., 1986 WL 1194393, at *9. 
 252. E.g., Reddy, 191 F.3d at 119; In re Rousso, No. 91-3, 1997 WL 422859, at *10 
(C.F.T.C. July 29, 1997); In re Buckwalter, No. 80-28, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,995, 
1991 WL 83522, at *25 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 25, 1991).  
 253. See Pouncy, supra note 90, at 1648–61 (analyzing CFTC decisions and federal court 
decisions interpreting the level of intent required for wash sales violations under the CEA); Id. 
(noting that “[t]he Commission’s interpretations of the scienter requirement necessary to 
establish a violation of the Act’s wash trading prohibition have created a region of uncertainty . . 
. .” (emphasis added)).  
 254. In re Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 12-22, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,218, 2012 
WL 3262462, at *4 n.4 (C.F.T.C. June 5, 2012) (“[T]o establish a violation of Section 4c(a) of 
the [CEA] . . . the [CFTC] also must demonstrate that a person knowingly participated in 
transactions initiated with intent to avoid a bona fide market position.”). 
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the time the transaction was initiated and the knowledge at the time of 
participation in the transaction that it was designed to have a wash 
result. This is similar to the intent required in a market-power 
manipulation claim under CEA §§ 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2)—the intent to 
create an artificial price. Accordingly, wash sale violations may even 
require proof of specific intent.255  
One commentator, Professor Charles R.P. Pouncy, has warned that 
requiring too high of a mental state can make it difficult to enforce 
prohibitions against market abuses such as wash trades. He notes that 
“the scienter requirement can serve not merely as a shield for the 
ingenuous, but also a sword for the malefactor.”256 Pouncy argued that it 
is often is challenging to establish a defendant’s mental state with 
specificity because “[t]o the extent that the actor is able to control 
information concerning her motivation, the trier of fact’s ability to 
assess the state of mind of the actor will be less certain, and the 
necessary degree of scienter will be more difficult to establish, if it can, 
in fact, be established at all.”257 Pouncy contended that, in requiring 
proof of scienter, “the [CFTC] may have for all practical purposes, 
placed these wash transactions beyond the reach of its enforcement 
activities.”258  
C.  The Dodd–Frank Act’s Disruptive Trading Practices Ban 
Section 747 of the Dodd–Frank Act added new provisions that 
prohibit disruptive trading practices to § 4c(a) of the CEA.259 
Specifically, the new § 4c(a)(5) reads as follows:  
(5) Disruptive practices. It shall be unlawful for any person 
to engage in any trading, practice, or conduct on or subject 
to the rules of a registered entity that— 
(A) violates bids or offers;  
(B) demonstrates intentional or reckless disregard for the 
orderly execution of transactions during the closing period; 
or  
(C) is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the 
trade as, “spoofing” (bidding or offering with the intent to 
cancel the bid or offer before execution).260  
                                                                                                                     
 255. See, e.g., Trasnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1495–
96 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 256. Pouncy, supra note 90, at 1689–90.  
 257. Id. at 1651–52. 
 258. See id. at 1685.  
 259. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,943 (proposed Mar. 18, 2011). 
 260. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5) (2012). 
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Although § 4c(a)(5) is self-executing, and therefore does not require 
CFTC Regulations or interpretive guidance to take effect,261 the CFTC 
originally considered adopting regulations to implement and further 
define the contours of its new authority under § 4c(a)(5) of the CEA.262 
Accordingly, the CFTC issued an advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking (ANPR) seeking public comment on the statutory 
provisions in question.263 But the commission ultimately “determined 
that it was appropriate to address the statutory disruptive [trading] 
practices through a proposed interpretive order.”264 On May 16, 2013, 
the CFTC unanimously approved the Antidisruptive Practices Authority 
“Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement.”265  
The provisions of § 4c(a)(5) apply to trading, practices, or conduct 
“on or subject to the rules of a registered entity,”266 such as a futures 
exchange or swap execution facility. The section makes no reference to 
the kind of financial product at issue, which means that the subsections 
of § 4c(a)(5) apply to futures, swaps, commodity options, and other 
derivative products covered by the CEA.267 Additionally, subsections 
(B) (banging the close) and (C) (spoofing) of § 4c(a)(5) both explicitly 
include an intent requirement.268 A banging the close violation requires 
proof of scienter, i.e., intentional or reckless conduct,269 whereas a 
                                                                                                                     
 261. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890, 31,890 n.4 (May 28, 2013). 
For additional materials, see generally Transcript of Open Meeting on the 29th Series of 
Rulemakings Under the Dodd–Frank Act, CFTC (May 16, 2013) [hereinafter Transcript, 
Rulemaking Under the Dodd–Frank Act], available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/
@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission_051613-trans.pdf.  
 262. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. at 14,944; see also Interpretive 
Guidance and Policy Statement on Disruptive Practices, CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/dtp_factsheet.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) 
[hereinafter CFTC, Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement] (stating that the CFTC “is 
issuing this Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement to provide market participants and the 
public with guidance on the scope and application of the statutory prohibitions set forth in CEA 
section 4c(a)(5)”). The Dodd–Frank Act also added CEA § 4c(a)(6) (codified at 7 U.S.C. 
§ 6c(a)(6)), which grants the CFTC broad authority to adopt rules that are “reasonably necessary 
to prohibit the [enumerated practices] and any other trading practice that is disruptive of fair and 
equitable trading.” Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. at 14,944 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 263. Antidisruptive Practices Authority Contained in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 67,301 (Nov. 2, 2010). 
 264. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. at 14,944. 
 265. See Transcript, Rulemaking Under the Dodd–Frank Act, supra note 261. 
 266. CFTC, Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement, supra note 262. 
 267. Aronow, supra note 224, at *1. 
 268. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No 112-105, § 4c(a)(5)(B)–(C), 42 Stat. 998 
(1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5) (2012)) (covering “intentional or reckless” behavior in 
subsection (B), whereas subsection (C) prohibits “bidding or offering with the intent to cancel 
the bid or offer before execution” (emphasis added)). 
 269. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890, 31,895 (May 28, 2013). 
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spoofing claim requires proof of intent beyond recklessness.270 Section 
4c(a)(5)(A) of the CEA—violating bids and offers—is a strict liability 
offense, but it only applies to a limited type of conduct.271 This conduct 
cannot occur on automated exchanges and market platforms that 
automatically match bids and offers,272 which significantly limits its 
applicability to trading by ATSs.273  
D.  Prohibition of Reckless, Fraud-Based Manipulative Devices  
Section 753 of the Dodd–Frank Act amended subsection 6(c)(1) of 
the CEA274 in a manner that greatly enhanced the CFTC’s enforcement 
authority to police market manipulation and fraud. It accomplished this 
by inserting language into the CEA that mirrored the SEC’s catch-all 
prohibition against fraudulent and manipulative devices—section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).275 Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act provided the SEC with its basis for 
promulgating SEC Rule 10b-5276—its signature tool for combatting 
                                                                                                                     
 270. Id. at 31,896 (“[A] CEA section 4c(a)(5)(C) violation . . . requir[es] a market 
participant to act with some degree of intent, or scienter, beyond recklessness to engage in the 
‘spoofing’ trading practices prohibited by CEA section 4c(a)(5)(C).”). 
 271. Id. at 31,893–94. CEA § 4c(a)(5)(A) only applies to the following limited type of 
conduct: “buying a contract on a registered entity at a price that is higher than the lowest 
available price offered for such contract or selling a contract on a registered entity at a price that 
is lower than the highest available price bid for such contract.” Id. “By adopting a policy that 
market participants cannot execute trades at prices that do not accurately reflect the best price 
for such contracts, this interpretive statement furthers the CEA’s purpose of ensuring the 
integrity of the price discovery process by helping ensure that the prices disseminated to market 
users and the public reflect bona fide prices that accurately reflect the normal forces of supply 
and demand.” Id. at 31,894.  
 272. Id. at 31,893 (providing that CEA § 4c(a)(5)(A) does not apply in any trading 
environment where trading algorithms automatically match the best price for bids and offers). 
 273. For example, Globex—the electronic trading platform for CME Group (which 
includes, inter alia, CBOT and NYMEX)—uses trade matching algorithms, thereby making 
§ 4c(5)(A) inapplicable to trading activities on Globex. See CME GROUP, CBOT RULEBOOK R. 
580, available at http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CBOT/I/5/5.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 
2014) (“The CME Globex platform employs multiple predefined sets of matching algorithms 
used to match trades on the platform.”).  
 274. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 753, 124 Stat. 1376, 1750–54 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012)). 
 275. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,399 (July 
14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180) (“The language of CEA section 6(c)(1), 
particularly the operative phrase ‘manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance,’ is virtually 
identical to the terms used in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘Exchange 
Act’).”). “Given the similarities between CEA section 6(c)(1) and Exchange Act section 10(b), 
the [CFTC] deems it appropriate and in the public interest to model final Rule 180.1 on SEC 
Rule 10b-5.” Id. The CFTC further stated that “by modeling final Rule 180.1 on SEC Rule 10b-
5, the [CFTC] takes an important step toward harmonization of regulation of the commodities, 
commodities futures, swaps and securities markets.” Id. n.11. 
 276. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).  
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fraud and manipulation.277 On July 7, 2011, the CFTC took advantage 
of that and added Dodd–Frank Act statutory authority by unanimously 
voting to adopt final Rule 180.1.278 The Rule implements “the statutory 
prohibition under CEA § 6(c)(1) against using or employing ‘any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance’ in connection with any 
swap, or a contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or 
for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity.”279 
The CFTC adopted the final rules almost entirely as they were 
proposed,280 but it declined to modify the rules based on the 
recommendations by some commentators for heightened supervision of 
algorithmic trading and ATSs.281 The CFTC modeled Rule 180.1 on 
SEC Rule 10b-5.282 In its final rule release, the commission stated:  
Final Rule 180.1 prohibits fraud and fraud-based 
manipulations, and attempts: (1) By any person (2) acting 
intentionally or recklessly (3) in connection with (4) any 
swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate 
commerce, or contract for future delivery on or subject to 
                                                                                                                     
 277. See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399 & n.9.  
 278. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1; Transcript of Open Meeting on Five Final Rule Proposals under the 
Dodd–Frank Act 35, 62 (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/
@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmissionmult_070711-trans.pdf (providing the record of 
the unanimous vote adopting final Rule 180.1); see also Prohibition on the Employment, or 
Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price 
Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,398. The new anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions 
became effective on August 15, 2011. Id. 
 279. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399. For an in-
depth analysis of Rule 180.1, see Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 171, at 393–98. 
 280. Except for the addition of the word “inaccurate” in the last sentence of Rule 
180.1(a)(4), the text of the final rule is identical to the proposed rule. Prohibition on the 
Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and 
Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399. 
 281. David J. Gilberg et al., CFTC Anti-Fraud and Manipulation Enforcement Authority, 
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 5 (July 14, 2011), http://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/CFTC-
Anti-Fraud-Manipulation-Enforcement-Authority.pdf.  
 282. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399 (“Given the 
similarities between CEA section 6(c)(1) and Exchange Act section 10(b), the [CFTC] deems it 
appropriate and in the public interest to model final Rule 180.1 on SEC Rule 10b-5.”). The 
CFTC further stated that “by modeling final Rule 180.1 on SEC Rule 10b-5, the [CFTC] takes 
an important step toward harmonization of regulation of the commodities, commodities futures, 
swaps and securities markets.” Id. at 41,399 n.11; Anti-Manipulation and Anti-Fraud Final 
Rules, CFTC http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/amaf_
factsheet_final.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (“Final Rule 180.1, which is modeled on 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, broadly prohibits manipulative and deceptive 
devices and contrivances, employed intentionally or recklessly, regardless of whether the 
conduct in question was intended to create or did create an artificial price.”).  
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the rules of any registered entity (as defined in the CEA).283  
Arguably, the most significant characteristic of Rule 180.1 is that it 
prohibits fraud-based manipulation under the lower scienter standard of 
recklessness—as opposed to the specific intent standard for price 
manipulation from § 9(a)(2).284  
                                                                                                                     
 283. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,400. A violation 
of Rule 180.1 does not “require[] proof of a market or price effect.” Id. at 41,401. In relevant 
part, Rule 180.1(a) states the following:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with 
any swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or 
contract for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, to 
intentionally or recklessly:  
(1) Use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud;  
(2) Make, or attempt to make, any untrue or misleading statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made not untrue or misleading;  
(3) Engage, or attempt to engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; or, 
 (4) Deliver or cause to be delivered, or attempt to deliver or cause to be 
delivered, for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce, by any 
means of communication whatsoever, a false or misleading or inaccurate report 
concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect 
the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, knowing, or acting in 
reckless disregard of the fact that such report is false, misleading or inaccurate. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, no violation of this subsection shall exist where 
the person mistakenly transmits, in good faith, false or misleading or inaccurate 
information to a price reporting service. 
17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (2013).  
 284. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,404 (“Upon 
consideration of all the comments in this rulemaking record, the [CFTC] clarifies that a showing 
of recklessness is, at a minimum, necessary to prove the scienter element of final Rule 180.1.”). 
The CFTC stated “that final Rule 180.1 does not reach inadvertent mistakes or negligence.” Id. 
at 41,405; see also id. at 41,405 & n.90 (“Consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Exchange Act section 10(b) in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976), the 
[CFTC] finds no indication in CEA section 6(c)(1) that Congress intended anyone to be made 
liable for a violation of final Rule 180.1 unless he or she acted other than in good faith.”). 
“Under final Rule 180.1, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the violation by a 
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 41,405. Although recklessness is a lower mental state 
requirement than many causes of action, it may be difficult even to prove recklessness in 
situations involving ATS-initiated trading. See Matt Prewitt, Note, High-Frequency Trading: 
Should Regulators Do More?, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 131, 156 (2012) (stating 
that “scienter requirements complicate matters” because, like SEC Rule 10b-5, CFTC Rule 
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IV.  FAILURE-TO-SUPERVISE CLAIMS UNDER REGULATION 166.3 
Federal regulations broadly require CFTC registrants to diligently 
supervise their officers, employees, and agents. Specifically, CFTC 
Regulation 166.3 states the following: 
Each [CFTC] registrant, except an associated person who 
has no supervisory duties, must diligently supervise the 
handling by its partners, officers, employees and agents (or 
persons occupying a similar status or performing a similar 
function) of all commodity interest accounts carried, 
operated, advised or introduced by the registrant and all 
other activities of its partners, officers, employees and 
agents (or persons occupying a similar status or performing 
a similar function) relating to its business as a [CFTC] 
registrant.285 
The purpose of the CFTC’s supervisory requirement is to protect 
customers from fraudulent or manipulative activities by CFTC 
registrants.286 In adopting Regulation 166.3 in 1978,287 the CFTC 
explicitly rejected the concept of a rule with a list of specific 
supervisory requirements, as had been included in the original proposed 
                                                                                                                     
180.1 requires at least a showing of recklessness, and “[t]he recklessness standard will probably 
render it challenging, but not impossible, for regulators to prove HFT market abuse if they have 
detailed and well-analyzed market data”). “[HFT] tactics such as stuffing, smoking, and 
spoofing fall within the commonplace understanding of market manipulation. Because these 
techniques aim to induce misinformed trading by counterparties, they most likely count as 
‘deceptive devices’ under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act” and the CFTC’s analogous rule, 
CFTC Rule 180.1. Id. at 155–56. 
 285. 17 C.F.R. § 166.3. 
 286. Sanchez v. Crown, No. 02-R050, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,183, 2006 WL 
156743, at *8 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 18, 2006); In re Sogemin Metals Inc., No. 00-04, Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 28,008, 2000 WL 36107708, at *5 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 7, 2000) (involving a 
respondent who did not have adequate controls in place to deter or detect a kickback scheme, 
which included having no affirmative compliance program or compliance manual, and whose 
only compliance responsibilities were handled by compliance officers in London); see Adoption 
of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,889 (July 24, 1978) (stating, in the 
Federal Register adopting release for Regulation 166.3, that “[t]he basic purpose of the rule is to 
protect customers by ensuring that their dealings with the employees of [CFTC] registrants will 
be reviewed by other officials in the firm”). 
 287. Regulation 166.3, as adopted in 1978, read as follows:  
Each [CFTC] registrant, except an associated person who has no supervisory 
duties, must diligently supervise the handling of all commodity interest 
accounts carried, operated, or advised by the registrant and all other activities 
of its partners, officers, employees and agents (or persons occupying a similar 
status or performing a similar function) relating to its business as a [CFTC] 
registrant.  
Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. at 31,890–91.  
53
Scopino: Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price of F
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
274 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
rule,288 and instead opted for a rule with a broad, open-ended 
supervisory duty.289 In practice, the open-ended nature of Regulation 
166.3 has provided the CFTC with flexibility to bring enforcement 
actions for supervisory failures that are not limited to specific, 
enumerated statutory provisions or regulatory requirements.290 
Accordingly, “[a] violation under Regulation 166.3 is an independent 
violation for which no underlying violation is necessary.”291 A 
Regulation 166.3 violation “is demonstrated by showing either that: (1) 
the registrant’s supervisory system was generally inadequate; or (2) the 
registrant failed to perform its supervisory duties diligently.”292 
“Regulation 166.3 imposes on registrants an affirmative duty to 
supervise their partners, employees and agents diligently by 
establishing, implementing and executing adequate supervisory 
structures and compliance programs.”293 In Regulation 166.3 violation 
cases, the CFTC has referenced the failure to supervise employees 
diligently to ensure, inter alia, the following: (1) compliance with a 
registrant’s own internal compliance policies and procedures;294 
                                                                                                                     
 288. See id. at 31,886, 31,889 (referring to the specific supervisory proposals in Protection 
of Commodity Customers, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742 (Sept. 6, 1977)). 
 289. Id. at 31,889 (stating that Regulation 166.3 “establishes a general supervision 
requirement for all CFTC registrants except associated persons who have no supervisory 
duties”). 
 290. See, e.g., In re FCStone LLC, No. 13-24, 2013 WL 2368539, at *1–2, *5–6 (C.F.T.C. 
May 29, 2013) (finding a violation of Regulation 166.3 in connection with an FCM’s 
insufficient policies and procedures associated with credit and concentration risks and the 
FCM’s failure to diligently supervise firm employees who were responsible for managing the 
risks associated with customer accounts where the FCM had to absorb a $127 million loss 
incurred by two customers who had been trading natural gas futures, options, and swaps).  
 291. In re The Linn Group, Inc., No. 13-21, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,598, 2013 
WL 1703082, at *5 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 18, 2013) (citing In re Thomas Collins [1996–1998 Transfer 
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,194, ¶ 45,744 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 10, 1997)); see also In re 
First Nat’l Trading Corp., Nos. 90-28, 92-17, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,142, 1994 WL 
16796569, at *10 (C.F.T.C. July 20, 1994); In re Paragon Futures Ass’n, No. 88-18, Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,266, 1992 WL 74261, at *13 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 1, 1992); In re GNP 
Commodities Inc., No. 89-1, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,360, 1992 WL 201158, at *17 
n.11 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 11, 1992), aff’d in part and modified in part sub nom. Monieson v. CFTC, 
996 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1993).  
 292. In re Interactive Brokers LLC, No. 13-19, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,592, 2013 
WL 1496929, at *3 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 9, 2013).  
 293. In re Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 12-22, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,218, 2012 
WL 3262462, at *6 (June 5, 2012); see also In re LFG, L.L.C., No. 01-19, 2001 WL 940235, at 
*3 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 20, 2001) (finding a violation of Regulation 166.3 where a firm “had no 
written procedures relating to the monitoring of foreign omnibus accounts, no one was 
responsible for monitoring the trading in foreign omnibus accounts and, indeed, it appears to 
have been the policy of the firm not to monitor the trading in foreign omnibus accounts”). 
 294. For cases detailing the failure to supervise employees for compliance with one’s own 
internal policies and procedures, see In re Cadent Fin. Servs. LLC, No. 11-13, Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,972, 2011 WL 2100633, at *1 (C.F.T.C. May, 25 2011) (stating, inter alia, 
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(2) diligence in handling customer accounts and monitoring them for, 
among other things, wrongdoing;295 and (3) diligence in monitoring 
customer accounts for risks that could result in financial harm to the 
registrant itself.296  
                                                                                                                     
that the FCM “failed to follow procedures it had in place concerning the placement of bunched 
orders by account managers”); In re MF Global Inc., No. 10-03, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
31,500, 2009 WL 5125367, at *6 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 17, 2009) (stating that the FCM “failed in 
particular to enforce compliance with its own policies regarding futures trading in the AP’s 
personal account”); In re Rosenthal Collins Grp., L.L.C., No. 08-12, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 30,899, 2008 WL 4051020, at *3 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 26, 2008) (stating that the FCM “failed to 
diligently supervise” its employees in their handling of certain “payments in cash and by 
check” by failing to follow its own internal compliance procedures); In re MF Global, Inc., No. 
08-02, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,730, 2007 WL 8044726, at *3 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 26, 2007) 
(stating that the FCM and one of its APs failed to diligently supervise the handling of certain 
offshore fund accounts by its employees, “failed to follow its policies and procedures with 
respect to transfers of trades and opening of new accounts,” and “failed to respond to and 
investigate accumulating indications of questionable activity”). 
 295. For cases detailing the failure to supervise employees for diligence in monitoring 
customer accounts for, among other things, wrongdoing, see CFTC v. Matrix Trading Grp., Inc., 
No. 00-8880-Civ., 2002 WL 31936799, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2002) (stating that two 
defendants “failed to maintain meaningful procedures for detecting fraud by their employees—
[the two defendants] actually trained the APs to make these misrepresentations during their 
telephone solicitations” and that “[b]y failing to implement meaningful procedures for detecting 
fraud and failing to follow [the registrant’s] purported internal control procedures with regard to 
telephone solicitations, [the two defendants] violated [Regulation] 166.3”); see also In re 
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, No. 13-02, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,422, 2012 WL 
5217738, at *2 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 22, 2012) (finding that an FCM had failed to diligently supervise 
its employees’ handling of a customer account where the employees allowed an unregistered 
FCM to trade a third party’s funds through a proprietary futures trading account carried by the 
FCM); In re Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC, No. 12-18, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,166, 
2012 WL 1242406, at *2–3 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 12, 2012); In re Cadent Fin. Servs. LLC, No. 11-13, 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,972, 2011 WL 2100633, at *4 (C.F.T.C. May 25, 2011) 
(“[D]ue to deficiencies in [the FCM’s] supervisory system and its’ [sic] failure to properly 
implement and monitor supervisory procedures, [the FCM] failed to diligently supervise the 
handling by its partners, employees and agents of all of its commodity interest accounts and 
activities relating to its business as a registrant and therefore violated Regulation 166.3.”); In re 
Excellent USA, Inc., No. 01-20, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 28,914, 2002 WL 34936446, at 
*2 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 4, 2002) (stating that the FCM “failed to supervise the handling of the foreign 
customer omnibus accounts”); Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders Rosenthal Collins Group, 
LCC, a Registered [FCM] to Pay More than $2.5 Million for Supervision and Record-
Production Violations (Apr. 12, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
PressReleases/pr6230-12 (“‘This case reflects the CFTC’s resolve to hold FCMs liable for 
failing to adhere to their supervisory obligations,’ said David Meister, the Director of the 
CFTC’s Division of Enforcement. ‘Even if an FCM does not knowingly assist in a Ponzi 
scheme conducted by an account holder, an FCM cannot ignore questionable transactions that 
stand out as red flags of fraudulent conduct, particularly when those flags should have been 
obvious under the FCM’s own policies and procedures.’”). 
 296. For failure to supervise employees for diligence in monitoring the risks associated 
with customer accounts, see generally In re FCStone LLC, No. 13-24, 2013 WL 2368539 
(C.F.T.C. May 29, 2013).  
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“[A registrant] may violate Regulation 166.3 even if it does not 
violate any specific supervisory requirement imposed by either statutory 
provision or regulatory rulemaking.”297 Further, “[e]vidence of 
violations that ‘should be detected by a diligent system of supervision, 
either because of the nature of the violations or because the violations 
have occurred repeatedly’ is . . . probative of a failure to supervise.”298 
Indeed, “[i]f ‘customer orders reasonably raise concerns about their 
lawfulness under the [CEA], the futures professionals who accept or 
monitor the orders have a duty of further inquiry.’”299 The CFTC stated 
in its proposing release for the supervisory rule, however, that “the 
performance of a wrongful act by an employee . . . does not necessarily 
mean that the employee was improperly supervised, although it is often 
a strong indication of a lack of proper supervision.”300  
As mentioned above, “[f]or a registrant to fulfill its duties under 
Regulation 166.3, it must both design an adequate program of 
supervision and ensure that the program is followed.”301 To prove a 
failure-to-supervise claim, the CFTC must determine whether the 
registrant in question had established an adequate system of 
supervision, what roles different employees and agents played in that 
system, and the specific supervisory duties that employees and agents 
failed to perform diligently.302 Put another way, one must assess the 
nature of the system of supervision, the specific employees’ roles in that 
system, and whether those employees had performed those assigned 
roles in a diligent manner.303 Under Regulation 166.3, a registrant has a 
                                                                                                                     
 297. Id. at *5 (“This concept was conceived at the time the [CFTC] initially adopted 
Regulation 166.3 and declined to mandate specific supervisory requirements for all FCMs.” 
(citing In re GNP Commodities Inc., No. 89-1, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,360, 1992 WL 
201158, at *17 n.11 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 11, 1992), aff’d in part and modified in part sub nom. 
Monieson v. CFTC, 996 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1993))).  
 298. In re Open E Cry LLC, No. 12-24, 2012 WL 10259805, at *7 (C.F.T.C. June 7, 2012) 
(quoting In re Paragon Futures Ass’n, No. 88-18, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,266, 1992 
WL 74261, at *14 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 1, 1992)). 
 299. In re Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, No. 13-02, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
32,422, 2012 WL 5217738, at *4 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 22, 2012) (quoting In re U.S. Sec. & Futures 
Corp., No. 01-01, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,494, 2009 WL 3244152, at *11 (C.F.T.C. 
Oct. 7, 2009)).  
 300. Protection of Commodity Customers, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742, 44,747 (Sept. 6, 1977). 
 301. In re Open E Cry, 2012 WL 10259805, at *6 (citing In re GNP Commodities Inc., 
1992 WL 201158 and CFTC v. Carnegie Trading Grp., Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 2d 788, 805 (N.D. 
Ohio 2006)).  
 302. See In re Murlas Commodities, Inc., No. 85-29, [1994–1996 Transfer Binder] Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,485, 1995 WL 18009905, at *8 n.42 (C.F.T.C Sept. 1, 1995).  
 303. In re Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC, No. 12-19, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,166, 
2012 WL 1242406, at *6 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 12, 2012) (“Moreover, during the relevant period, 
[defendant] failed to perform its supervisory duties diligently by not following its compliance 
procedures that were in place, also in violation of Regulation 166.3 . . . .”). The Consent Order 
stated that defendant “failed to diligently supervise its officers’, employees’, and agents’ 
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“duty to develop procedures for the detection and deterrence of possible 
wrongdoing by its agents.”304 “The lack of an adequate supervisory 
system can be established by showing that the registrant failed to 
develop proper procedures for the detection of wrongdoing.”305 Further, 
the CFTC has stated that a registrant has failed to implement an 
adequate supervisory system where, inter alia, the registrant fails to 
adequately train employees regarding their obligations to comply with 
specific CFTC regulations.306 Likewise, a registrant’s failure to follow 
its own internal compliance procedures and policies, i.e., a failure to 
ensure that its supervisory program is diligently administered and 
implemented, can constitute a violation of Regulation 166.3.307  
The CFTC’s supervision requirement is not a strict liability 
provision.308 Instead, administrative and judicial failure-to-supervise 
decisions appear to apply a reasonableness standard, holding registrants 
                                                                                                                     
handling of an account held at [the registrant]” that was “used in [a] multimillion dollar Ponzi 
scheme.” Id. at *1; see Bunch v. First Commodity Corp., No. 86-R201, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 25,352, 1992 WL 12616854, at *3 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 5, 1992).  
 304. Samson Refining Co. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1986–1987 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,596, 1990 WL 10570561, at *10 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 16, 1990) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 305. In re Open E Cry, 2012 WL 10259805, at *6 (citing CFTC v. Trinity Fin. Group, Inc. 
[1996–1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,179 at 45,635 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 
1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom. Sidoti v. CFTC, 178 F.3d 1132 
(11th Cir. 1999)).  
 306. In re Mizuho, No. 13-11, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,509, 2013 WL 55702, at *3 
(C.F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013); Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders Mizuho Securities USA Inc. to Pay 
$175,000 to Settle CFTC Charges of Secured Fund Deficiencies and Supervision Failures (Jan. 
3, 2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6491-13; see also, e.g., 
In re The Linn Grp., Inc., No. 13-21, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,598, 2013 WL 1703082, 
at *5 (Apr. 18, 2013) (stating that the registrant “failed to adequately train its employees, 
officers, and agents to ensure compliance with the [CEA] and [CFTC] Regulations, including 
with respect to the handling, monitoring, recording, and reporting of customer funds”); In re 
Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, No. 12-22, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,218, 2012 WL 
3262462, at *7 (June 5, 2012) (finding that “Morgan Stanley failed to ensure that its employees 
who participated in the execution or processing of [specific kinds of transactions] had received 
adequate training”); In re Tenco, Inc., No. 11-20, 2011 WL 3813126, at *4 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 25, 
2011) (stating that an FCM violated Regulation 166.3 because, inter alia, it “did not have a 
system in place to train employees in [CFTC Rules], exchange rules or corporate policies”). 
 307. In re Rosenthal Collins Grp., 2012 WL 1242406, at *6.  
 308. See, e.g., In re First Nat’l Trading Corp., Nos. 90-28, 92-17, [1994–1996 Transfer 
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,413, 1995 WL 18009834, *1 (C.F.T.C. May 31, 1995) 
(finding that the president and chief executive officer had recklessly abrogated his supervisory 
responsibilities where, inter alia, he testified that he did not care if subordinates monitored the 
sales practices of account executives); Quinn v. Dunhill Invs. Corp., No. 90-R130, Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,002, 1991 WL 11711628, at *7 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 14, 1991) (reasoning that 
supervisory requirements do not impose strict liability and denying supervisory liability where 
supervisor was not aware of misrepresentation); In re Apache Trading Corp., No. 87-14, Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,413, 1989 WL 1664804, at *11 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 20, 1989).  
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liable if their supervisory systems or actions in implementing those 
systems were not reasonable under the circumstances. This analysis 
sometimes references whether registrants reasonably should have—or 
would have, if their supervisory systems had been sufficient—detected 
the specific underlying instances of wrongdoing at issue.309 For 
example, some of the decisions mention “red flags”—prior indicators 
that provided the registrants with notice that its officers, employees, and 
agents were acting improperly or that the existing supervisory system 
was insufficient—that registrants either failed to adequately address or 
disregarded.310  
                                                                                                                     
 309. See, e.g., Modlin v. Cane, No. 97-R083, [1996–1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,392, 1998 WL 35479096, at *16 (July 30, 1998), aff’d, No. 97-R083, 2000 
WL 36108104 (Mar. 15, 2000) (concluding that the fraudulent activity in the account was so 
egregious that it should have been detected by diligent supervision); In re Murlas Commodities, 
Inc., No. 85-29, [1994–1996 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,485, 1995 WL 
18009905, at *2–3 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 1, 1995) (determining that the firm’s supervisory system 
failed to prevent a substantial number of violations, but those violations were spread out over a 
two-year period and represented a small proportion of the firm’s overall business so it could not 
be inferred that the violations resulted from supervisory failures); Zizzo v. Vision Ltd. P’ship, 
No. 94-R022, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,089, 1994 WL 16796519, at *4 (May 23, 1994) 
(dismissing failure-to-supervise claim where the plaintiff failed to allege that (a) the supervisor 
knew of the misconduct and failed to take reasonable steps to stop it, (b) the supervisor failed to 
discharge specific supervisory duties, or (c) a supervisory failure was a proximate cause of the 
complainant’s harm); In re Paragon Futures Ass’n, No. 88-18, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
25,266, 1992 WL 74261, at *11 (Apr. 1, 1992) (reasoning that a violation of the CEA by 
personnel under supervision could form the basis for a failure-to-supervise claim if the 
violations were of the type that would have been detected by a diligent supervisory system); 
Kalkstein v. Delphi Commodities Inc., No. R 80-1167-81-110, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
22,555, 1985 WL 1106309, at *4 (Apr. 18, 1985) (finding failure to supervise where person who 
had primary responsibility for sales claimed to be unaware of misrepresentations in firm’s 
promotional materials and stated that he could “only hope and assume” that salespersons he 
supervised would conduct themselves properly); Rule v. Heneghan, No. R81-454-81-656, 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22,535, 1985 WL 1106291, at *7 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 14, 1985) 
(reasoning that the duty to investigate possible wrongdoing does not arise before a registrant can 
reasonably be expected to know that there is a problem), aff’d in part and remanded as to 
damages, No. R81-454-81-656, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,287, 1986 WL 1194594 
(C.F.T.C. Sept. 30, 1986); Shashaani v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce & Smith, Inc., No. R 81-247-81-
571, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22,271, 1984 WL 932759, at *5 (C.F.T.C. July 10, 1984) 
(finding that a manager was liable for supervisory failure in connection with wrongdoing that 
occurred after the point when he was put on notice of unauthorized trading), remanded on other 
grounds, No. R81-247-81-571, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22,629, 1985 WL 1106378 
(C.F.T.C. June 19, 1985). 
 310. E.g., In re Rosenthal Collins Grp., 2012 WL 1242406, at *1, *3 (stating, in a consent 
order settling the case, that the registrant FCM had “failed to diligently supervise its officers’, 
employees’, and agents’ handling of an account held at” the registrant where the registrant 
missed “[n]umerous [r]ed [f]lags [c]oncerning [s]uspicious [a]ctivity” related to a customer who 
used his account with the registrant to orchestrate a Ponzi scheme); In re Alaron Trading Corp., 
No. 08-10, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,835, 2008 WL 1829519, at *1 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 18, 
2008) (noting, in a consent order, that the CFTC found that an FCM had failed to supervise 
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Unlike the traditional negligence standard, which asks what a 
reasonably prudent person would have done in similar circumstances, 
Regulation 166.3 decisions appear to apply a reasonably prudent 
registrant standard because the analysis typically focuses on how the 
defendant’s behavior departed from what other (reasonably prudent) 
registrants would, or should, have done.311 For example, a reasonably 
prudent registrant would be aware of, and have read, CFTC interpretive 
guidance, staff advisories, Federal Register rule releases explaining 
CFTC Regulations, and the like.  
A.  Duty to Supervise Employees Who Establish, Monitor, and 
Maintain Electronic Trading Platforms  
In several recent enforcement cases, the CFTC has stated that 
registrants have a duty to supervise their officers, employees, and agents 
who are responsible for creating, monitoring, maintaining, and 
controlling electronic trading platforms and systems. For example, in 
2012, the CFTC simultaneously filed and settled a case in which an 
FCM’s “customized trading software” contained a flaw that caused the 
software to “incorrectly calculate[] customer profits and losses resulting 
from trades in the Russian ruble [futures] contract” for seven months; 
the software glitch enabled an observant (but unethical) trader to engage 
in a fraudulent prearranged trading scheme.312 The CFTC stated that the 
FCM “failed to adequately monitor suspicious trading activity in 
                                                                                                                     
employees’ handling and oversight of customer accounts); In re MF Global Inc., No. 08-02, 
[2007–2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,730, 2007 WL 8044726, at *9 
(C.F.T.C. Dec. 26, 2007); In re Excellent, USA, Inc., No. 01-20, [2002–2003 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 28,914, 2002 WL 34936446, at *5 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 4, 2002). 
 311. See, e.g., In re Forex Capital Mkts. LLC, No. 12-01, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
32,658, 2011 WL 4689390, at *2 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 3, 2011) (“Had [the registrant] diligently 
supervised its officers, employees, and agents regarding these aspects of its business, [the 
registrant] would have discovered these problems with its trade integrity and had the 
opportunity to correct them . . . .”). 
 312. In re Open E Cry LLC, No. 12-24, 2012 WL 10259805, at 2 (C.FT.C. June 7, 2012) 
(involving an FCM, which settled allegations that it had failed to supervise its employees’ 
handling and oversight of customer accounts, where one customer was able to take advantage of 
a flaw in the FCM’s customized trading software by engaging in wash sales that took advantage 
of a systematic price miscalculation associated with the Russian rubles futures contract); Press 
Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders Futures Commission Merchant Open E Cry, LLC to Pay 
$250,000 to Settle Failure to Supervise Charges (June 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6276-12 (“[FCM] failed to detect and correct a 
flaw in software it offered its customers for trading futures contracts that miscalculated the 
customers’ intraday profits and losses from trading the Russian ruble futures contract. . . . [A] 
Russian national . . . exploited the ruble calculation error and [the FCM’s] supervision failures. 
[The Russian national] engaged in a fraudulent prearranged trading scheme . . . . [The FCM] 
failed to implement adequate alert systems to detect suspicious trading activity, such as the 
trading of extremely large quantities of futures contracts, and thus failed to detect and stop [the 
Russian national’s] trading . . . .”). 
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customer accounts” in violation of Regulation 166.3 because FCMs 
must “diligently supervise the handling of their customer accounts, as 
well as all other activities of their personnel related to their business as 
an FCM.”313 The CFTC noted that the FCM used computer software to 
monitor risk in customer accounts that was “technologically capable of 
creating automated ‘alerts’ that generate emails to risk management 
personnel upon occurrence of various types of suspicious trading 
activity,” but that the FCM “did not, however, have its system 
configured to generate any systemwide automated alerts.”314 The “night 
desk personnel” who were working when the trader exploited the 
software flaw that miscalculated values in the Russian rubles futures 
contract did not have any individualized automated alerts activated on 
their computers.315 Although they were “charged with visually 
monitoring the flow of customer trades during the . . . overnight 
session,” they did not notice the suspicious trading activity.316 
The CFTC also has used Regulation 166.3 to combat supervisory 
failures connected with electronic trading platforms in the off-exchange 
foreign currency (forex) market, where fraud has been a recurring 
problem.317 In 2011, the CFTC simultaneously filed and settled a case 
alleging that retail foreign exchange dealer (RFED),318 Forex Capital 
Markets (FXCM) had violated Regulation 166.3.  In 2013, the CFTC 
filed and settled a similar case against another RFED, FXDirect Dealer 
                                                                                                                     
 313. In re Open E Cry, 2012 WL 10259805, at *2, *4–5 (“[FCM] was aware that [the 
customized software trading program] could potentially miscalculate customer profits and 
losses . . . . [But the FCM] failed to implement any risk management procedure directed at 
detecting miscalculation of customer profits . . . , despite this understanding of its previous 
issues in this area, and despite its access to a tool that, among other things, listed cash balance 
discrepancies . . . . Despite the fact that [the FCM’s] personnel routinely reviewed the deviation 
reports for other purposes, [the FCM] failed to adequately review the reports to monitor account 
balance discrepancies . . . .”); see also In re Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, No. 12-22, Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,218, 2012 WL 3262462, at *5 ( C.F.T.C. June 5, 2012).  
 314. In re Open E Cry, 2012 WL 10259805, at *5. 
 315. Id.  
 316. Id.  
 317. See CFTC Fraud Advisories: Foreign Currency Trading (Forex) Fraud, CFTC, 
http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/FraudAwarenessPrevention/CFTCFraudAdvisories/fra
udadv_forex (last visited Dec. 14, 2014); Foreign Exchange Currency Fraud: CFTC/North 
American Securities Administrators Association Investor Alert, CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/Con 
sumerProtection/FraudAwarenessPrevention/ForeignCurrencyTrading/cftcnasaaforexalert (last 
visted Dec. 14, 2014); CFTC, FOREIGN CURRENCY TRADING FRAUD, available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@cpfraudawarenessandprotection/documents/file/cpfor
eigncurrencytradingfraud.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2014); see also Commission Advisory: 
Beware of Foreign Currency Trading Frauds, CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf98/opaforexa 
15.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 318. RFED “means any person that is, or that offers to be, the counterparty to a retail forex 
transaction,” other than persons that fall within enumerated exceptions. 17 C.F.R. § 5.1(h)(1) 
(2013).  
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(FXDD). Their violation was in failing to supervise how their officers, 
employees, and agents handled, controlled, and monitored their 
electronic trading platforms.319 In the consent orders (i.e., the 
settlements) for both cases, the CFTC stated that Regulation 166.3 had 
been violated because the RFEDs had failed to supervise their 
“officers’, employees’, and agents’ handling of customer accounts” on 
electronic trading platforms “with respect to slippage (i.e., the change in 
price between order placement and execution) on market orders and 
margin liquidation orders.”320 More specifically, the CFTC determined 
that the two RFEDs had failed to supervise their officers, employees, 
and agents to prevent them from establishing and maintaining 
asymmetrical slippage parameters on electronic trading platforms. The 
effect was that trade orders in which the prices moved—“slipped”—in 
favor of customers would be rejected, whereas orders in which the 
prices moved in favor of the registrant would be accepted.321 With these 
                                                                                                                     
 319. In re FXDirectDealer, LLC, No. 13-34, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,813, 2013 
WL 5295802, at *3 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 18, 2013); In re Forex Capital Mkts. LLC, No. 12-01, 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. ¶ 32,658, 2011 WL 4689390, at *3–4 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 3, 2011).  
 320. In re Forex Capital Mkts., 2011 WL 4689390, at *1; accord In re FXDirectDealer, 
2013 WL 5295802, at *1; see also Joshua Gallu, FXCM Agrees to Pay $14 Million to Resolve 
CFTC ‘Slippage’ Claims, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-10-03/fxcm-agrees-to-pay-14-million-to-resolve-cftc-slippage-claims.html (“FXCM, 
between 2008 and 2010, deprived customers of $8.26 million in ‘positive price slippage,’ 
advantageous price changes that occurred after the clients placed orders and before the 
transaction was executed . . . . While customers didn’t receive the benefit of positive price 
slippage, they did absorb losses from negative movements . . . .”); Press Release, CFTC, CFTC 
Orders FXDirectDealer, LLC to Pay $2.74 Million for Supervision Failures Relating to Trading 
Platform (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6697-13; Press 
Release, CFTC, Forex Capital Markets LLC Ordered to Pay More Than $14.2 Million to Settle 
CFTC Charges Relating to Its Failure to Supervise Customer Accounts (Oct. 3, 2011), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6119-11; News Release, NFA, NFA Fines 
New York Forex Firm FXDirectDealer LLC $1.1 Million and Orders the Firm to Pay $1.8 
Million in Restitution to Customers (Sept. 18, 2013), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/
news/newsRel.asp?ArticleID=4299; News Release, NFA, NFA Levies $2,000,000 Monetary 
Sanction Against FXCM and Orders Refunds to Customers, (Aug. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.nfa.futures.org/news/newsRel.asp?ArticleID=3851. 
 321. In re FXDirectDealer, 2013 WL 5295802, at *1; accord In re Forex Capital Mkts., 
2011 WL 4689390, at *1. 
[D]uring the relevant period, [the registrant’s] officers, employees, and agents 
responsible for establishing, maintaining, and monitoring its electronic trading 
platforms (specifically, the slippage parameters on the MT4 platform) failed to 
establish a system that prevented asymmetrical slippage on orders executed 
through the MT4 platform. In addition, [the registrant] failed to supervise 
diligently these officers’, employees’, and agents’ handling of the MT4 
platform . . . . 
In re FXDirectDealer, 2013 WL 5295802, at *3. 
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two cases, the CFTC emphasized that registrants must diligently 
supervise their employees who are “tasked with establishing, 
monitoring, and maintaining” computerized trading platforms.322  
One of the RFED consent orders cites NFA Interpretive Notice 9060 
for NFA Compliance Rule 2-36(e) concerning the supervision of the use 
of electronic trading systems.323 Interpretive Notice 9060 states in 
pertinent part: 
The forex markets are highly automated, with virtually all 
trading done on electronic platforms. Most orders are also 
placed electronically, usually entered directly with the 
platform via the Internet. Therefore, in order to fulfill their 
supervisory responsibilities, Members must adopt and 
enforce written procedures to address the security, capacity, 
credit and risk-management controls, and records provided 
by the firm’s electronic trading systems. . . . For an 
electronic trading platform, the procedures must also 
address the integrity of the trades placed on it.324 
The Notice also explicitly mentions slippage, stating “[a]n electronic 
trading platform should be designed to ensure that any slippage is based 
on real market conditions” and that “slippage . . . should move in 
customers’ favor as often as they move against it.”325 Interpretive 
Notice 9060 states that RFEDs “must adopt and enforce written 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure the integrity of trades placed 
on their trading platforms.”326  
                                                                                                                     
The price quotes offered by FXDD . . . often change, or “slip,” between the 
time the customer clicks on a price showing on the computer and the time 
FXDD fills the customer’s order. If the price slips, FXDD’s system employs 
slippage parameters that determine whether FXDD fills or rejects a customer 
order at the original price clicked by the customer . . . FXDD used 
asymmetrical slippage parameters on its principal trading platform, meaning 
that the system favored FXDD over its customers in slippage situations. 
Ginger Szala, The Blotter: FXDD Fined $2.74 Million by CFTC, FUTURES MAG. (Sept. 20, 
2013), http://www.futuresmag.com/2013/09/20/the-blotter-fxdd-fined-274-million-by-cftc. 
 322. In re Forex Capital Mkts., 2011 WL 4689390, at *2 (“[The registrant] had officers, 
employees, and agents that were tasked with establishing, monitoring, and maintaining its 
trading platforms. [The registrant’s] officers, employees, and agents, however, failed to establish 
a system that prevented asymmetrical slippage on market orders and market liquidation orders. 
In addition, [the registrant’s] officers, employees, and agents failed to detect the unequal 
treatment of price slippage that occurred thousands of times a day across thousands of customer 
accounts for more than two years.”).  
 323. Id. at *4 n.4. 
 324. Interpretive Notice, NFA, 9060—Compliance Rule 2-36(e): Supervision of the Use of 
Electronic Trading Systems (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/
NFAManual.aspx?RuleiD=9060&Section=9 (footnotes omitted). 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
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Interestingly, the CFTC did not accuse the FXCM and FXDD of 
fraud, perhaps because it would have been difficult to establish scienter 
based on the circumstances. Former CFTC Commissioner Scott D. 
O’Malia issued a concurring statement in the consent order settling the 
case with FXCM.327 In it, he said that “[the registrant’s] apparent 
reliance on its trade platforms’ programming in lieu of robust 
supervision and monitoring highlights the need for the [CFTC] to adopt 
heightened standards for the supervision of electronic trading platforms 
and other systems.”328 Former Commissioner O’Malia further stated:  
The [CFTC] needs to take a harder look at the role that 
technology is playing in all of the markets under its 
authority. The [CFTC] needs to develop further expertise to 
look past the black box at those who design, operate, 
maintain, monitor and supervise the technology that has 
largely taken the place of traditional trading venues and 
trade execution functions to identify and prosecute 
misconduct. We can no longer assume that there can be no 
violations absent a person holding the smoking gun; that 
time has passed.329  
Former Commissioner O’Malia also noted that, “[w]hile the charges do 
not sound in fraud or misappropriation,” the supervisory failures 
exhibited in the case were “repugnant.”330 
B.  Regulation 166.3 as Applied to ATS-Directed Trading Practices  
The FXCM and FXDD consent orders show how the CFTC could 
use Regulation 166.3 to combat manipulative and disruptive trading 
practices that result from the actions of ATSs that are not diligently 
supervised by registrants’ employees, officers, or agents.331 Unlike other 
                                                                                                                     
 327. In re Forex Capital Mkts., 2011 WL 4689390, at *10 (O’Malia, Comm’r, concurring).  
 328. Id. (“This matter ought to serve as warning to those who seek to circumvent their 
obligations under the CEA and regulations as well as their duties to their customers in reliance 
on the fiction that technology is infallible and provides a defense for conduct which would 
clearly attract higher scrutiny when directly engaged in by a person.”). 
 329. Id. (“The platforms and their protocols should not be immune [from] the imputation of 
scienter.”).  
 330. Id. (noting that under the settlement, the penalties on FXCM included, inter alia, a $6 
million civil monetary penalty from the CFTC, a $2 million monetary sanction by NFA, and 
payment of $8,261,937 in restitution to victims). 
 331. Indeed, securities-market SROs have used supervisory requirements to punish 
brokerage firms that do not diligently supervise the accounts of customers whose trading is 
controlled by ATSs. See, e.g., Scott Patterson & Jacob Bunge, Newedge Fined for Lax Oversight 
of Manipulative Trades, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887324425204578597962040067332.html (subscription required) (“Wall 
Street’s stock-market cops slapped a New York brokerage firm with a record fine for failing to 
stop computer-driven trading clients who sought to manipulate U.S. markets for nearly four 
63
Scopino: Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price of F
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
284 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
enforcement causes of action that require the wrongdoer to act either 
intentionally or recklessly, Regulation 166.3 appears to apply a 
reasonableness standard, as detailed above. As such, the CFTC could 
use Regulation 166.3 in circumstances where the humans serving as the 
officers, employees, or agents of a registrant failed to construct, 
program, manage, and oversee an ATS so as to ensure that the ATS 
does not engage in trading practices that disrupt derivative markets or 
distort and manipulate the prices of derivatives and commodities. 
Similarly, the CFTC could invoke Regulation 166.3 in situations 
where an FCM failed to diligently supervise its officers, employees, or 
agents in connection with the oversight of customer accounts for 
improper activities performed by ATSs. Put another way, if a 
registrant’s ATS engages in practices that mimic banging the close, 
wash trading, or spoofing, then the CFTC arguably could bring a 
Regulation 166.3 claim against the registrant if the registrant failed to 
diligently supervise its employees who were responsible for managing 
and operating the ATS. 
Indeed, as discussed above, the CFTC already has brought cases 
asserting Regulation 166.3 violations in which registrants’ employees 
failed to diligently supervise employees who were responsible for 
programming, overseeing, or controlling their electronic trading 
platforms.332 Regulation 166.3 does not require an underlying violation 
of a CEA provision or CFTC Regulation, so the CFTC could bring a 
supervisory failure claim in connection with ATS-initiated trading 
                                                                                                                     
years.”). “Newedge allowed the questionable behavior—some of which was executed by day-
trading firms—to persist despite numerous red flags, including concerns raised by employees, 
an independent consultant, exchanges and regulators . . . .” Id. 
Brokerages are required to monitor clients’ trading activity . . . to curb 
manipulative activity, among other things. . . . The brokerage [firm] allowed 
potentially manipulative trading such as “spoofing,” in which firms place 
orders designed to trick other firms into buying or selling stocks, and “marking 
the close,” in which firms push around stock prices at the close of trading in 
order to benefit from the final price . . . .  
[C]lients also engaged in multiple “wash trades . . . .” 
Id.; see also Suzanne Barlyn, Wall St. Watchdog Probing 170 Instances of Possible Algorithmic 
Abuses, REUTERS (May 19, 2014, 5:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/19/us-
finra-algorithms-idUSBREA4I0RJ20140519 (stating that the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA), the securities industry SRO, “is looking at instances in which brokerage 
firms may have used algorithms to engage in abusive trades, or failed to supervise the use of 
algorithms by their advisers,” and that “FINRA is concerned about algorithms designed to 
trigger illegal, manipulative market behaviors such as ‘spoofing,’ when orders are rapidly placed 
and canceled to create the illusion of market demand”).  
 332. E.g., In re FXDirectDealer, LLC, No. 13-34, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,658, 
2013 WL 5296802, at *1 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 18, 2013); In re Forex Capital Mkts., 2011 WL 
4689390, at *1. 
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activities without having to prove all of the elements of a cause of 
action for, say, price manipulation or wash trading. Instead, the CFTC 
would have to show that, in connection with ATS-initiated manipulative 
or disruptive trading activities, the registrant either failed to diligently 
supervise its employees or failed to have an adequate supervisory 
system in place. As mentioned previously, the CFTC is willing to bring 
a Regulation 166.3 claim against an FCM for failure to supervise its 
employees who are responsible for monitoring customer accounts for 
suspicious activity and wrongdoing, even if the activity in question 
ultimately turns out not to be illegal under the CEA or CFTC 
Regulations.333  
A failure-to-supervise case that the CFTC simultaneously filed and 
settled against FCStone, an FCM, in 2013 further illustrates the 
flexibility of Regulation 166.3 for broadly combating weak supervisory 
systems without invoking specific, underlying causes of action or 
violations. The CFTC stated that “FCStone failed to implement 
adequate customer credit and concentration risk policies and controls in 
2008 and part of 2009, allowing one account . . . to acquire a massive 
options position that [the customer] could not afford to maintain.”334 As 
a result, “[u]ltimately, FCStone was forced to take over the [a]ccount, 
and lost approximately $127 million.”335 Former Director of 
Enforcement David Meister summed up the case as follows: 
The [CFTC’s] supervision regulation helps ensure the 
financial integrity of the markets and safeguard customer 
funds. When an FCM’s financial risk controls are so 
lacking that they do virtually nothing to prevent an 
unchecked customer from taking grossly excessive trading 
risks as happened here, a harmful domino effect of 
financially dangerous consequences can follow, affecting 
not only the FCM but also potentially other customers and 
                                                                                                                     
 333. See In re LFG, L.L.C., No. 01-19, 2001 WL 940235, at *1, *3 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 20, 
2001). In this consent order, the CFTC stated that an FCM failed to diligently supervise its 
employees’ handling of the foreign omnibus accounts of two Japanese firms who submitted 
orders that, as with wash sales, “when totaled, resulted in each omnibus account being both long 
and short approximately the same number of futures contracts in each contract month. Despite 
the suspicious nature of this trading, [the FCM] never inquired as to the customers’ intent or 
made any inquiry into the trading at issue.” Id. at *1. The CFTC determined that, under the 
circumstances, the trades in question were not wash sales, but that the unusual trading patterns 
should have prompted greater scrutiny by the FCM. Id. at *4. Ultimately, Japanese criminal 
authorities convicted the principals of one of the Japanese firms in question for defrauding 
customers. Id. at *2.  
 334. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders FCStone LLC to Pay a $1.5 Million Civil 
Monetary Penalty for Failing to Have Risk Controls, in Violation of Supervision Obligations 
(May 29, 2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6594-13. 
 335. Id.  
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the market at large.336  
Regarding the Regulation 166.3 violation in the FCStone case, the 
CFTC started from the basic proposition that FCMs, such as FCStone, 
are required to diligently supervise all of the activities of their officers, 
employees, and agents in connection with their business as FCMs.337 
From there, the CFTC noted that the employee activities in question 
included managing the risks associated with customer accounts, such as 
credit risk, concentration risk, and any other risk that could “either 
substantially contribute[] to, or could reasonably . . . threaten, material[] 
losses of firm assets.”338 “Moreover, when supervisory failures exposed 
customers to potential risk of loss the [CFTC] has found that such 
conduct violates Regulation 166.3.”339 The CFTC then determined that 
a registrant’s failure to supervise its officers’, employees’, and agents’ 
activities related to monitoring customers’ credit risk and concentration 
risk constituted a violation of Regulation 166.3. The CFTC stated that 
FCStone’s “supervisory failures violated Regulation 166.3 because they 
either contributed substantially to, or could reasonably have been 
expected to result in material losses of FCStone LLC’s assets.”340  
As support for the proposition that FCStone’s actions (or lack 
thereof) in managing its business as a registrant in connection with 
credit and concentration risks constituted supervisory failures that 
violated Regulation 166.3, the CFTC cited, in addition to judicial and 
CFTC decisions (many of them consent orders), a hodgepodge of 
sources. These sources included three previous Federal Register 
rulemaking releases (two of which were from the 1980s) referring, inter 
alia, to the importance of FCM capital requirements.341 They also 
included a 2001 report by CFTC staff that mentioned the dangers to 
FCMs of “carr[ying] positions in thinly traded markets, or positions that 
represent a large portion of a particular product,”342 and several CFTC 
rules concerning financial controls and safeguards for FCMs.343  
                                                                                                                     
 336. Id.  
 337. In re FCStone LLC, No. 13-24, 2013 WL 2368539, at *5 (C.F.T.C. May 29, 2013).  
 338. Id. at *7. 
 339. Id. at *6 (citing In re Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, LP, No. 12-20, Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,141, 2012 WL 1377971, at *6 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 13, 2012) (instituting and 
imposing sanctions “in an administrative proceeding finding an FCM in violation of Regulation 
166.3 because it failed to investigate after receiving information suggesting that a Broker-Dealer 
might be providing its customers with an inaccurate description of the account held at the 
FCM”)).  
 340. Id. at *7. 
 341. Id. at *6–7 & nn.14–16.  
 342. Id. at *4.  
 343. Id. at *1, *6–7. The Consent Order did not allege any independent substantive 
violations of the CEA or CFTC Regulations, other than Regulation 166.3, although the facts 
indicated that the problematic account had violated position limits and, at times, did not meet 
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Notably, FCStone settled with the CFTC rather than litigating, so it 
is unclear if a federal court would grant the CFTC such flexibility to 
pull from disparate sources in creating a Regulation 166.3 duty to 
diligently supervise employees for, among other things, adequately 
monitoring customers’ concentration risk.344 The CFTC was correct in 
stating that “[m]anaging the risk associated with customer accounts is 
an elemental activity that relates to any FCM carrying customer 
accounts.”345 However, a defendant litigating a Regulation 166.3 case 
could contend that the particular facts at issue did not translate into a 
failure-to-supervise violation, but merely a series of unfortunate 
occurrences that happened despite the registrant’s reasonable 
supervisory diligence. 
The FCStone consent order suggests that when something goes 
badly for a registrant, such as an incident involving a rogue trader or a 
near bankruptcy due to severe losses in carried accounts, the CFTC 
likely will be able to find sufficient rope with which to hang the 
registrant on a Regulation 166.3 violation.346 This noose could come 
from internal compliance policies that were not followed, exchange 
rules that were violated, or even prior CFTC staff reports warning of the 
very same risk(s) that caused the instant troubles.347 Of course, if one 
views a Regulation 166.3 violation as applying a reasonably prudent 
registrant standard, the CFTC’s position in the FCStone case is hardly 
unusual: A reasonably prudent CFTC registrant—an FCM—would have 
been aware of, inter alia, the 2001 CFTC staff report and would have 
known that it needed to have systems in place to monitor customer 
accounts for credit and concentration risk.348  
Given this flexible approach, the CFTC probably could use 
Regulation 166.3—and its reasonably prudent registrant standard—in a 
similar fashion to combat circumstances where a registrant failed to 
supervise its employees tasked with overseeing an ATS that engaged in 
manipulative or disruptive trading practices. Indeed, because today’s 
trading environments are highly-automated and computerized, a 
                                                                                                                     
exchange margin calls. Id. at *3–4. Additionally, FCStone’s adjusted net capital fell below the 
costs charged to it resulting from the account for thirty-four days in 2009. Id. at *5.  
 344. Id. at *7–8 (“With regard to concentration risk, FCStone LLC completely failed to 
create and implement any meaningful risk control policy or tool that would identify and control 
customers’ concentration risk.”). 
 345. Id. at *6.  
 346. For example, in almost any case involving an FCM that suffers severe losses that 
threaten the stability of the FCM—and, consequently, the funds in customer accounts—
something probably went wrong internally sufficient for the CFTC to file a supervisory failure 
claim by invoking the maxim that “when supervisory failures expose[] customers to potential 
risk of loss the [CFTC] has found that such conduct violates Regulation 166.3.” Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. See id. at *7.  
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reasonably prudent registrant constructing a supervisory system to 
monitor its own ATS-initiated trading or customer accounts using ATSs 
likely would make sure that its supervisory system had automated alerts 
for suspicious trading patterns. Other automated internal controls to 
enable the registrant to rapidly respond to potentially improper activities 
would also be appropriate. 
To bring a Regulation 166.3 action in circumstances involving a 
registrant’s failure to diligently supervise employee oversight of ATS-
controlled trading, the CFTC could pull from various sources: CFTC 
Regulations, staff advisories, interpretive guidance, Federal Register 
rule releases, and the like. The CFTC could emphasize the need for 
registrants to diligently supervise those employees charged with 
monitoring trading accounts and other aspects of the registrant’s 
business and operations, automated or otherwise. The CFTC could also 
note the importance of the price discovery function of markets and, 
correspondingly, the need to keep markets free from manipulative and 
disruptive trading practices. Diligent supervision of employees who 
oversee and operate ATSs is needed to keep the markets as free from 
manipulative and disruptive trading practices as possible.  
A claim of failure to diligently supervise would derive its basis from 
the fact that registrants must diligently supervise their employees to 
prevent them: (1) from engaging in trading practices that distort the 
prices of futures and other derivatives and, importantly, (2) from failing 
to monitor customer accounts, electronic trading platforms or systems, 
and, likewise, ATSs, for such behavior. Notably, trading practices that 
distort prices of derivatives impair the price discovery function of 
markets, regardless of whether humans or ATSs perform those 
disruptive or manipulative trading practices. A Regulation 166.3 
supervisory failure is a separate, primary violation that does not require 
proof of any other underlying misconduct that violates the CEA or 
CFTC Regulations.349 Therefore, if an FCM failed to monitor a 
customer account that engaged in suspicious ATS-controlled trading 
activity that resembled wash trading or banging the close, the CFTC 
could allege (if the facts permitted) that the FCM failed to diligently 
supervise its employees who were responsible for monitoring customer 
accounts for such behavior. The commission could do this regardless of 
whether the CFTC could prove an underlying wash trading or banging 
                                                                                                                     
 349. In re The Linn Group, Inc., No. 13-21, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,598, 2013 
WL 1703082, at *5 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 18, 2013); In re GNP Commodities Inc., No. 89-1, Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,360, 1992 WL 201158, at *17 n.11 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 11, 1992); In re 
Paragon Futures Ass’n, No. 88-18, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,266, 1992 WL 74261, at 
*13 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 1, 1992); see also In re First Nat’l Trading Corp., Nos. 90-28, 92-17, [1994–
1996 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,413, 1995 WL 18009834, at *5 
(C.F.T.C. May 31, 1995). 
68
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/5
2015] IMPROPER TRADING PRACTICES BY ALGORITHMIC ROBOTS 289 
 
the close claim against the actual perpetrator.350 
In cases alleging Regulation 166.3 supervisory violations, the CFTC 
has not had to prove the mental state for the cause of action related to 
the underlying improper conduct—price manipulation or wash sales—
that the registrant’s employees or customers allegedly were able to 
commit due to the supervisory failures. Instead, for a Regulation 166.3 
claim, the CFTC must prove that the registrant either (1) did not have an 
adequate supervisory system or (2) failed to diligently supervise its 
officers, employees, or agents in connection with its business as a 
registrant. Depending on the facts, an FCM that allowed its customers to 
use their accounts with the FCM as vehicles for trading activities that 
“had the appearance of” wash trades, banging the close or other 
disruptive trading practices could very well fail one or both of the 
prongs of the Regulation 166.3 test.351 Of course, if the registrant had 
been reasonably diligent, they might avoid this result. Diligence could 
be evidenced by, inter alia, the fact that the registrant had noticed the 
suspicious trading, diligently investigated its circumstances and 
determined that the trading in question had not distorted or manipulated 
prices or otherwise disrupted the market.  
That said, the majority of Regulation 166.3 decisions involve 
circumstances where there have been underlying violations of the CEA 
or CFTC Regulations. It may, therefore, be challenging for the CFTC to 
litigate a Regulation 166.3 cause of action where the underlying 
behavior did not violate the CEA or CFTC Regulations, either because 
the defendant did not have the requisite scienter or for some other 
reason. The CFTC arguably could invoke Regulation 166.3 in situations 
where a registrant failed to diligently supervise its employees who were 
responsible for programming and operating its ATS. But where the ATS 
engaged in trading practices that distorted futures contract prices, 
disrupted the markets, or otherwise mimicked improper activities (such 
as banging the close), more explicit authority for such enforcement 
actions could be beneficial to remove any uncertainty as to the CFTC’s 
ability to require registrants that use ATSs to diligently supervise the 
employees in charge of the ATSs’ activities. 
Accordingly, the CFTC could supplement the existing broad-based 
supervisory provision in Regulation 166.3 by promulgating a rule (or 
                                                                                                                     
 350. In re LFG, L.L.C., No. 01-19, 2001 WL 940235, at *3 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 20, 2001) 
(stating, in a consent order, that an FCM had violated Regulation 166.3 where it had no written 
procedures relating to monitoring omnibus accounts and where a customer had entered 
offsetting spread orders that “had the appearance of wash sales”). The CFTC further stated that 
“[i]n this case, the trades do not appear to be wash sales, but the orders were sufficiently unusual 
that LFG should have sought clarification from the non-clearing FCM or its 
customers . . . regarding the intent or rationale behind the trades.” Id. at *4.  
 351. See id. at *3. 
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rules) explicitly stating that every registrant that uses an ATS must have 
certain policies and procedures in place. Those policies would ensure 
that employees charged with programming and operating ATSs did not 
engage in trading practices that, absent any mental state requirement, 
would violate the CEA or CFTC Regulations if engaged in by a 
human—trading practices that mimic wash trading or banging the close, 
for instance. The rule would make clear that registrants would risk 
liability for failure-to-supervise violations if ineffective oversight 
enabled ATS-directed trading to manipulate or distort the prices of 
derivative contracts, to disrupt the market, or to mimic illegal trading 
practices, such as banging the close, wash trading, and spoofing.352  
But given that the CFTC, in drafting Regulation 166.3, intentionally 
opted for a flexible and open-ended supervisory rule that did not list 
specific requirements, the CFTC might not want to change that 
approach by promulgating a rule listing specific ATS-related 
supervisory requirements. Therefore, alternatively, the CFTC could 
direct NFA to craft compliance rules and interpretive notices explaining 
with greater specificity how the supervisory requirements apply to 
circumstances in which a registrant’s trading is directed by an ATS. The 
CFTC supervises NFA, which, as the industry’s SRO, regularly 
promulgates interpretive notices that further explain its compliance 
rules. As discussed earlier, NFA previously has issued interpretive 
notices concerning the supervision of forex electronic trading 
platforms353 so implementing compliance rules and accompanying 
guidance concerning computer-directed trading in the futures and 
derivative markets would be a natural role for NFA to fulfill. New NFA 
compliance rules and guidance concerning ATS-directed trading could 
establish baseline industry standards related to monitoring ATS-directed 
trading for activities that resemble price manipulation, wash trading, 
banging the close, spoofing, or other improper trading practices.  
In any event, as mentioned, existing Regulation 166.3 arguably 
implicitly requires registrants that use ATSs to have written policies and 
procedures designed to prevent their employees from failing to monitor 
and control ATSs. This monitoring and control is intended to prevent, 
inter alia, behavior that resembles wash trading, banging the close, and 
other manipulative devices as those terms are understood in the CEA 
and CFTC Regulations, but without regard to the mental state 
requirements of those causes of action because Regulation 166.3 
appears to apply a reasonableness standard. Similarly, Regulation 166.3 
arguably implicitly requires FCMs to have written policies and 
procedures outlining how they will supervise employees tasked with 
                                                                                                                     
 352. Of course, Congress also could amend the CEA to make this requirement a part of 
federal law.  
 353. E.g., 9060—Compliance Rule 2-36(e), supra note 324.  
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monitoring customer accounts involving ATS-directed trading. This 
monitoring is also for spoofing, banging the close, wash trading, and 
other manipulative and disruptive practices, and the duty to monitor 
customer accounts for suspicious trading is likewise a duty that exists 
without regard to the mental state of the customers or the customers’ 
ATS programmers and operators.  
One limitation of Regulation 166.3, however, is that its broad and 
open-ended nature may make it too amorphous to serve as the source of 
specific, uniform reasonable standards for the use of ATSs by CFTC 
registrants. Therefore, to the extent that the CFTC desires to provide 
market participants with a concrete list of required practices in 
connection with the use of ATSs by registrants,354 Regulation 166.3, by 
itself, is unhelpful. 
Another limitation of Regulation 166.3 is that it only applies to 
registrants—persons required to register—meaning that Regulation 
166.3 would not be able to combat ATS-controlled disruptive or 
harmful trading activities by non-registrants, except indirectly through 
the non-registrants’ FCMs or IBs. Additionally, although the focus of 
this Article has been on CFTC enforcement provisions and not private 
rights of action, courts have held that there is no private right of action 
for violations of Regulation 166.3.355 As a result, Regulation 166.3 
                                                                                                                     
 354. See Peter Marrin, Industry Should Shape Algorithm Rules, Panel Tells CFTC, SNL 
ENERGY GAS UTIL. WK. (Mar. 7, 2011) (subscription required), stating: 
Faced with the “virtually impossible” task of enforcing rules on how traders use 
algorithms before they complete transactions, the [CFTC] . . . should instead 
require trading firms to implement standard but internal checks on algorithmic 
and high-frequency trading, including quantity limits, intraday position limits, 
price collars and a “kill button.” 
“By raising the standards and establishing best practices, we can ensure that all 
participants are treated equally and ensure that the markets are protected from 
untested algorithms that could undermine well functioning markets,” said 
CFTC Commissioner Scott O’Malia, who leads the agency’s Technology 
Advisory Committee. 
Id. The argument in support of a broadly-worded and open-ended supervisory requirement 
similar to the existing Regulation 166.3 is that it is more flexible and adaptable to changing 
times, circumstances, and technologies than a prescriptive list of explicit requirements or 
prohibitions. Additionally, many areas of the law have a general prohibition against negligent 
behavior that, with time, through the development of decisional law, has served to establish 
standards of reasonable (and unreasonable) conduct. Alternatively, one could establish a regime 
that combined the two: an open-ended requirement coupled with a non-exhaustive list of 
specific requirements or prohibitions.  
 355. See Khalid Bin Alwaleed Found v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 709 F. Supp. 815, 818 (N.D. 
Ill. 1989); Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc, 618 F. Supp. 1069, 1072–73 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985); see also Khalid Bin Talal Bin Abdul Azaiz Al Seoud v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 720 F. 
Supp. 671, 676 (N.D. Ill. 1989).  
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would provide no recourse for persons harmed by ATS-initiated 
manipulative or disruptive trading practices caused by inadequately 
supervised employees of registrants who were responsible for 
monitoring ATSs for such behavior.356 Further, some might find it 
unsatisfying to charge a person who engaged in manipulative and 
disruptive market conduct with a supervisory violation, as opposed to a 
more “serious” civil enforcement cause of action, such as price 
manipulation or wash sales.  
If a failure-to-supervise claim is viewed in such a manner, then the 
CFTC could consider promulgating rules that would enable it to pursue 
other causes of action without having to prove the mental state of the 
defendant. The commission could establish claims grounded in price 
manipulation or noncompetitive trading for example, perhaps using a 
negligence/reasonableness standard, in circumstances where an ATS 
controlled and directed the trading activities in question.357 In particular, 
such an approach might be warranted if the CFTC determines that a 
specific trading practice disrupts markets or distorts prices even if done 
unintentionally. If the CFTC requires persons who use ATSs to register 
in a manner that identifies themselves as registrants who use ATSs—for 
example, by creating sub-categories of existing registrant types, such as 
“ATS floor traders” or “ATS CTAs”358—the CFTC could promulgate a 
regulation imposing negligence liability for specific improper trading 
practices by “ATS registrants.” Such a move would not be entirely 
                                                                                                                     
 356. Congress could, of course, amend the CEA to allow for private causes of action 
against registrants that failed to diligently supervise employees who were tasked with 
monitoring ATSs for manipulative or disruptive trading practices where improper trading 
practices by ATSs harmed other market participants.  
 357. Again, aside from a CFTC-promulgated rule, Congress could certainly amend the 
CEA to state that, in circumstances involving ATS-directed trading, the CFTC could sufficiently 
state a claim alleging improper trading practices without having to prove that the registrant (or 
the registrant’s employees who programmed or operated the ATS) acted with a culpable mental 
state beyond negligence—i.e., reasonableness.  
 358. The CFTC delegates administration of the registration of swap dealers and market 
intermediaries to NFA. See, e.g., Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 
Fed. Reg. 2613, 2619 (Jan. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 23 & 170); 
Performance of Registration Functions by National Futures Association with Respect to Swap 
Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. 2708, 2709 (Jan. 19, 2012). Therefore, 
alternatively, the CFTC could direct NFA to implement a registration system using sub-
categories for registrants that use ATSs. Such an approach would not be entirely without NFA 
precedent or analog. For example, as a result of the Dodd–Frank Act’s granting the CFTC 
authority to regulate swaps, NFA, as the derivatives industry SRO, subsequently created sub-
categories for swap registrants like swap FCMs and APs—membership status “as an NFA 
Member swaps designated firm.” See Registration Information for Swap FCMs, IBs, CPOs and 
CTAs, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-swaps-information/regulatory-
info-swap-intermediaries/registration-info.HTML (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). Finally, in the 
event that a CFTC-promulgated rule or NFA-administered registration program were viewed as 
insufficient, Congress could amend the CEA to explicitly include ATS-registrant sub-categories.  
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without analog in futures and derivatives regulation, given that, as was 
mentioned earlier, § 4o(1)(B) of the CEA imposes liability for fraud, 
under a negligence standard, without requiring scienter, but only applies 
to CTAs, CPOs, and their APs.359 In the event that a CFTC rule is 
viewed as insufficient, Congress could amend the CEA to impose 
liability under a negligence standard for disruptive or manipulative 
trading practices perpetrated by ATS-directed trading. 
CONCLUSION 
While bounty hunter Deckard was searching for six escaped 
androids on a planet full of humans, the CFTC is searching for improper 
trading practices in a vast ocean of superfast electronic bids and offers. 
Deckard’s enemies were androids that were almost indistinguishable 
from humans except for their lack of empathy. For the purposes of this 
Article, the CFTC’s opponents are self-learning ATSs that act 
independently from their human masters and, in some cases, place 
thousands of trades per second. For both Deckard and the CFTC, having 
the proper tools for the job is essential to meeting the challenge 
presented by technological advances in their respective fields. Many 
enforcement causes of action require proof of at least recklessness, a 
fact that could complicate efforts by the CFTC to prohibit manipulative 
and disruptive trading practices by ATSs. Fortunately, Regulation 166.3 
and its reasonably prudent registrant standard has the potential to be an 
effective tool in combatting improper trading practices by ATSs. At the 
very least, Regulation 166.3 could be used to ensure that registrants 
develop and implement adequate supervisory systems to monitor ATS-
directed trading for potentially disruptive and manipulative trading 
practices.  
                                                                                                                     
 359. See Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4o(1)(B), 42 Stat. 998 (1922) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) (2012)); Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 233 F.3d 981, 
993–94 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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